Graduate 143: BT 15: Sec. 09

Part I. The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being
Division 1. Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein
Chapter 1. Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein
Section 09. The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein

It is necessary at the very outset to make clear how the investigation of the being of Dasein differs from the investigation of the being of any other kind of entity. It is necessary to make clear how the being of Dasein differs from that of other kinds of entities. Heidegger first gestures at this point by saying, "The Being of any such entity [as we ourselves] is in each case mine." (BT 67/41) This is not meant to point to any kind of solipsism but rather points to the fact that Dasein is different from other entities because it has a relationship to its own being that other kinds of entities do not have toward their own being. "These entities [i.e. Dasein], in their Being, comport themselves towards their Being. ... Being is that which is an issue for every such entity." (BT 67/41-42)

Here, as noted at the end of section 07, we face the challenge of a language inadequate to strictly capture the relationships that Heidegger is trying to describe, but we shall do our best to make headway. He says that two consequences follow from this initial characterization of Dasein's being. The first consequence is that the being of Dasein cannot be construed in terms of existentia as that has traditionally been understood. "The 'essence' ["Wesen"] of this entity lies in its "to be" [Zu-sein]. Its Being-what-it-is [Was-sein] (essentia) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia). But here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the Being of this entity as "existence" [Existenz], this term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the traditional term "existentia"." (BT 67/42) The kind of being or existence that has traditionally been ascribed to entities in the world is the kind of being that Heidegger refers to as being-present-at-hand. But whether or not this kind of being belongs to Dasein (and I cannot claim to know at this point whether Heidegger thinks it does or can), it is the case that it is not the kind of being that makes Dasein distinctive. So, hereafter, Heidegger accepts the convention of using the expression being-present-at-hand to stand for the kind of being that has traditionally been referred to by the expression "existentia", and using the expression "existence", to designate the being that belongs solely to Dasein.

"The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence." Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that." (BT 67/42) Here, again, we see Heidegger emphasizing the place of 'possibilities' and differentiating these from 'properties' as we often speak of them--as things that some entity possesses. "So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being." (BT 67/42) (It may be that we are to draw a close connection between Dasein's being and Dasein's way of being. I cannot say at this point.)

The second consequence of this preliminary characterization of the being of Dasein is this: "That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine." (BT 67/42) Heidegger emphasizes that Dasein is not just one member of a larger genus of entities that are present-at-hand. He says, "To entities such as these [i.e. present-at-hand], their Being is 'a matter of indifference'; or more precisely, they 'are' such that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite." (BT 68/42) This is related to the idea that being is an issue for Dasein. Entities that are merely present-at-hand are not just indifferent to the question of being, in contrast to Dasein, which are concerned about that question; rather, entities that are merely present-at-hand are not the kinds of things that could be either concerned or indifferent about the question in the first place. This is the great contrast.

Heidegger continues: "Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decisions as to the way in which it is in each case mine [je meines]. That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-at-hand would." (BT 68/42) One of the peculiar things to note about Heidegger's way of speaking of Dasein is the tendencies to objectify it--to speak of that Dasein that is mine as if it were separate from me. We must be careful here, for it may well be that Heidegger this objectification is not intended to reflect the actual relationship that I bear to 'my' Dasein, but is just a function of the language. If we sense a recursiveness or circularity in the relationship between an Dasein and its being, that is probably right. We should look for ways to make this relationship clear.

In speaking of possibilities, Heidegger says that Dasein is, in each case, essentially its own possibilities. He speaks of it as being able either to 'win' itself or 'lose' itself. He goes on: "But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic--that is, something of its own--can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity--when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment." (BT 68/43)

The idea of authenticity has been raised before, though it has not been (and remains to be) made really clear what Heidegger means by that. However, one important clue does come to us from thinking about the original German. 'Authentic' or 'real' are the familiar English translations of the German 'eigentlich' which is etymologically related to the word 'eigen' which means 'own'. So, for Heidegger, included in the idea of eigentlich is the idea of owning or ownership. For this reason, some have preferred to translate 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity' as 'own-li-ness' and 'un-own-li-ness'. Translating it in this way makes clearer Heidegger's comments in the above quotation like, "something of its own," "chosen terminologically in a strict sense," "Dasein is characterized by mineness." I will plan, in general, on continuing to follow the Macquarrie and Robinson translation, but may insert comments about the alternative translation where I think it is appropriate or helpful.

Part of what will need to be explicated is the relationship between being, possibilities, and authenticity (own-li-ness). When Heidegger says that Dasein comports itself towards its being as its ownmost possibility, is that descriptive of Dasein under the own-ly mode of being, or under the un-own-ly mode of being or in general? There seems to be something essential to Dasein that is not lost or altered just by virtue of its being own-ly or un-own-ly. We shall have to watch out for this.

Heidegger continues: "The two characteristics of Dasein which we have sketched--the priority of 'existentia' over essentia, and the fact that Dasein is in each case mine [die Jemeinigkeit]--have already indicated that in the analytic of this entity we are facing a peculiar phenomenal domain." (BT 68/47) [1] Dasein does not have the kind of being which belongs to something merely present-at-hand, and so it cannot be approached in that way for the purposes of theoretical (or thematical) explication. He goes on: "The right way of presenting it is so far from self-evident that to determine what form it shall take is itself an essential part of the ontological analytic of this entity. Only by presenting this entity in the right way can we have any understanding of its Being. No matter how provisional our analysis may be, it always requires the assurance that we have started correctly." (BT 69/43)

On this point, Heidegger continues: "In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands. This is the formal meaning of Dasein's existential constitution. But this tells us that if we are to Interpret this entity ontologically, the problematic of its Being must be developed from the existentiality of its existence." (BT 69/43) What it means for Dasein to be a possibility is still unclear. (Again, I think it has to do with the idea of there being different ways of being.) But Heidegger makes clear that Dasein should not be understood in terms of any particular possible idea of existence. Instead, Heidegger says, Dasein should be Interpreted and uncovered in the "undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part. This undifferentiated character of Dasein's everydayness is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity. Out of this kind of Being--and back into it again--is all existing, such as it is. We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein "averageness" [Durchschnittlichkeit]." (BT 69/43) It may strike as strange that Heidegger would say that the undifferentiated character of Dasein's ordinary way of being has a positive phenomenal content. In order to understand what he means by 'undifferentiated', it seems, we need to have a certain context in mind. Just as he earlier drew a distinction between two senses of 'indifferent', so we must watch out for multiple senses of 'undifferentiated'.

His characterization of this 'undifferentiated' character of Dasein's everydayness and averageness will have important implications for what follows. The first thing to note about it is that it's very familiarity has stood as a hindrance to its being taken seriously and carefully considered. Heidegger says, "And because this average everydayness makes up what is ontically proximal for this entity, it has again and again been passed over in explicating Dasein. That which is ontically closest and well known, is ontologically the farthest and not known at all; and its ontological signification is constantly overlooked." (BT 69/43) In a previous entry, I used the analogy of one's relationship to one's own face which is, in one sense, closest to me in that it is my own face, and yet there may be an important sense in which I know my own face (and am able to know my face) less well than I can the face of a person standing in front of me. Similarly, Heidegger suggests that our average everyday way of being is so familiar that we often overlook it and consequently fail to recognize its significance for understanding our own ontology. In looking to the ontological task, then, Heidegger says, "not only must this entity not be missed in that kind of Being in which it is phenomenally closest, but it must be made accessible by a positive characterization." (BT 69/44)

In the next paragraph, he writes: "Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies a priori. And here too Dasein's Being is an issue for it in definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof." [2] (BT 69/44) Here we see that existentiality must be differentiated from either own-li-ness or un-own-li-ness. Existentiality, as such, is identical to neither of these stances. More will have to be said later about the relationship of un-own-li-ness to 'fleeing' and 'forgetfulness'.

"But the explication of Dasein in its average everydayness does not give us just average structures in the sense of a hazy indefiniteness. Anything which, taken ontically, is in an average way, can be very well grasped ontologically in pregnant structures which may be structurally indistinguishable from certain ontological characteristics [Bestimmungen] of an authentic Being of Dasein." (BT 70/44) Here Heidegger is pointing to the way in which consideration of Dasein's average everydayness can serve as a guide to understanding the being of Dasein as such. Look at the average structures does not just give us information about those structures. Dasein, which can be viewed ontically and as existing in an average way, can be considered in such a way as to illuminate those structures that underly both the un-own-ly and the own-ly (authentic) being of Dasein.

"All explicata to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by considering Dasein's existence-structure. Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them "existentialia". These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call "categories"--characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein." (BT 70/44) Here is a vocabulary point that we must keep in mind: existentialia are the characters of Dasein's being defined in terms of existentiality. It is possible to define the characters of a certain entity's being in some other terms; for instance, in terms of categories. But to do so in Dasein's case would be to approach Dasein as just another entity present-at-hand, and though one might come away with true information, one would not have identified what is distinctive of Dasein and sets it apart from all other kinds of entities. It is crucial to remember that our approach to the investigation of the being of Dasein follows from considering its "existence-structure."

Categories and existentialia must be kept distinct. Heidegger says that the ancients took the entities that they encountered in the world as the basic examples for the interpretation of being. NOEIN [Gk. perceive] was accepted as the way of access to those things. But Heidegger points out, "[T]he Being of these entities must be something which can be grasped in a distinctive kind of LEGEIN (letting something be seen), so that this Being becomes intelligible in advance as that which it is--and as that which it is already in every entity." (BT 70/44) For Heidegger there must be some way of access to entities in the world that is prior to perception or NOEIN. Previous discussion of the being of entities have always involved categorization [from the Gk. kategopeisthai and kategopiai]. The categories and categorizations that result, Heidegger says, "include the various ways in which the nature of those entities which can be addressed and discussed in a LOGOS may be determined a priori." (BT 70-71/ 45) (It is not clear to me whether Heidegger accepts that such limits can be set a priori. If he does accept that, at least he is not committed to the idea that those categories are exhaustive or definitive, for there is still the other category of existentialia to consider.)

"Existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of Being. The entities which correspond to them require different kinds of primary interrogation respectively: any entity is either a "who" (existence) or a "what" (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense). The connection between these two modes of the characters of Being cannot be handled until the horizon for the question of Being has been clarified." (BT 71/45)

Heidegger concludes this section by reminding us that in the course of laying out this existential analytic of Dasein, we move toward another goal that is as pressing as that of the question of being itself. That other task is the "laying bare that a priori basis which must be visible before the question of 'what man is' can be discussed philosophically." (BT 71/45) Before Dasein can be considered philosophically, psychologically, anthropologically, or biologically, it must be understood in terms of its most fundamental being. Everything else will follow from that. The theme of the present analytic may be grasped more clearly by differentiating it from all these other investigations. And this contrast also serves to bring into sharper relief the necessity of this investigation.

--

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Regarding the priority of 'existentia' over essentia: by this, to remind, Heidegger is emphasizing that the being-what-it-is-ness of Dasein can only be understood by grasping the being of Dasein, or its existence (or, perhaps, its way of existing). In some sense, perhaps, what Dasein is is supposed to be grounded in how Dasein is. Heidegger may be pushing the idea that Dasein essentially is a certain kind of thing with different ways of being, and he wants to emphasize that Dasein's different ways of being make it what it is. Or, put another way, Dasein cannot be understood apart from the availability of real possibilities to it.

[2] Macquarrie and Robinson indicate that for further discussion of this point, one should look at section 40.

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 142: BT 14: Introduction to Part One, Division One

Part I. The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being
Division 1. Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein

[Introduction]

"In the question about the meaning of Being, what is primarily interrogated is those entities which have the character of Dasein. The preparatory existential analytic of Dasein must, in accordance with its peculiar character, be expounded in outline, and distinguished from other kinds of investigation which seem to run parallel (Chapter 1.) Adhering to the procedure which we have fixed upon for starting our investigation, we must lay bare a fundamental structure in Dasein: Being-in-the-world (Chapter 2). In the interpretation of Dasein, this structure is something 'a priori'; it is not pieced together, but is primordially and constantly a whole. It affords us, however, various ways of looking at the items which are constitutive for it. The whole of this structure always comes first; but if we keep this constantly in view, these items, as phenomena, will be made to stand out. And thus we shall have as objects for analysis: the world in its worldhood (Chapter 3), Being-in-the-world as Being-with and Being-one's-Self (Chapter 4), and Being-in as such (Chapter 5). By analysis of this fundamental structure, the Being of Dasein can be indicated provisionally. Its existential meaning is care (Chapter 6)." (BT 65/40)

We must continue to keep before our minds just why Dasein is the best starting point for this investigation into the meaning or sense of being as such. Also, of note, is the fundamentally different orientation of his approach to the structure of Dasein. Human beings are to be understood fundamentally in terms of their being-in-the-world. Interestingly, Heidegger refers to this structure as something a priori and as that which "affords us... various ways of looking at the items which are constitutive for it." I am, personally, especially interested in this point--about how this structure causes or allows things (phenomena) in the world to "stand out". Finally, Heidegger will identify the structure of the being of Dasein as care, and that will serve as the launching point into Division Two.

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 141: BT 13: Sec. 08

Introduction. Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being
Chapter 2. The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being. Method and Design of Our Investigation
Section 08. Design of the Treatise

Well, I finally made it through to the end of the Introduction--that is to page 63 of the 488-page English translation of Being and Time. 12% of the way there. (And then on to The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.)

In this brief section, Heidegger gives the outline of his project. Interestingly this massive tome only covers the first two-thirds of the first-half of the entire project that he envisioned.

He writes, "The question of the meaning of Being is the most universal and the emptiest of questions, but at the same time it is possible to individualize it very precisely for any particular Dasein. If we are to arrive at the basic concept of 'Being' and to outline the ontological conceptions which it requires and the variations which it necessarily undergoes, we need a clue which is concrete. We shall proceed towards the concept of Being by way of an Interpretation of a certain special entity, Dasein, in which we shall arrive at the horizon for the understanding of Being and for the possibility of interpreting it; the universality of the concept of Being is not belied by the relatively 'special' character of our investigation. But this very entity, Dasein, is in itself 'historical', so that its ownmost ontological elucidation necessarily becomes an 'historiological' Interpretation." (BT 63/39)

The first part of the treatise (as I said, incomplete) comprises the Interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being. The second part (never published) was supposed lay out a phenomenological "destruction of the history of ontology" that focused on Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle.

The two divisions of part one that were published cover (1) the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein and (2) Dasein and temporality.

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 140: BT 12: Sec. 07, Part 4

Introduction. Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being
Chapter 2. The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being. Method and Design of Our Investigation
Section 07. The Phenomenological Method of Investigation

C. The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology

In drawing together the preceding "Interpretations" of 'phenomenon' and 'logos,' Heidegger is struck by the "inner relationship between the things meant by these terms." (BT 58/34) He concludes: "Thus, "phenomenology" means APOPHAINESTHAI TA PHAINOMENA--to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning of that branch of research which calls itself "phenomenology". But here we are expressing nothing else than the maxim formulated above: 'To the things themselves!'" (BT 58/34) [1]

[It would be good to make more explicit the 'inner relationship' through looking at LOGOS and PHAINOMENON. Promissory.]

From this definition, we can see that "phenomenology," on Heidegger's interpretation, does not designate that object of study in the way that "theology" does. "The word merely informs us of the "how" with which what is to be treated in this science gets exhibited and handled. To have a science 'of' phenomena means to grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly." (BT 59/35) Caught up in this concept is an implicit prohibition against characterizing anything without such a demonstration.

One may wonder, at this point, just what Heidegger has in mind when speaking of 'descriptions' and 'demonstrations'. That is a question we should keep in mind as we continue to read. Heidegger says: "The character of this description itself, the specific meaning of the LOGOS, can be established first of all in terms of the 'thinghood' ["Sachheit"] of what is to be 'described'--that is to say, of what is to be given scientific definiteness as we encounter it phenomenally. The signification of "phenomenon", as conceived both formally and in the ordinary manner, is such that any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself, may be called "phenomenology" with formal justification." (BT 59/35) What Heidegger is doing here is clarifying the pertinent (for his investigation) sense in which something can be encountered phenomenally. You may recall from earlier sections (See Graduate 136.) that Heidegger recognizes several different conceptions of phenomenon. Any act of exhibiting an entity as it shows itself in itself may be dubbed "phenomenology" in the formal (ordinary) signification of that word. But there is also the phenomenological conception and that is what Heidegger is mainly concerned with. So he asks: "Now what must be taken into account if the formal conception of phenomenon is to be deformalized into the phenomenological one, and how is this latter to be distinguished from the ordinary conception?" (BT 59/35)

Heidegger believes that there is a close relationship between the formal (ordinary) conception and the phenomenological conception of phenomenon. (See Graduate 136.) The latter is the ground of the former. So it is always present whenever something is exhibited formally, but it also remains hidden. So Heidegger writes: "What is it that by its very essence is necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit something explicitly? Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground." (BT 59/35)

Here is the answer to that riddle: "Yet that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets covered up again, or which shows itself only 'in disguise', is not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities, as our previous observations have shown. This Being can be covered up so extensively that is becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or about its meaning. Thus that which demands that it become a phenomenon, and which demands this in a distinctive sense and in terms of its ownmost content as a thing, is what phenomenology has taken into its grasp thematically as its object." (BT 59/35)

We saw in the Introduction to section 07 (See Graduate 135.) that Heidegger thinks that phenomenology is the proper method for investigating the being of entities or the meaning [sense] of being in general. "The task of ontology," he writes, "is to explain Being itself and to make the Being of entities stand out in full relief." (BT 49/27) But if that is the task of ontology, then it must proceed by the phenomenological method, since "phenomenology" means "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself." (BT 58/34) But notice: what is the object of the phenomenological investigation? Heidegger says, "Thus that which demands that it (i.e. being) become a phenomenon, and which demands this in a distinctive sense and in terms of its ownmost content as a thing, is what phenomenology has taken into its grasp thematically as its object." (BT 59/35, Italics mine.) So the object of this phenomenology is not, directly, the being of entities. Rather, the object of the phenomenological investigation is Dasein, since Dasein is that which seeks to understand the being of entities and to do so in terms of its ownmost content as a thing. This point will be further clarified later. [2]

Heidegger continues: "Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible. In the phenomenological conception of "phenomenon" what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives. And this showing-itself is not just any showing-itself, nor is it some such thing as appearing. Least of all can the Being of entities ever be anything such that 'behind it' stands something else 'which does not appear'. (BT 60/35-36)

Here Heidegger begins to weave together themes and ideas from his earlier treatments of 'phenomenon' and 'logos'. It is in this context that one must be careful how one treats expressions like "appearing" and "uncovering" since those terms have been introduced in very particular contexts. In laying out all the various senses of 'phenomenon,' Heidegger notes a number of these senses in which the way that something shows itself is indicative or reflective of some underlying phenomenon that gives rise to that showing. His point here is that the kind of showing-itself that we are interested in--that is connected with the Being of entities--is not any one of these other kinds of showings. Rather, it is fundamental. There is nothing 'behind' them and just because they are 'for the most part not given, there is need for phenomenology.' (BT 60/36)

Heidegger goes on to say that "Covered-up-ness is the counter-concept to 'phenomenon'." (60/36) And he examines the various ways in which a phenomenon may be covered up. First, he says, a phenomenon can be covered up in the sense that it is still undiscovered. It is neither known or unknown. [3] Second, he says that a phenomenon can be buried over. It was at some point discovered but then "deteriorated" to the point of getting covered up again. In this sense, something may be covered over completely or else remain visible only as a semblance. This is the third way that something may be covered-up. "Yet so much semblance, so much 'Being'. This covering-up as 'disguising' is both the most frequent and the most dangerous, for here the possibilities of deceiving and misleading are especially stubborn." (BT 60/36) He goes on to suggest that those structures of being may remain clear in some sense when bound up in a system. (At this point, I am not sure whether this is a sincere or ironic statement. He could be mocking the idea of systems and saying that they actually contribute to the disguising, or he could be pointing out that within rigorous systems, phenomena may retain certain important features and characteristics.)

"The covering-up itself, whether in the sense of hiddenness, burying-over, or disguise, has in turn two possibilities. There are coverings-up which are accidental; there are also some which are necessary, grounded in what the thing discovered consists in [der Bestandart des Entdeckten]. Whenever a phenomenological concept is drawn from primordial sources, there is a possibility that it may degenerate if communicated in the form of an assertion. It gets understood in an empty way and is thus passed on, losing its indigenous character, and becoming a free-floating thesis. Even in the concrete work of phenomenology itself there lurks the possibility that what has been primordially 'within our grasp' may become hardened so that we can no longer grasp it. And the difficulty of this kind of research lies in making it self-critical in a positive sense." (BT 60-61/36) A comment about my parenthetical note in the preceding paragraph: It seems that Heidegger was sincere in pointing to the way in which the 'structures of being' may "claim their right" or "present themselves as something 'clear'" within a system. In this quotation he seems to be pointing to the way in which assertions divorced from their context become dangerous in the sense that they can more easily be misconstrued and lead to disguising.

Heidegger says, "The way in which Being and its structures are encountered in the mode of phenomenon is one which must first of all be wrested from the objects of phenomenology." (BT 61/37) (I confess that this claim is less clear to me. What is the 'mode of phenomenon' and isn't being, itself, the object of phenomenology... or does phenomenology describe a method. Hmm...) He says that the point of departure, the way of access, and the passage through the covering up must be carefully secured by proper method. Interestingly, he says, "The idea of grasping and explicating phenomena in a way which is 'original' and 'intuitive' ["originaren" und "intuitiven"] is directly opposed to the naivete of a haphazard, 'immediate', and unreflective 'beholding'. ["Schauen"]." (BT 61/37) So 'intuitive' is not the same is 'immediate' or 'unreflective'.

Now we are in a position to fix the significations or meanings of 'phenomenal' and 'phenomenological'. "That which is given and explicable in the way the phenomenon is encountered is called 'phenomenal'... Everything which belongs to the species of exhibiting and explicating and which goes to make up the way of conceiving demanded by this research, is called 'phenomenological'. (BT 61/37)

[*] Heidegger says that phenomena, understood phenomenologically, are never anything but what goes to make up being, and he says that being is in every case the being of some entity. So if our aim is that being should be 'laid bare' we must carefully select the entity that we will serve as an adequate point of departure for this investigation. "These entities must... show themselves with the kind of access which genuinely belongs to them. ... If our analysis is to be authentic, its aim is such that the prior task of assuring ourselves 'phenomenologically' of that entity which is to serve as our example, has already been prescribed as our point of departure." (BT 61/37) What is that point of departure? Dasein.

"With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities--ontology. In explaining the tasks of ontology we found it necessary that there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme that entity which is ontologico-ontically distinctive, Dasein, in order to confront the cardinal problem--the question of the meaning of Being in general. Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation. The LOGOS of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a ERMENEUEIN, through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structure of Being which Dasein itself posses are made known to Dasein's understanding of Being. The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting." It is also 'hermeneutic' in the sense that it is working out the conditions for the possibility of any ontological investigation (especially of entities other than Dasein). 'Hermeneutic' also has the sense of "an analytic of the existentiality of existence; and this is the sense which is philosophically primary. Then so far as this hermeneutic works out Dasein's historicality ontologically as the ontical condition for the possibility of historiology, it contains the roots of what can be called 'hermeneutic' only in a derivative sense: the methodology of those humane sciences which are historiological in character." (BT 61-62/37-38)

Heidegger reminds his readers that being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is not a class or genus of entities. Rather, it pertains to every entity and so is 'universal'. "Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being is a transcendens pure and simple. And the transcendence of Dasein's Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation. Every disclosure of Being as the transcendens is transcedental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritaas transcendentalis." (BT 62/38)

Ontology and phenomenology are not distinct philosophical disciplines or just one among many other philosophical disciplines. Rather, for Heidegger, philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, "and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns." (BT 62/38)

As he closes this section, Heidegger acknowledges his debt to Edmund Husserl in whose work phenomenology first emerged. He writes, "Our commentts on the preliminary conception of phenomenology have shown that what is essential in it does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical 'movement' ["Richtung"]. Higher than actuality stands possibility. We can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility." (BT 62-63/38) [4] He goes on to make a few 'disclaimers' about the difficulty of the material that will follow, pointing out that the task of grasping entities in their being is one for which "we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 'grammar'." (BT 63/39) He cites Plato's Parmenides and Aristotle's Metaphysics (bk. 7, ch. 4) as places where the analysis of being is taken up, but indicates that his own investigation will delve more deeply.

--

FOOTNOTES:

[1] "[T]he maxim formulated above" refers to BT 50/28. See Graduate 135.

[2] Indeed, this point is clarified at the bottom of BT 61/37. See the paragraph marked with [*].

[3] Macquarrie and Robinson offer the following footnote to the, admittedly cryptic line, "It is neither known no unknown": "'Uber seinen Bestand gibt es weder Kenntnis noch Unkenntnis.' The earllier editions have 'Erkenntnis' where the latter ones have 'Unkenntnis'. The word Bestand' always presents difficulties in Heidegger; here it permits either of two interpretations, which we have deliberately steered between: 'Whether there is any such thing, is neither known nor unknown', and 'What it comprises is something of which we have neither knowledge nor ignorance.'"

[4] What Heidegger is saying about 'possibility' here is not clear to me.

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 139: Bible Study and the Old Testament

Is Bible study important? The question may strike some ears as very odd. Any good Christian would surely agree that Bible study is an important part of the Christian life. And yet so many people seem to struggle with this fundamental discipline and, whatever they may say, the trend in American churches is that fewer and fewer people are seriously engaging the Word. I would not be even be surprised to learn that larger numbers of serious Christians--by which I mean to refer to (often young adult) Christians who are enthusiastic about restoring New Testament Christianity and reaching out into the community and serving and being a light--; I would not be surprised to learn that even these, apparently strong, Christians place very little stock in spending regular time in the word.

I often come back to this story in my own thinking about these issues (and I think I may have mentioned it in previous entries). I remember being a part of a conversation during my freshman year of college in which one student was expressing her dissatisfaction with Christian outreach ministries, especially to the homeless and poverty-stricken. She complained that Christians spend too much time focusing on things like prayer meetings and Christian education and, as a result, spent less time actually helping the poor than their non-Christian counter-parts. I could certainly appreciate her concern and her point of view, and yet, as I listened, I couldn't shake the conviction that the direction of her thinking was ultimately mistaken.

Questions along similar lines have come up for me, especially in relationship to the Bible study that I lead. One of the questions that continues to bother me and exercise my mind is this: How important is it to go really deep into the text? I realize that I'm teaching people who think at different levels. Some are really brainy and enjoy studying and working out puzzles and paradoxes and want to know all that's going on behind the scenes in any given Scripture passage. And there are other people who don't have the patience for exploring deep subtleties and aren't interested in a lot of the history and context and are much more 'practically,' this-worldly minded. And I struggle with the recognition that neither of these kinds of lives is inappropriate. People are different, and I worry that my preoccupation with the subtleties of the biblical texts has more to do with my own braininess than with what is actually necessary in order for these people to have a meaningful walk with God.

The simple fact is that we need non-brainy people. It was a non-brainy friend who called Triple-A and got a tow-truck for me when my car got a flat tire. If she had been a brainy person, like me, she probably would have been totally clueless as to what steps to take. There's nothing wrong with being non-brainy. So my question is, when it comes to Bible study, when I push people to go deep, is it because it's really important for them that they go deep, or is that just my brainy impulse (my attempt, perhaps, to make everyone like me) and should I not be pushing that angle so strongly?

Still more recently, this question came up in a conversation that I had with a friend about studying the Old Testament. In my Bible study, we just finished a series that took us through the entire book of Proverbs. It was a challenging series. The structure of Proverbs does not make it conducive to certain familiar Bible study techniques and appreciating the wisdom recorded in that book requires thorough and concentrated mental engagement. In the course of this conversation about Bible study, one idea that was suggested was that the New Testament is more practical and immediately relevant to our lives now, and, therefore, easier (if not more worthwhile) to study. We need to be mindful of the fact that it's simply more difficult for people to get into the Old Testament books and we need to focus, anyway, on what will most impact their lives.

Is this right? Is this an accurate description or assessment of the shape and character of the Scriptures and of their relationship to Christians and the successful Christian life? I think this direction of thought is not only badly mistaken but a serious hindrance to spiritual growth and to successful Christian living.

There are a couple different points that I would like to address. One has to do with the idea that we need to be focused on what is "practical." Have you noticed that theme in each of the illustrations I've used? Christians seem to be increasingly interested in what is practical. A second issue has to do with how much study is too much study or more study than is really necessary. And that is related to the third issue that we will address: What exactly is the point of Bible study? What is it good for?

To begin with, we need to get away from the practical/impractical distinction. This is an almost-completely unhelpful distinction. Or if we need to hold on to that distinction, than we need to consider carefully what counts as practical. And that will require getting clear on what exactly our goal is. If our goal is just to aid in meeting people's physical needs, it may be that prayer and Bible study are not helpful for that. On the other hand, if our ultimate goal is the salvation of souls, then prayer and Bible study would seem to have a more significant role to play. Still, on the other hand (i.e. the third hand) maybe evaluating prayer and Bible study in terms of their instrumentality for reaching our goals is simply the wrong approach. Maybe our goal should not be feeding the poor or winning souls, but living in the power of God. Of course, these three are not mutually exclusive; that is just the point. But we also need to realize that if we pursue either of the former two without the latter, then we will have completely missed the core of New Testament Christianity that is being elevated in some circles today. We do not pray and study the Bible because doing so is instrumental for either feeding the poor or winning souls--where those activities are abstracted from a growing spiritual life and relationship with God. We pray and study the Bible because those are indispensable means by which we draw closer to God.

It's worth raising the question at this point: Is drawing closer to God practical? Does drawing closer to God allow us to save more souls? Does drawing closer to God allow us to meet more needs? Hopefully you can see the absurdity of these questions. If we think that saving souls can be divorced from relationship with God, then we have seriously misconceived what is involved in the salvation of souls to begin with. And what good will filling stomachs and building shelters do--making people more comfortable for their short life on this globe--if their souls are lost for eternity. And why on earth are we evaluating closeness to God in terms of its usefulness for accomplishing either of these goals. To ask whether drawing closer to God is practical for some other end, is to miss the point that drawing closer to God is the final end. Certainly there is a relationship between drawing closer to God and being a light in the world, and the one will lead to the other, but the one is not for the other.

Now, to look at the other side of the coin, we need to consider: are there people in the church who do focus on prayer and Bible study to such an extent that they do neglect evangelism and helping the poor and serving the community and actually being a light in the world. Certainly, there are people who practice a form of Christianity that completely misses these crucial points that are emphasized over and over and over again throughout the pages of Scripture. But we must be careful, in reacting against that bad tendency, that we diagnose the source of the problem correctly and do not, inadvertently, throw out the proverbial baby with the bath-water. The problem, in our churches, is not that we are too much focused on prayer and Bible study. In fact, the problem may be that we are not focused on it enough. Or another way of putting it, we practice a form or semblance of prayer and Bible study that is not actually the real thing, and so we miss out on the life-transforming impact of those important spiritual disciplines.

How can we pray and study effectively? That is the question. And this is where we get to the issue of how much study is really necessary. Again, some people have a predisposition to study and scholasticism, etc., etc. and some people do not. So why require that everyone dedicate themselves so extensively to Bible study. On this point, perhaps surprisingly, I am prepared to make a concession. I recognize and appreciate that different people have different dispositions, and so it may not be necessary for all people to spend many hours each week reading and studying the Scriptures. However, if a person were to adopt this course, I would insist that he or she also abstain altogether from watching television and movies, and refrain from all other forms of popular entertainment including music, magazines, and the Internet.

Well, that is a radical and outrageous suggestion, isn't it. Usually its only very radical and unreasonable people who insist on total avoidance of every form of popular entertainment. This sounds decidedly backwards and reactionary. But stop for a moment and think. I am not saying that television and movies and popular music are bad. I am not saying that in the least. I am just saying that if your disposition is such that you simply cannot engage the Scriptures in a sustained and serious manner, then you should avoid these forms of entertainment. On the other hand, if you can and do apply yourself to careful Bible study, then there is nothing wrong (in principle) with taking in television, movies, etc..

Now why would I set up the options in this way? The simple fact of the matter is that, through television, films, and popular music (as well as magazines, newspapers, the Internet) you have a direct pipeline into your home of all sorts of ideas--some of which are good, some of which are neutral, and many of which are contrary to what will actually lead to a successful and flourishing life. (Just think of advertising.) And if you are constantly drawing upon this pipeline without anything to counter-balance, then you are just surrendering yourself to those voices and their messages. In addition, we assimilate so much from this pipeline with little or no effort, and the activity of reading and studying the Scriptures does require so much more exertion, that one ought to expect that careful study and sustained effort would be necessary in order to effect this counter-balancing measure. If on the other hand, this popular culture pipeline does not feed into your home, then it will require considerably less in order for you to flourish in the way that God intended you to. At least, the number of contrary messages that you will have to fight against will be much smaller.

To put it in slightly stronger language--if you do not have the mental acumen necessary to read through a passage of Scripture, study it, understand it's significance for the original audience, interpret it's message, apply it to your life, and put into practice what you learn, then you do not have the mental acumen to sift through the myriad of messages that you receive in a single hour of television in order to determine what you should and should not accept and how you should act in response. This is not to say that you are any less of a person; it's just to say that you should avoid certain media. If a person is not able to control his alcohol intake, he should avoid hanging out in bars. If a person is not able to control his gambling habit, he should not visit Las Vegas. The principle is exactly the same.

Well, I'm prepared to acknowledge that I may have stated things a bit over-strongly. After all, talking about people's "mental acumen" can get very personal. But hopefully you can see the point, even if it's poorly made. Additionally, one reason for putting the point so strongly is just to highlight the fact that I think very few if any people are in the category of people that I described. We may have become a culture of people with short attention spans, but that doesn't mean that we are incapable of reacquiring those skills and capacities that we have lost--if we are willing to put forward the necessary amount of effort.

At this point, we've talked a bit about the problems with interpreting Bible study in light of it's "practicality." We've also said something about how much Bible study is minimally necessary. Now we'll touch on the topic of why Bible study is important. This point is related to the former two. If people come to Bible study for the wrong reason, then it makes sense that they will fail to derive from that activity the benefit for which it is intended. Here we can make one further point about "practicality."

I take it to be a fairly common idea that one of the main purposes of Bible study is to find out "what we are supposed to do." Whether through direct commands or the examples of the early church, people come to the Bible in order to find out how they ought to live their lives and what they ought to do. Here is that very 'practical' mindset at work. The problem is that there are vast portions of the Bible that offer very little on this topic. It's not hard to imagine what a person with this agenda must go through. He or she starts out in Genesis. It's not clear that Genesis has a lot of practical application but at least it's full of interesting stories. The same is true of much of Exodus. But then this reader gets to the books of Leviticus and Numbers and there are laws and there are genealogies and all this stuff that applies to the nation of Israel and doesn't apply to you or me. You get back into the interesting stories in Joshua and Judges and Samuel and Kings. But even if you don't get lost in all this "impractical" "history," you'll still eventually run up against the Psalms. And Psalms is a book full of people talking about how great God is or how terrible God is or how happy they are or how sad they are and it's completely impractical. Proverbs is supposed to be practical but who can understand it? Ecclesiastes is just depressing. Song of Solomon is weird. Oh, yeah, I forgot to mention Job which is almost wall-to-wall speeches. Then you get to the prophets and between the interesting stories there are these long exhortations--again--to the people of Israel with nothing of practical value for me. Finally, you get to the New Testament and there's stuff about Jesus (and we tend to like stuff about Jesus) and there's the stuff about the church and that has application to me. And so people focus on the New Testament (that last quarter of their Bible) while neglecting the Old Testament (the first three-quarters).

Now you may have figured out that I don't buy the story that I'm telling you, but I think that this can help us to understand why people have such a hard time with Bible study. They are reading the Bible in order to find out "what they are supposed to do" and that's not the only or even the main focus of the Bible. The further irony of this point is that people who read the Bible in order to find out what they should do often don't do what they are supposed to do. They read the passages that are written to them and then say that the teachings are too difficult or too impractical or not feasible or not realistic and so they end up not doing what the Bible says to do. What a marvelous strategy.

If the Bible is supposed to tell us what we're supposed to do, then why don't we do it. And certainly there are passages where the Bible lays out very clearly what we are supposed to do. I would suggest that a lot of it has to do with our picture of the world and reality and God. Does that sound awfully abstract? Perhaps. But think about it for a moment. Think about those excuses: "It's not realistic, it doesn't make sense in this world, maybe in a different time or different place or under different circumstances, but the commands of the Bible just don't make sense in this world we live in." But just what world is it that we live in? Is it the world pervaded by the Spirit and presence of God or is it the dog-eat-dog world that is cut off from that fellowship with our creator and Lord. If you're living in that latter world, there's little reason to wonder that you find God's commands difficult. You need to shift your thinking and take seriously that God is real and present and start to interact with Him and engage His resources and draw upon His strength. But you can't do that if your way of approaching and thinking about the world is informed primarily by this-worldly sources of information. (Did we say something earlier about television being a pipeline into your home of the world's ideas and values?)

I might go so far as to say that the principle function of the Scriptures is to reveal to us the character of God. Because it is that knowledge of God's character--acquired in the course of interactive relationship, of which Bible study is a part--that really transforms our way of thinking and approaching the world so that we can actually do the things that God tells us to do. (...the things that we already know that we should do but don't do because of fear or doubt or anxiety or insufficient time or a general suspicion that those commands just don't make sense in this world.)

How do you come to know who God is and what He is like. Simple answer: Bible study. And it has to be fairly intense Bible study because when we're not studying our Bible's we are constantly bombarded by all sorts of contrary messages (from the world) about the nature of God and reality in general.

It is also, on just this point, that study of the Old Testament becomes crucial. Recently I heard a speaker who gave sermons on (1) the Syrophonecean woman who asked Jesus to heal her demon-possessed daughter and (2) the woman who anointed Jesus' feet with perfume at the home of Simon the Leper. In both cases, he made a comment that bugged me. He said that these two individuals had an instinctive understanding of the love of God. Somehow they understood that their request would be answered or that their gift would be accepted even though social and cultural taboos forbade them to do what they did.

An instinctive understanding? How about an informed understanding? You see, there's a problem with the idea that they had only an instinctive understanding: what does that mean for the person who doesn't have that instinctive understanding. Either you have it instinctively or you don't. If you don't have it instinctively, then what avenue is there for you (or me) to access the grace and power and mercy of God in the way that these two women did. In a world where people are already convinced that no one has a handle on truth and everything is relative, appealing to an instinctive grasp of the love of God can offer nothing to a person who doesn't have that instinct but desperately needs that touch from God.

And, ultimately, I suspect that neither of these women had an instinctive understanding. Rather, they had an informed understanding of God's nature and recognized in Jesus the hand and Spirit of God. Where did they get that understanding of God's nature? Not from the New Testament. It hadn't been written yet. They got it from the Old Testament.

Now that will just sound bizarre to some Christians, because they are so used to the idea that the God of the Old Testament is mean and judgmental and vindictive while the God of the New Testament (revealed in Jesus) is nice and friendly and loving. These sorts of Christians will just be puzzled by the idea that someone could look at the Old Testament and come to understand God's loving nature. But that is just the problem. We are not informed about the Old Testament. We don't study it. And is it any wonder that we, then, lack the basic understanding of God's goodness and grace that these two women had? We need to take seriously, again, that the God of the Old Testament is gracious, compassionate, slow to anger, abounding in loving kindness. As we grow in our knowledge and understanding of that--that is what will change and transform our lives. (That is what will enable us to do the things that the Bible says that we should do and that we know we should do and that we don't do even though we know we should.)

Over and over, Jesus marvels at the unbelief of the Jewish people. He marvels because they had the Old Testament and so should have been prepared for his coming. Those people who actually did recognize Jesus as Messiah--we have a tendency to think of them as the exception to the rule. But, really, the people who didn't recognize Jesus did so because of certain entrenched ideas that did not come out of the Old Testament. The entire Old Testament experience of the Jewish people was intended to pave the way for the coming of the Messiah--to prepare a people who would receive Him. And this work was successful. We see it's success in people like the Syrophonecean woman and Mary the sister of Lazarus.

At this point, it would be appropriate to launch into a discussion of the way in which the Bible presents its material. Again, people often have trouble with studying the Bible because they read it in the wrong way. This is as much a hindrance as reading it for the wrong reasons. But I think I've already said more than enough for one entry so I'll leave that discussion for another time. Hopefully you found something worthwhile in this entry. Again, I hope that where I speak very forcefully or polemically, that is reflective of my enthusiasm and deep concern about the issues, and is not reflective of some deep-seated belligerence on my part toward anyone. I hope that you can and will have read it in that spirit.

Well, it's been fun for me to continue to think and write about these issues.

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.