Graduate 161: BT 28: Sec. 21

Part I, Division 1, Chapter 3. The Worldhood of the World
Subdivision B. A Contrast between our Analysis of Worldhood and Descartes' Interpretation of the World
Section 21. Hermeneutical Discussion of the Cartesian Ontology of the 'World'

Toward the close of the last section, Heidegger writes, "Thus the ontological grounds for defining the 'world' as res extensa have been made plain: they lie in the idea of substantiality, which not only remains unclarified in the meaning of its Being, but gets passed off as something incapable of clarification, and gets represented indirectly by whatever substantial property belongs most pre-eminently to the particular substance." (BT 127/94) On this construal, 'substantiality' is, itself, taken to be a kind of entity so that the idea of "substance" comes to have a double-signification. Moreover, since each substance becomes understood in terms of its preeminent feature or property, it takes on a blurred ontico-ontological quality that is also a source of confusion. Heidegger turns to track down this fundamental 'equivocation' in section 21.

"The critical question now arises: does this ontology of the 'world' seek the phenomenon of the world at all, and if not, does it at least define some entity within-the-world fully enough so that the worldly character of this entity can be made visible in it? To both questions we must answer "No"." (BT 128/95) [1]

Descartes is trying to grasp Nature ontologically, and Heidegger thinks this can be done only by first taking up an entity within-the-world that is proximally ready-to-hand. If that approach will not work then progress might be made by "an ontology based upon a radical separation of God, the "I", and the 'world'," (BT 128/95) "If, however, this is not possible, we must then demonstrate explicitly not only that Descartes' conception of the world is ontologically defective, but that his Interpretation and the foundations on which it is based have led him to pass over both the phenomenon of the world and the Being of those entities within-the-world which are proximally ready-to-hand." (BT 128/95) This is what Heidegger proceeds to do.

Heidegger begins by asking about what starting point should be used to help us understand those entities whose being as extensio Descartes equates the Being of the 'world'. What kind of being that belongs to Dasein should we fix upon as our launching point? "The only genuine access to them [i.e. to those entities that Descartes focused on] lies in knowing [Erkennen], intellectio, in the sense of the kind of knowledge [Erkenntnis] we get in mathematics and physics." (BT 128/95)

Here is Heidegger's description of Descartes' view of mathematical knowledge: "Mathematical knowledge is regarded by Descartes as the one manner of papprehending entities which can always give assurance that their Being has been securely grasped. If anything measures up in its own kind of Being to the Being that is accessible in mathematical knowledge, then it is in the authentic sense. [2] Such entities are those which always are what they are." (BT 128/95) According to Heidegger, Descartes is attracted to mathematical knowledge because mathematical entities are constant and enduring in an important way. They always present themselves as they are and never as anything else. "That which enduringly remains, really is." (BT 128/95) So Descartes understands the being of entities in terms of the idea of knowledge and how such entities come to be known and thought about (cognized). Descartes seems to equate being roughly with what is constantly present-at-hand. He does not look to entities in the world to understand their being but imposes an understanding of being (one that has to do with persistence) on them. So even his leaning toward mathematics is not determinative for his understanding of being, "but rather by his ontological orientation in principle towards Being as constant presence-at-hand, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp." (BT 129/95) Heidegger sees in Descartes a shift from traditional ontology to a focus on modern mathematical physics and its transcendental foundations.

Since Descartes' understanding of being is grounded on the idea of knowledge and how entities can come to be known or cognized, he is automatically shut off from even considering the possibility that sensation and physical perception could grant insight into the essence of things. [3] NOEIN ('beholding') and DIANOEIN ('thinking') are just accepted as fundamental (owing to a long-standing traditional approach to ontology) and so, while sensatio (AISTHESIS, relating to perception) may still serve as a way of access to entities, as by a perceptual beholding, Descartes is mostly critical of that path to understanding. [4]

One may recall that in his meditation on the piece of wax, Descartes emphasizes that essence of the piece of wax cannot be known through its myriad of sensible properties (coloured, flavoured, hard, cold, and sounding when struck). The senses "tell us nothing about entities in their Being." (BT 129/97) Descartes concludes: "Quod agentes, percipiemus naturam materiae, sive corporis in universum spectati, non consistere in eo quod sit res dura, vel ponderosa, vel colorata, vel alio aliquo modo sensus afficiens: sed tantum in eo quod sit res extensa in longum, latum et profundum." (BT 129-130/97) "Which thing doing, we will perceive (regarding) the nature of matter, or body universally considered, that it does not consist in being something hard or heavy or colored, or the senses in some other way being affected; but so much [only] in being something extended in length, breadth, and depth."

But Heidegger is convinced that Descartes' analysis will not stand up to scrutiny. His method will not allow him to show what is present in sensation in its own kind of being. Descartes' approach cannot reveal the true character of those things. [5] Hardness, for instance, is interpreted as a kind of resistance, but neither of these is understood in a phenomenal sense, "as something experienced in itself whose nature can be determined in such an experience." (BT 130/97) Resistance is interpreted as the relationship between the locations of various entities and the variable rates of changes in the positions of those entities. "But when the experience of hardness is Interpreted this way, the kind of Being which belongs to sensory perception is obliterated, and so is any possibility that the entities encountered in such perceptions should be grasped in their Being. Descartes takes the kind of Being which belongs to the perception of something, and translates it into the only kind he knows: the perception of something becomes a definite way of Being-present-at-hand-side-by-side of two res extensae which are present-at-hand; the way in which their movements are related is itself a mode off that extensio by which the presence-at-hand of the corporeal Things is primarily characterized. Of course no behaviour in which one feels one's way by touch [eines tastenden Verhaltens] can be 'completed' unless what can thus be felt [des Betastbaren] has 'closeness' of a very special kind. But this does not mean that touching [Beruhrung] and the hardness which makes itself known in touching consist ontologically in different velocities of two corporeal Things. Hardness and resistance do not show themselves at all unless an entity has the kind of Being which Dasein--or at least something living--possesses." (BT 130/97)

So Descartes takes phenomenal experience and translates it in such a way that it is interpreted in terms of another kind of being; he then supposes that this translation/interpretation has disclosed the essence of those experiences and the entities experienced. But Heidegger resists this reduction. It may be useful for certain purposes or capture certain truths, but it is not the sum or whole.

"The idea of Being as permanent presence-at-hand not only gives Descartes a motive for identifying entities within-the-world with the world in general, and for providing so extreme a definition of their Being; it also keeps him from bringing Dasein's ways of behaving into view in a manner which is ontologically appropriate. But thus the road is completely blocked to seeing the founded character of all sensory and intellective awareness, and to understanding these as possibility of Being-in-the-world. On the contrary, he takes the Being of 'Dasein' (to whose basic constitution Being-in-the-world belongs) in the very same way as he takes the Being of the res extensa--namely, as substance." (BT 130-131/98) The idea that the essence of things should be interpreted in terms of permanence allows Descartes to identify the world with the sum total of entities within the world; he does not realize that the world is more like the context in which entities can emerge and appear in certain ways and as they do. It also allows him to ignore Dasein's various ways of interacting with entities in the world. Recall the Heidegger takes it that Dasein has a pretheoretical understanding of being that allows it to interact with various kinds of entities with various kinds of being in appropriate ways; that is why consideration of Dasein's ways of interacting in the world ('sensory and intellective awareness') is such an important clue for understanding the being of entities in the world and being in general. These reveal the character of Dasein as being-in-the-world. But Descartes treats the being of human beings in essentially the same way that he treats the being of all entities--in terms of substance.

But was Descartes even aware of these kinds of issues? How can we charge Descartes with 'identifying the world with certain entities within-the-world' if he did not even have the interpretation of within-the-world-ness on his mind? If he had no conception of the phenomenon of the world, how can we accuse him of having given a problematic interpretation of that phenomenon?

Heidegger acknowledges that Descartes does not explicitly address these kinds of issues but insists that one can still evaluate him in these terms by looking at the 'objective tendencies of the problematic'. He points out that in his treatment of the res cogitans and res extensa, Descartes claims to formulate and to solve the problem of the "I" and of the 'world'. He claims to have given certain grounds for the existence and the possibility of knowledge claims about both areas. But because he does not question his own presuppositions, "he has made it impossible to lay bare any primordial ontological problematic of Dasein; this has inevitably obstructed his view of the phenomenon of the world, and has made it possible for the ontology of the 'world' to be compressed into that of certain entities within-the-world. The foregoing discussion should have proved this." (BT 131/98) The essence of the critique, as I interpret Heidegger, is that though Descartes claimed to have disclosed what is essential about the "I" and the 'world,' in fact, he actually failed to account for huge parts of both. Granted, he may not have set out with the intention of revealing all the various dimensions of the "I" and the 'world,' but his conclusions were such that they eliminated any possibility of such an inquiry. One has distilled the essence of a thing who is able to, on that basis, account for all the various facets of that thing. But Descartes cannot do that by appeal to the res cogitans and res extensa. He cannot account for the various dimensions of our 'sensory and intellective awareness'. This is not, by itself, grounds for rejecting his view, but when it purports to be definitive in some way or cuts off further inquiry, then there is a problem. This is what Heidegger has tried to show.

Heidegger takes note of one objection according to which, "even if in point of fact both the problem of the world and the Being of the entities encountered environmentally as closest to us remain concealed, Descartes has still laid the basis for characterizing ontologically that entity within-the-world upon which, in its very Being, every other entity is founded--material Nature." (BT 131/98) According to this view, Descartes' characterization of the fundamental essence of physical things is the basis for every attribution of further characteristics to those entities--all of which are but quantitative modifications of the modes of the extensio itself. And these, in turn, would ground such qualities as "beautiful", and "in keeping", and "useful". If one is oriented primarily by Thinghood, these qualities are not quantifiable but if one is oriented by Descartes' extensio then we could 'build up' securely the structure of what is proximally ready-to-hand.

But Heidegger doubts that the being of the ready-to-hand really can be reached ontologically by this procedure--by treating extendedness as the most fundamental category. To posit a material thing is to posit a kind of being--"a constant presence-at-hand of Things" (BT 132/99)--and the valuation of such things as "beautiful", or "useful" "cannot tell us anything at all new about the Being of goods, but would merely presuppose again that goods have pure presence-at-hand as their kind of Being." (BT 132/99) But this presupposition of a pure presence-at-hand existence cannot be corroborated by careful reflection on experience. Heidegger writes, "But even pre-phenomenological experience shows that in an entity which is supposedly a Thing, there is something that will not become fully intelligible through Thinghood alone." (BT 132/99)

What do "values" amount to ontologically? And what does it mean ontologically to invest things with "value"? As long as the answers to these questions remain obscure, we cannot be sure that we have come to a full understanding of the real essence of things.

"Descartes has narrowed down the question of the world to that of Things of Nature [Naturdinglichkeit] as those entities within-the-world which are proximally accessible. He has confirmed the opinion that to know an entity in what is supposedly the most rigorous ontical manner is our only possible access to the primary Being of the entity which such knowledge reveals. But at the same time we must have the insight to see that in principle the 'roundings-out' of the Thing-ontology also operate on the same dogmatic basis as that which Descartes has adopted." (BT 133/100)

--

"We have already intimated in Section 14 that passing over the world and those entities which we proximally encounter is not accidental, not an overesight which it would be simple to correct, but that it is grounded in a kind of Being which belongs essentially to Dasein itself." (BT 133/100) Heidegger plans to lay out how this is the case after he has further developed his account of the main structures of Dasein and "when we have assigned [zugewiesen] to the concept of Being in general the horizon within which its intelligibility becomes possible". Then, he says, a thorough critique of the Cartesian ontology of the world can become possible. Unfortunately, this portion of Heidegger's project (Part One, Division Three) was never published. The plan would have been that through this account, Heidegger would be able to show why, in the earliest attempts to grapple with being, the phenomenon of the world was passed over and philosophers became fixated on entities (especially in 'Nature') as providing the key to a fundamental ontology.

The idea, then, is that while the world, Dasein, and entities within-the-world are the ontologically constitutive states which are closest to us, they cannot be encountered effectively as phenomena if one takes one's orientation fundamentally from Things in the world. [6]

However, this is not to say that Descartes' project is useless. Recall that spatiality is manifestly one of the constituents of entities within-the-world. Descartes' introduction of extensio allowed Kant to identify something more fundamental and a priori. "There is some phenomenal justification for regarding the extensio as a basic characteristic of the 'world', even if by recourse to this neither the spatiality of the world nor that of the entities we encounter in our envifronment (a spatiality which is proximally discovered) nor even that of Dasein itself, can be conceived ontologically." (BT 134/101)

Subdivision C will develop the connection between spatiality and Descartes' conception of the extensio.

--

[1] I will have to review to make sure that my impressions are right. When he asks whether Descartes has disclosed the phenomenon of the world, he is asking whether Descartes has reached a point where he can grasp the nature of 'worldhood'--that in virtue of which Dasein is able to encounter a world at all, that which must be present for the possibility of encountering any world as a unified, coherent, and intelligible whole.

[2] Note another instance of "authentic".

[3] "The problem of how to get appropriate access to entities within-the-world is one which Descartes feels no need to raise.

[4] NOEIN means 'perceive'. DIA- means 'through'. AISTHESIS is related to AISTHETA ('perceptible thing') and AISTHESTHAI ('perceive'), and to the English, 'aesthetic'.

[5] Heidegger indicates: (Cf. Section 19).

[6] "The world and Dasein and entities within-the-world are the ontologically constitutive states which are closest to us; but we have no guarantee that we can achieve the basis for meeting up with these as phenomena by the seemingly obvious procedure of starting with the Things of the world, still less by taking our orientation from what is supposedly the most rigorous knowledge of entities. Our observations on Descartes should have brought us this insight." (BT 134/101)

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 160: BT 27: Sec. 20

Part I, Division 1, Chapter 3. The Worldhood of the World
Subdivision B. A Contrast between our Analysis of Worldhood and Descartes' Interpretation of the World
Section 20. Foundations of the Ontological Definition of the 'World'

The idea that extension is the state-of-being that is constitutive of material entities is grounded on the more general concept of substantiality. "By substance we can undersand nothing else than an entity which is in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to be." (BT 125/92) Descartes understood that, in this sense, God is the only true substance. Every other entity is created by God. But this generates a problem: "The Being which belongs to one of these entities is 'infinitely' different from that which belongs to the other; yet we still consider creation and creator alike as entities. We are thus using "Being" in so wide a sense that its meaning embraces an 'infinite' difference." (BT 125/92) We still speak of two kinds of (created) substances: the thinking thing (res cogitans) and the extended thing (res extensa).

But how should we resolve this dilemma that's been raised--this possible source of confusion. "In the assertions 'God is' and 'the world is', we assert Being. This word 'is,' however, cannot be meant to apply to these entities in the same sense (SUNONUMOS, univoce), when between them there is an infinite difference of Being..." (BT 126/93) To ascribe 'being,' in the same sense, to God, physical substances, and mental substances, is to treat them all either as created or as uncreated. The Medievals took the meaning 'being' in each of these cases to operate 'by analogy'. This is an inadequate attempt at resolution, Heidegger thinks, but neither the Medievals nor Descartes attempt to dig any deeper into the matter. They do not develop a solid understanding of 'being' but rather treat its various significations as 'self-evident'.

Descartes actually goes so far as to suggest that substantiality (substance as such) is in and for itself inaccessible from the outset. Heidegger thinks that Kant takes this same basic view. Being is not something that is perceived or that affects us in such a way that we should be able to make an inquiry into its nature. Heidegger writes, "Because 'Being' is not in fact accessible as an entity, it is expressed thhrough attributes--definite characteristics of the entities under consideration, characteristics which themselves are. Being is not expressed through just any such characteristics, but rather through those satisfying in the purest manner that meaning of "Being" and "substantiality", which has still been tacitly presupposed." (BT 127/94) [1] Though we may try to grasp substance itself apart from either extension or thought, it is not actually possible to encounter such substances apart from their principle attributes.

"Thus the ontological grounds for defining the 'world' as res extensa have been made plain: they lie in the idea of substantiality, which not only remains unclarified in the meaning of its Being, but gets passed off as something incapable of clarification, and gets represented indirectly by way of whatever substantial property belongs most pre-eminently to the particular substance." (BT 127/94) Herein lies the reason for the double-signification of 'substantiality'. Sometimes 'substance' is taken to refer to something ontological and sometimes to something ontical, because, it is claimed, the ontological cannot be grasped except through the ontical. But Heidegger takes it that this construal refflects a failure to master the basic problem of Being. So he will set about tracking down the equivocation that is the source of the confusion and straightening it out.

--

FOOTNOTES:

[1] "Quin et facilius intelligimus substantiam extensam, vel substantiam cogitatem, quam substantiam solam, omisso eo quod cogitet vel sit extensa" (BT 127/94) "And in fact, more easily do we understand extended substance or thinking substance than substance alone, having laid aside that which would be thought or extended."

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 159: BT 26: Sec. 19

Part I, Division 1, Chapter 3. The Worldhood of the World
Subdivision B. A Contrast between our Analysis of Worldhood and Descartes' Interpretation of the World
Section 19. The Definition of the 'World' as res extensa

In this subdivision (B), Heidegger tries to illuminate his own discussion and investigation of worldhood by comparing his approach to ontology with that of Descartes. In this section, he lays out Descartes' definition and understanding of the world as 'res extensa' (an extended thing).

For Descartes, the distinction between the 'ego cogito' ('I think') and the 'res corporea' ('bodily thing') is a basic ontological distinction and divides the world into things of 'Nature' and things of 'spirit.' But Heidegger is concerned that the ontological foundation of this distinction has remained unclarified--in spite of the fact that one may be able to site any number of entities as belonging to one or the other of these categories. "What kind of understanding of Being does he have when he defines the Being of these entities?" (BT 123/89) Sometimes 'Nature' refers to the kind of being that belongs to a certain entity (substantiality) and, at other times, 'Nature' is taken just to be the entity being described (substance).

"To determine the nature of the res corporea ontologically, we must explicate the substance of this entity as a substance--that is, its substantiality. What makes up the authentic Being-in-itself [An-ihm-selbstsein] of the res corporea?" (BT 123/90) Heidegger reads Descartes as claiming that substances become accessible in their attributes and that the most fundamental or essential attributes that belong to all bodily entities are those of length, breadth, and thickness--extension. This is so because extension is presupposed in everything else that can be ascribed to bodies. "Extension is a state-of-Being constitutive for the entity we are talking about; it is that which must already 'be' before any other ways in which Being is determined, so that these can 'be' what they are. Extension must be 'assigned' ["zugewiesen"] primarily to the corporeal Thing." (BT 123-124/90) Other characteristics of bodies (for instance, divisio, figura, motus (division, shape, and motion)) are conceived as modes of extension. [1]

"In any corporeal Thing the real entity is what is suited for thus remaining constant [standigen Verbleib], so much so, indeed that this is how the substantiality of such a substance gets characterized." (BT 125/92)

Having laid out, briefly, Descartes ontology of the world, Heidegger will continue with his critique in the next section by looking at the foundations of this ontological definition.

--

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Now I'm just indulging a little practice with my Latin. "...atque unum et idem corpus, retinendo suam eandem quantiatem, pluribus diversis modis potest extendi: nunc scilicet magis secundum longitudinem, minusque secundum latitudinem vel profunditatem, ac paulo post e contra magis secundum latitudinem, et minus secundum longitudinem." "...and one and the same body, retaining it's same quantity [of matter], is able to be extended in many different ways: now certainly [it can be] to a greater extent according to length, and not so much according to width or depth, and also a little later [it may be], on the contrary, to a greater extent according to width and less according to length."

"Eademque ratione ostendi potest, et pondus, et colorem, et alias omnes eiusmodi qualitates, quae in materia corporea sentiuntur, ex ea tolli posse, ipsa integra remanente: unde sequitur, a nulla ex illis eius naturam dependere." "And [by] the same reasoning it is able to be shown [that] weight, and color, and all other qualities of this sort, which are perceived in corporeal matter, from this can be lifted, leaving the thing itself untouched: whence it follows that the nature of this thing (viz. extension) depends upon none of these."

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 158: BT 25: Introduction to Chapter Three, Subdivision B

Part I, Division 1, Chapter 3. The Worldhood of the World
Subdivision B. A Contrast between our Analysis of Worldhood and Descartes' Interpretation of the World

[Introduction]

Our investigation into the concept and structure of worldhood is proceeded by gradual steps. It begins by looking at an entity within-the-world and only later taking in the world as a whole. We shall try to clarify this approach by comparing it to Descartes' ontology of the world and to his method of investigation. In this, we shall try to bring out the ontological 'foundations' that (unknowingly) formed the foundation of that ontology and of those that followed.

Basically, Descartes sees extensio (i.e. extension) as the most fundamental ontological category in the world. Heidegger will look at his account and also attempt to use it as a way of negatively supporting his own account of the spatiality of the environment and of Dasein itself. He plans to do this because he takes extension to be one of the constituents of spatiality, which is constitutive for the world.

"With regard to Dascartes' ontology there are three toopics which we shall treat: 1. the definition of the 'world' as res extensa (Section 19); 2. the foundations of this ontological definition (Section 20); 3. a hermeneutrical discussion of the Cartesian ontology of the 'world' (Section 21). The considerations which follow will not have been grounded in full detail until the 'cogito sum' has been phenomenologically destroyed. (See Part Two, Division 2.)" (BT 123/89) [1]

--

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Part Two, Division 2 was never published.

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 157: BT 24: Sec. 18

Part I, Division 1, Chapter 3. The Worldhood of the World
Subdivision A. Analysis of Environmentality and Worldhood in General
Section 18. Involvement and Significance; the Worldhood of the World

"The ready-to-hand is encountered within-the-world. The Being of this entity, readiness-to-hand, thus stands in some ontological relationship towards the world and towards worldhood. In anything ready-to-hand the world is always 'there'. Whenever we encounter anything, the world has already been previously discovered, though not thematically. But it can also be lit up in certain ways of dealing with our environment. The world is that in terms of which the ready-to-hand is ready-to-hand. How can the world let the ready-to-hand be encountered? Our analysis hitherto has shown that what we encounter within-the-world has, in its very Being, been freed for our concernful circumspection, for taking account. What does this previous freeing amount to, and how is this to be understood as an ontologically distinctive feature of the world? What problems does the question of the worldhood of the world lay before us?" (BT 114/83)

Here Heidegger gives a helpful summary of many of the main points and commitments that he's described up to this point. It is interesting to note--and this has come up before but is worth pointing out again--that Heidegger seems to think of 'readiness-to-hand' and 'worldhood' as almost discrete entities. Now we must be very careful in how we speak of these as things. Readiness-to-hand is the kind of being that belongs to entities with which we find ourselves engaged. For that reason, it [i.e. readiness-to-hand] stands in some ontological relationship to the world and to worldhood. The ready-to-hand is that which we already encounter within the world and it is what is disclosed by the world. Toward the end of this quote, Heidegger raises the question about how this encounter or disclosure works. He says that what we encounter within-the-world has been freed for our concernful circumspection. Now we want to look more closely at what is involved in being freed.

This material is helpful in expanding on what was begun in the last entry regarding reference and assignment. The state that is constitutive for the ready-to-hand as equipment is one of reference or assignment. What we want to know is how can entities with this kind of being (i.e. readiness-to-hand) be 'freed' from the world with regard to their being. Along these same lines, we want to know why these are the sorts of entities that we encounter first.

Heidegger writes, "As definite kinds of references we have mentioned serviceability-for-, detrimentality [Abtraglichkeit], usability, and the like. The "towards-which" [das Wozu] of a serviceability and the "for-which" [das Wofur] of a usability prescribed the ways in which such a reference or assignment can become concrete." (BT 114/83) We need to be careful too remember that the serviceability and usability of an entity are not just properties of that entity. So the fact that a sign 'indicates' or that a hammer 'hammers'--'indicating' and 'hammering' are not properties of these things. Heidegger writes, "Anything ready-to-hand is, at the worst, appropriate for some purposes and inappropriate for others; and its 'properties' are, as it were, still bound up in these ways in which it is appropriate or inappropriate, just as presence-at-hand, as a possible kind of Being for something ready-to-hand, is bound up in readiness-to-hand." (BT 115/83) 'Hammering' is not a property of hammers and hammers are not discrete entities that exist independently of any context within the space-time world. Rather, a particular object is either appropriate or inappropriate for use as a hammer. Our way of perceiving it presupposes the goal and actually shapes our understanding of the hammer as useful for hammering. This is possible because equipment possesses 'serviceability' (and serviceability is a reference). Serviceability does not refer to the appropriateness of an entity but is rather that condition which makes it possible for one to define the character of an entity by its appropriateness. If entities were not already serviceable, then we would not be able to see them as referring to some larger context of goals and interests, and we would not be able to come to recognize them as appropriate for certain tasks. The kind of reference involved here has to do with the entity having been assigned or referred to some larger context of goals, interests, and aims. "The character of Being which belongs to the ready-to-hand is just such an involvement. If something has an involvement, this implies letting it be involved in something. The relationship of the "with... in..." shall be indicated by the term "assignment" or "reference"." (BT 115/84) Again, this goes back to the point that a 'sign' does not just direct our attention to something in the world, but it also directs our attention to the totality of involvements and concerns that give that sign meaning. This is true for any tool--we recognize it as the thing it is only because viewing it draws our attention to the context in which it is embedded and that gives it its significance.

"When an entity within-the-world has already been proximally freed for its Being, that Being is its "involvement". With any such entity as entity, there is some involvement. The fact that it has such an involvement is ontologically definitive for the Being of such an entity, and is not an ontical assertion about it." (BT 116/84) Entities, then, are freed for their involvements and that involvement is not something that it happens to have but something that is ontologically definitive for the thing. What an entity is 'involved in' is the "towards-which" of serviceability and the "for-which" of usability. In other words, when ever we speak of something being "serviceable," we always have in mind some "towards-which" for which it is serviceable. Or when we speak of something being "usable" it is always something "for-which" it is usable. No object is serviceable or usable in a vacuum.

"With the "towards-which" of serviceability there can again be an involvement: with this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a "hammer", there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection 'is' for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein--that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein's Being." (BT 116/84) [1]

The context of involvements is always prior to ('earlier than') any single item of equipment. "But the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a "towards-which" in which there is no further involvement: this "towards-which" is not an entity with the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of Being, worldhood itself belongs. This primary "towards-which" is not just another "towards-this" as something in which an involvement is possible. The primary 'towards-which' is a "for-the-sake-of-which". But the 'for-the-sake-of' always pertains to the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue. We have thus indicated the interconnection by which the structure of an involvement leads to Dasein's very Being as the sole authentic "for-the-sake-of-which"; for the present, however, we shall pursue this no further. 'Letting something be involved' must first be clarified enough to give the phenomenon of worldhood the kind of definiteness which makes it possible to formulate any problems about it." (BT 116-117/84)

The preceding is a nice summation of much that has preceded and draws all of this discussion of the various purposes and "towards-which" and where they find their end. These chains of "towards-which" lead to a final "for-the-sake-of-which," which is found in the being of Dasein, which is the sole authentic "for-the-sake-of-which" and whose being is defined as being-in-the-world and to whose state of being worldhood belongs. [2] But we cannot pursue that point more deeply until we have clarified which is meant by "letting something be involved." Recall that one of the questions raised at the end of the last section had to do with how something that did not have the bear the significance of a piece of equipment could come to do so. Heidegger addresses that in a way in this next paragraph.

"Ontically, "letting something be involved" signifies that within our factical concern we let something ready-to-hand be so-and-so as it is already and in order that it be such. The way we take this ontical sense of 'letting be' is, in principle, ontological. And therewith we Interpret the meaning of previously freeing what is proximally ready-to-hand within-the-world." (BT 117/84-85) Again, that we can 'let something be' and do not have to make it so reflects the way in which a piece of equipment is already caught up in a context of involvements. Such entities are discovered in their readiness-to-hand. "This 'a priori' letting-something-be-involved is the condition for the possibility of encountering anything ready-to-hand, so that Dasein, in its ontical dealings with the entity thus encountered, can thereby let it be involved in the ontical sense." (BT 117/85) The way in which 'letting-something-be-involved' is the condition for the possibility of encountering anything ready-to-hand means that it is the condition for the possibility of both our encountering it and our failing to encounter it (which may be thought of as a deficient mode of encountering). Another (possibly deficient) way of encountering such an entity is as something, not to be put to use, but to be altered, adjusted, improved, or even smashed to pieces.

"When we speak of having already let something be involved, so that it has been freed for that involvement, we are using a perfect tense a priori which characterizes the kind of Being belonging to Dasein itself." (BT 117/85) [3] In other words, letting an entity be involved, if we understand this ontologically, consists in previously freeing it for its readiness-to-hand within the environment. Our concern encounters it as already ready-to-hand environmentally. Heidegger emphasizes, "[I]t just is not 'proximally' a 'world-stuff' that is merely present-at-hand." (BT 118/85)

"As the Being of something ready-to-hand, an involvement is itself discovered only on the basis of the prior discovery of a totality of involvements." (BT 118/85) Understanding one set of involvements presupposes understanding a more encompassing set of involvements. And this prior understanding must already be possessed. "In this totality of involvements which has been discovered beforehand, there lurks an ontological relationship to the world. In letting entities be involved so that they are freed for a totality of involvements, one must have disclosed already that for which [woraufhin] they have been freed." (BT 118/85) But that for which the ready-to-hand has ultimately been freed cannot be discoverable in this same way. So, hereafter, "discoveredness" shall be reserved as a term for a possibility of being which every entity without the character of Dasein may possess.

But what is involved in this previous disclosure? "To Dasein's Being, an understanding of Being belongs. Any understanding [Verstandnis] has its Being in an act of understanding [Verstehen]. If Being-in-the-world is a kind of Being which is essentially befitting to Dasein, then to understand Being-in-the-world belongs to the essential content of its understanding of Being. The previous disclosure of that for which what we encounter within-the-world is subsequently freed, amounts to nothing else than understanding the world--that world towards which Dasein as an entity always comports itself." (BT 118/85-86) We have already said that Dasein is unique in that its own being is an issue for it. Now Heidegger says that any understanding has its being in an act of understanding. If the kind of being that belongs to Dasein is being-in-the-world, and Dasein has an understanding of that being which it possesses, then an understanding of being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein and to Dasein's understanding. So when we speak of freeing entities as presupposing some prior disclosure of the context of involvements that allows us to recognize that entity as such, what we are referring to is the understanding of being-in-the-world and of the world that already belongs essentially to Dasein.

Whenever we let there be an involvement, we understand that in terms of letting something be involved and the "with-which" and "in-which" of involvements. These and the "towards-which" and the "for-the-sake-of-which" all must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligibility. "And what is that wherein Dasein as Being-in-the-world understands itself pre-ontologically? In understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an "in-order-to" [Um-zu], and it has done so in terms of a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which it itself is--one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly and which may be either authentic or inauthentic." (BT 119/86) [4] From this "in-order-to" follows the "towards-this" and the "in-which" where something can be let to be involved. "That wherein [Worin] Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is that for which [das Woraufhin] it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The "wherein" of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this "wherein" is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which [woraufhin] Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world." (BT 119/86) So the world is that which is already understood by Dasein. It is that for which entities may be encountered--that is, it the for-the-sake-of-which toward which entities may be encountered as involved. And this structure to which Dasein assigns itself--the "in-order-to"--in terms of a potentiality-for-being is what makes up the worldhood of the world.

"That wherein Dasein already understands itself in this way is always something with which it is primordially familiar." (BT 119/86) This familiarity is not necessarily theoretically transparent or explicit, but even the possibility of an ontologico-existential Interpretation of the world depends upon our already being familiar with it. This familiarity is constitutive of Dasein and makes up Dasein's understanding of being. The possibility of an ontologico-existential Interpretation can be taken up by Dasein insofar as it "has set itself the task of giving a primordial Interpretation for its own Being and for the possibilities of that Being, or indeed for the meaning of Being in general." (BT 119/86) [5]

But we still only laid bare the horizon (the limits) within which our investigation of the world and worldhood is to proceed. We must make still more clear how the context of Dasein's assigning-itself is to be taken ontologically.

We mentioned the act of understanding, which will be discussed further in section 31. In that act of understanding, we said, these various relations are already disclosed and the act of understanding is held in these relations as with something already familiar. The understanding lets itself make assignments both in and of these relationships--relationships of signifying. "In its familiarity with these relationships, Dasein 'signifies' to itself: in a primordial manner it gives itself both its Being and its potentiality-for-Being as something which it is to understand with regard to its Being-in-the-world." (BT 120/87) Caught up in the signification of Dasein's being and potentiality-for-being in its being-in-the-world, the for-the-sake-of-which signifies (draws our attention to) an "in-order-to", a "towards-this", and the "in-which" and "with-which" of involvement. All of these relationships belong to a primordial totality: "they are what they are as this signifying [Be-deuten] in which Dasein gives itself beforehand its Being-in-the-world as something to be understood." (BT 120/87) And this relational totality of signifying is called "significance." "This is what makes up the structure of the world--the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is. Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of Being, and which can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves [in seinem An-sich]." (BT 120/87) Dasein is able to discover entities in the world that are ready-to-hand as useful for various ends and purposes because it already possesses a familiarity with significance--with the way in which entities are contextualized. This is what allows entities to appear as they are.

"Dasein as such is always something of this sort; along with its Being, a context of the ready-to-hand is already essentially discovered: Dasein, in so far as it is, has always submitted itself already to a 'world' which it encounters, and this submission belongs essentially to its Being." (BT 120-121/87)

Heidegger says that the being of words and of language are founded on 'significations'. Significations can be disclosed because Dasein is always already familiar with significance itself. This familiarity is the ontological condition which makes it possible for Dasein to disclose significations. "The significance thus disclosed is an existential state of Dasein--of its Being-in-the-world; and as such it is the ontical condition for the possibility that a totality of involvements can be discovered." (BT 121/87)

Now one might object, at this point, that since the involvement (which is the being of the ready-to-hand) has been shown to be definable as a context of assignments or references--and since even worldhood may be so defined--then the 'substantial being' of entities within-the-world has been reduced to a set of relations grasped only in the realm of 'pure thinking'.

In answer, Heidegger reminds us of a number of structures or dimensions of this ontological inquiry (problematic) that need to be kept distinct: "1. the Being of those entities within-the-world which we proximally encounter--readiness-to-hand; 2. the Being of those entities which we can come across and whose nature we can determine if we discover them in their own right by going through the entities proximally encountered--presence-at-hand; 3. the Being of that ontical condition which makes it possible for entities within-the-world to be discovered at all--the worldhood of the world. This third kind of Being gives us an existential way of determining the nature of Being-in-the-world, that is, of Dasein." (BT 121/88) In other words, since Dasein has the character of being-in-the-world, understanding the worldhood of the world is especially closely tied to understanding the being of Dasein. The being of entities ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, however, is different from the kind of being that belongs to Dasein. (Here is the distinction between the existential and the categorial.)

Now Heidegger says that one can approach worldhood, which is constituted by that context of assignments and references, as a system of relations. But in doing so, one is apt to miss the real phenomenal contents of those references and assignments. "The phenomenal content of these 'Relations' and 'Relata' --the "in-order-to", the "for-the-sake-of", and the "with-which" of an involvement--is such that they resist any sort of mathematical functionalization; nor are they merely something thought, first posited in an 'act of thinking.'" (BT 121-122/88) Such a way of approaching entities in the world treats them as existing independently and in isolation before being brought, after the fact, into a web of relations. But that is not right. Heidegger says that we are already in that web. "This 'system of Relations', as something constitutive for worldhood, is so far from volatilizing the Being of the ready-to-hand within-the-world, that the worldhood of the world provides the basis on which such entities can for the first time be discovered as they are 'substantially' 'in themselves'." (BT 122/88) There is no meaningful sense in which an entity is the thing that it is apart from this web of assignments and references. "And only if entities within-the-world can be encountered at all, is it possible, in the field of such entities to make accessible what is just present-at-hand and no more." (BT 122/88) And entities can only be encountered if they already exist within-the-world, alongside-of Dasein.

"By reason of their Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more, these latter entities can have their 'properties' defined mathematically in 'functional concepts.' Ontologically, such concepts are possible only in relation to entities whose Being has the character of pure substantiality. Functional concepts are never possible except as formalized substantial concepts." (BT 122/88) [6]

Before delving deeper into our the ontological problematic (investigation) we shall set about clarifying this interpretation of worldhood by considering a case at the opposite extreme.

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FOOTNOTES:

[1] Note the instance of "possibility of Dasein's being."

[2] Note the instance of "authenticity."

[3] This relatively early reference to time and tense should be noted for later.

[4] Important point for later. Take note.

[5] Another helpful summary statement.

[6] This use of 'functional' and 'formal' needs to be understood more clearly.

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 156: BT 23: Sec. 17

Part I, Division 1, Chapter 3. The Worldhood of the World
Subdivision A. Analysis of Environmentality and Worldhood in General
Section 17. Reference and Signs

In section 15, Heidegger said that to the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment. Equipment is essentially 'something-in-order-to...' and in the structure of the 'in-order-to' there lies an assignment or reference. In this section, we want to look directly at the phenomenon of reference or assignment that has become visible. Our goal is still to lay bare the world-phenomenon. There is a possibility that assignments and referential totalities will become constitutive for worldhood itself. "Hitherto we have seen the world lit up only in and for certain defininte ways in which we concern ourselves environmentally with the ready-to-hand, and indeed it has been lit up only with the readiness-to-hand of that concern. So the further we proceed in understanding the Being of entities within-the-world, the broader and firmer becomes the phenomenal basis on which the world-phenomenon may be laid bare." (BT 107/76-77) This, then, is the direction that we want to follow up on in this section.

We shall still take the being of the ready-to-hand as our point of departure, but our goal now is to grasp the phenomenon of reference or assignment itself more precisely. Heidegger writes, "We shall accordingly attempt an ontological analysis of a kind of equipment in which one may come across such 'references' in more senses than one. We come across 'equipment' in signs. The word "sign" designates many kinds of things: not only may it stand for different kinds of signs, but Being-a-sign-for can itself be formalized as a universal kind of relation, so that the sign-structure itself provides an ontological clue for 'characterizing' any entity whatsoever." (BT 107-108/77) Here are at least two ways of using the word 'sign.' 'Sign' may designate a class of things that may be further differentiated into groups of different kinds of signs. But 'sign' and 'being-a-sign-for' can also describe a feature of any entity whatsoever--a universal kind of relation. [1]

We will begin by considering the first usage of 'sign,' to refer to one type or category of equipment whose specific character as equipment consists in showing or indicating. Examples of these include "signposts, boundary-stones, the ball for the mariner's storm-warning, signals, banners, signs of mourning, and the like." (BT 108/77) Heidegger says that indicating can be defined as a 'kind' of referring and that referring, taken in a strictly formal way, is a relating. But he also says that relation is not a genus or category of things that may be subdivided into particular species or kinds of references. "A relation is something quite formal which may be read off directly by way of 'formalization' from any kind of context, whatever its subject-matter or way of Being." (BT 108/77) [2]

So here are three terms, the relations of which need to be understood: "indication," "reference," and "relation." Every 'indication' is a reference and every reference is a relation, but it is not the case that every relation is a reference or that every reference is an 'indication'. Heidegger writes: "The formally general character of relation is thus brought to light. If we are to investigate such phenomena as reference, signs, or even significations, nothing is to be gained by characterizing them as relations. Indeed we shall eventually have to show that 'relations' themselves, because of their formally general character, have their ontological source in a reference." (BT 108/78) So while there is a tendency to think of 'references' as one kind of 'relation,' Heidegger will try to show that the latter is actually ontologically grounded in the former.

At the moment, we want to understand the sign "as distinct from the phenomenon of reference". (BT 108/77) So we also want to treat it not as a relation but as an indication. But here we face a challenge insofar as there are so many different kinds of signs and so many different ways of indicating something. This great variety may be organized along formal lines by appeal to their relational character, but Heidegger is not satisfied with this approach. He writes, "[W]e find it especially tempting nowadays to take such a 'relation' as a clue for subjecting every entity to a kind of 'Interpretation' which always 'fits' because at bottom it says nothing, no more than the facile schema of content and form. (108/78)

--

So, to guide our investigation, Heidegger chooses one particular sign to consider: the adjustable arrow by which a motor car driver may indicate the direction the vehicle will take. This sign is an item of equipment which is ready-to-hand for the driver and for other people as well. "This sign is ready-to-hand within-the-world in the whole equipment-context of vehicles and traffic regulations. It is equipment for indicating, and as equipment, it is constituted by reference or assignment. It has the character of the "in-order-to", its own definite serviceability; it is for indicating. This indicating which the sign performs can be taken as a kind of 'referring'. But here we must notice that this 'referring' as indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign as equipment." (BT 109/78)

Two questions: In what way can the adjustable arrow's indicating be understood as a kind of 'referring'? What is the ontological structure of this particular kind of sign as equipment? According to Heidegger, 'referring' as indicating is grounded in the being-structure of equipment, in serviceability for something or some purpose. An entity (for instance, a hammer) may be serviceable without thereby being a sign, so serviceability is more basic to the ontological constitution of equipment. "Indicating, as a 'reference', is a way in which the "towards-which" of a serviceability becomes ontically concrete; it determines an item of equipment as for this "towards-which"." (BT 109/78) So indicating, as 'reference,' is one way in which a piece of equipment may manifest (make concrete) its "towards-which."

The idea seems to be this: the purpose of the adjustable arrow is to 'indicate' the direction in which the vehicle to turn. At this ontical level of discourse, the arrow does not 'refer' to anything; it does not, for instance, point to some particular thing. However, there is a sense in which the arrow, by performing its function of indicating, draws our attention to or refers to an equipment totality or equipment context. So here is an example of an 'indication' that is a 'reference,' even though the 'reference' is not an 'indication. But even this 'reference' to an equipment-context does not fully capture the ontological structure of that sign. Rather, it is the sign's serviceability that is fundamental. [3]

"What do we mean when we say that a sign "indicates"? We can answer this only by determining what kind of dealing is appropriate with equipment for indicating. And we must do this in such a way that the readiness-to-hand of that equipment can be genuinely grasped." (BT 110/79) If we are to understand what is involved in 'indicating,' we can do so by considering what follows from an indication. In the case of the arrow, to responses that are appropriate include, 'giving way' and 'standing still'. "Giving way, as taking a direction, belongs essentially to Dasein's Being-in-the-world." (BT 110/79) According to Heidegger, Dasein is always directed in some way, even at those moments when it is physically standing still. What is important for understanding the sign, then, is an understanding of the appropriate responses. The sign is not authentically grasped or encountered--it is not understood as the kind of thing that it is--if we just stare at it or if we think that it is pointing at something and look in that direction. [4] An arrow that points to something else addresses itself to "the circumspection of our concernful dealings... . The circumspective survey does not grasp the ready-to-hand; what it achieves is rather an orientation within our environment. [5] So there are a number of ways of encountering the arrow. One may even encounter it as a piece of equipment belonging to the car without understanding its function. Even in this way, we do not encounter it as a mere thing. "The experiencing of a Thing requires a definiteness of its own..., and must be contrasted with coming across a manifold of equipment, which may often be quite indefinite, even when one comes across it as especially close." (BT 110/79) But it is still the case that encountering or experiencing the arrow as a Thing does not allow us to encounter that piece of equipment authentically.

"Signs of the kind we have described let what is ready-to-hand be encountered; more precisely, they let some context of it become accessible in such a way that our concernful dealings take on an orientation and hold it secure. A sign is not a Thing which stands to another Thing in the relationship of indicating; it is rather an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself." (BT 110/79-80) You may have noticed a recurring theme at this point. The relationship of being-a-sign-for that exists between two objects is not something that obtains after-the-fact between two otherwise independent entities. Rather, it is something that occurs within an already-established context of discourse, interactions, and uses. When a driver sees the arrow on another car pointing to the left or sees a warning sign alerting him to the presence of road-work ahead, these other things are not encountered as independent, isolated, or discrete entities. Rather, they are something already understood. That is why the sign can perform its function: because it is already understood. The driver is ready for what comes ahead, or, if he is not, he encounters it as something that he should have been ready for. "Signs always indicate primarily 'wherein' one lives, where one's concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something." (BT 111/80)

Consider the example of a warning sign that alerts a driver to dangerous conditions ahead or, suppose, to the collapse of a bridge ahead. How does one establish a sign that will serve the function of communicating to drivers what is ahead? "This activity is performed in a circumspective fore-sight [Vorsicht] out of which it arises, and which requires that it be possible for one's particular environment to announce itself for circumspection at any time by means of something ready-to-hand, and that this possibility should itself be ready-to-hand." (BT 111/80) One must be able to set up a piece of equipment, ready-to-hand, that will allow the environment (including the collapsed bridge) to announce itself to the driver's circumspection. The difficulty comes in that what is most closely ready-to-hand within-the-world possesses the character of holding-itself-in, that is, of being largely invisible to us. [See H. 75-76] But a collapsed bridge is something unusual, a disruption. What is needed, then, is something that can serve the role of becoming conspicuous and so alerting the driver to the fact that something is out of place. [6]

Now one feature of warning signs to note is that they are not useful, not ready-to-hand, except in a very particular context. So when the manufacturer makes the warning sign, it is not immediately employed as the kind of thing it is until it is stationed on an appropriate road under appropriate conditions in a place where it is easily visible. But there are other signs that do immediately get established as ready-to-hand. This happens when one takes as a sign [Zum-Zeichen-nehmen]. In such a situation, what gets taken as a sign becomes accessible only through its readiness-to-hand. "If, for instance, thhe south wind 'is accepted' ["gilt"] by the farmer as a sign of rain, then this 'acceptance' ["Geltung"]--or the 'value' with which the entity is 'invested'--is not a sort of bonus over and above what is already present-at-hand in itself--viz, the flow of air in a definite geographical direction." (BT 111/80) The idea is that the south wind is not a thing in itself that becomes appropriated to the function of acting as a sign. "On the contrary, only by the circumspection with which one takes account of things in farming, is the south wind discovered in its Being." (BT 112/81) The south wind is encountered, as a sign, only within the context of the interests of farming.

Here, Heidegger addresses himself to a significant objection that may have been in your mind. "But, one will protest, that which gets taken as a sign must first have become accessible in itself and been apprehended before the sign gets established." (BT 112/81) But how would such entities be encountered in this before? As mere things? Or as equipment which has not been understood? This latter approach is to be preferred. "And here again, when the equipmental characters of the ready-to-hand are still circumspectively undiscovered, they are not to be Interpreted as bare Thinghood presented for an apprehension of what is just present-at-hand and no more." (BT 112/81) Heidegger says that a sign, in its conspicuousness and out-of-place-ness, does not merely 'document' the inconspicuousness constitutive for what is most closely ready-to-hand. Rather, the sign gets its conspicuousness from the inconspicuousness of the equipmental totality. Consider the case of a string tied around your finger, that is intended to remind you of something. Such a sign always points to something that is an object of one's concern and everyday circumspection. That larger context is presupposed and is what makes the string useful. But such a sign is very vague and can indicate many things and so is usually useful only for the person who ties and string, and even she may forget what the string was supposed to indicate or signify. However, "when the knot cannot be used as a sign, it does not lose its sign-character, but it acquires the disturbing obtrusiveness of something most closely ready-to-hand." (BT 110/81) What is important to see is that there is no point at which the sign or the thing signified are just entities in themselves, things present-at-hand, that acquire the status of sign and signified after the fact. Rather, what makes the sign a sign just is the fact that it is already embedded in a context of discourse and involvements.

Next Heidegger considers a particular case. He says that some may be tempted to try to see 'signs' in the fetishism and magic of primitive cultures, where inanimate objects are revered as being inhabited by or otherwise connecting one to spiritual beings and the spirit world. But interpreting these entities as signs will actually not enable us to grasp the kind of being-ready-to-hand that belongs to these objects. Rather, in primitive cultures, "the sign coincides with that which is indicated. Not only can the sign represent this in the sense of serving as a substitute for what it indicates, but it can do so in such a way that the sign itself always is what it indicates." (BT 113/82) Heidegger thinks that in primitive cultures the distinction between sign and signified has not yet been reached. However, he goes on to say, "But if an understanding of Being is constitutive for primitive Dasein and for the primitive world in general, then it is all the more urgent to work out the 'formal' idea of worldhood--or at least the idea of a phenomenon modifiable in such a way that all ontological assertions to the effect that in a given phenomenal context something not yet such-and-such or no longer such-and-such, may acquire a positive phenomenal meaning in terms of what it is not." (BT 113/82) [7]

The preceding points to a threefold relation between sign and reference. "1. Indicating, as a way whereby the "towards-which" of a serviceability can become concrete, is founded upon the equipment-structure as such, upon the "in-order-to" (assignment). 2. The indicating which the sign does is an equipmental character of something ready-to-hand, and as such it belongs to a totality of equipment, to a context of assignments or references. 3. The sign is not only ready-to-hand with other equipment, but in its readiness-to-hand the environment becomes in each case explicitly accessible for circumspection. A sign is something ontically ready-to-hand which functions both as this definite equipment and as something indicative of [was... anzeigt] the ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential totalities, and of worldhood." (BT 113-114/82) So, 1. When a sign indicates, it makes concrete a serviceability and a "towards-which". 2. The sign is, itself, a piece of equipment and belongs to a totality of equipment and a context of assignments and references. Within such a totality, all the items of equipment bear a relationship of reference to the "towards-which" or the "in-order-to". 3. The readiness-to-hand of a sign is such as to draw our attention, in circumspection, to the readiness-to-hand of the environment generally. A sign is a piece of equipment within a totality and context, at the ontical level; at the ontological level, it points to (indicates, refers to) the structure of readiness-to-hand of the referential totality and of worldhood.

Reference, then, is ontological more fundamental. Reference is not something that a sign does or one function that a sign performs. Rather, reference is that by which readiness-to-hand itself is constituted. A piece of equipment is ready-to-hand because it bears a relationship (of reference) to an end (a "towards-which" or "in-order-to"). We turn to the next section, then, with this question: "In what sense, then, is reference 'presupposed' ontologically in the ready-to-hand, and to what extent is it, as such an ontological foundation, at the same time constitutive for worldhood in general?" (BT 114/83)

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FOOTNOTES:

[1] I shall attempt to make clear how both these uses of 'sign' are important.

[2] As I read through this entry again, I am reminded that purely 'formal' relations have a different character than those that are connected to a particular way of being. Such relations are not as useful for understanding the being of entities. Keep this in mind.

[3] "On the other hand," Heidegger writes, "the kind of reference we get in 'serviceability-for', is an ontologico-categorial attribute of equipment as equipment. That the "towards-which" of serviceability should acquire its concreteness in indicating, is an accident of its equipment constitution as such." (BT 109/78) When I wrote this entry, I wasn't sure what to make of this apparently contrary line. I will not take it up here but will simply refer the reader to the next entry where Heidegger's treatment of these references is dealt with in a way that I think is helpful and illuminating.

[4] "The sign is not authentically 'grasped'... ...the sign is not authentically encountered." (BT 110/79) I may wish to refer to this passage later as an instance of the use of 'authentically'.

[5] Recall Heidegger's treatment of what 'circumspection' involves. "Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to'. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves in circumspection." (BT 98/69)

[6] Recall discussion of 'conspicuousness' from Section 16.

[7] Just a point regarding the use of 'formal': So Heidegger does seem to be trying to work out a formal, abstract concept--one that is manifested constantly in our immediate world of involvements, but one that is also flexible enough that it is constantly being manifested in all worlds of contexts.

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God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.