Graduate 136: BT 10: Sec. 07, Part 2
Introduction. Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being
Chapter 2. The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being. Method and Design of Our Investigation
Section 07. The Phenomenological Method of Investigation
A. The Concept of Phenomenon
Heidegger traces the etymology of the term 'phenomenon' to Greek roots that bear the following kinds of meanings: "to show itself," "to bring to the light of day, to put in the light," "the light, that which is bright--in other words, that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself." (BT 51/28) He goes on to say, "Thus we must keep in mind that the expression 'phenomenon' signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest." (BT 51/28) He says that the Greeks sometimes identified these as, simply, 'entities.'
We must keep before us Heidegger's very particular definition of 'phenomenon' as that which shows itself in itself. No ordinary or familiar construal of 'phenomenon' will do for us. Heidegger seems to be reaching for something deeper--something that grounds our ordinary concept of 'phenomenon.' He goes on to point out that an entity can show itself from itself in a variety of ways depending on the kind of access we have to it. "Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something which in itself it is not." (BT 51/28) Heidegger refers to this kind of "showing-itself" as "seeming." This is an important second signification of the Greek PAINOMENON from which the word, 'phenomenon,' is derived. [1]
So PAINOMENON has two significations: one that is captured by Heidegger's definition of 'phenomenon' as that which shows itself in itself, and another that he tries to capture by terms like 'semblant' or 'semblance' and means "something good which looks like, but 'in actuality' is not, what it gives itself out to be." (BT 51/29) Both of these significations of 'phenomenon' must be kept in mind, as must their structural interconnectedness. "Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself--that is, of being a phenomenon--can it show itself as something which it is not; only then can it 'merely look like so-and-so'." (BT 51/29) So the first signification of PAINOMENON ('phenomenon') is more primordial then and is already included in the second ('semblance').
One further and extremely important point: "But what both these terms express has proximally nothing at all to do with what is called an 'appearance', or still less a 'mere appearance'." (BT 51/29) Consider, for instance, that in connection with certain epistemological questions, some philosophers will speak of 'phenomenal experiences.' Examples of phenomenal experiences include, "Being appeared to redly," or "Feeling pain." Especially in the first case--imagine that you are looking at an apple on the table in front of you--there might be a question about whether there actually is a red object in front of you. You might suspect, for instance, that the apple is really just the product of an hallucination. You might doubt that there is a red object in front of you, however, it seems that you could not doubt that you are being appeared to redly. The 'phenomenal experience' is beyond doubt. Now this very familiar (in philosophical speak) use of the term 'phenomenal' is not what Heidegger has in mind. He explicitly rejects the interpretation of 'phenomenon' as 'appearance' or 'mere appearance.' Again, he is trying to get at something deeper. We will try to get clear about what the difference between 'phenomenon,' 'semblance,' and 'appearance,' is, but we shall first have to wade a bit deeper into Heidegger's understanding of 'appearance'.
The remainder of this passage is devoted to "clarifying" the differences between the concepts of 'phenomenon,' 'semblance,' 'appearance,' and 'mere appearance.' I say, "clarifying," because Heidegger's treatment is actually not that clear. Macquarrie and Robinson indicate in their footnote, "Though... the ensuing discussion presents relatively few difficulties... for the translator, the passage shows some signs of hasty construction..." (BT 51 Footnote 1) After going through this section several times, I think some sense can be made of it, and I will try to present that by looking at the remainder of this passage in three sections.
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"This [i.e. "appearance," or, perhaps, "mere appearance"] is what one is talking about when one speaks of the 'symptoms of disease'... . Here one has in mind certain occurrences in the body which show themselves and which, in showing themselves as thus showing themselves, 'indicate'... something which does not show itself." (BT 52/29. Brackets mine.)
Are you confused yet? So far Heidegger has defined 'phenomenon' as "that which shows itself in itself," and has defined 'semblance' as "something that looks like, but in actuality is not, what it gives itself out to be." Now he has chosen to treat 'symptoms of a disease' as 'appearances' that are connected to certain "occurrences in the body which show themselves"--i.e. phenomena--that 'indicate' something that does not show itself. Heidegger seems to be saying, at this point, that 'appearances' show-themselves and by doing so indicate the presence of some 'phenomenon' that does not show-itself. But this reading seems to be contradicted by the very next line:
"The emergence [Auftreten] of such occurrences, their showing-themselves, goes together with the Being-present-at-hand of disturbances which do not show themselves. Thus appearance, as the appearance 'of something', does not mean showing-itself; it means rather the announcing-itself by [von] something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself." (BT 52/29)
Heidegger just finished saying that when speaking of appearances, one has in mind "certain occurrences in the body which show themselves" (emphasis mine). He even goes on to refer to the emergence of these occurrences as "their showing-themselves." Then he turns completely around and says, "Thus appearance, as the appearance 'of something', does not mean showing-itself". What are we to make of this. Are appearances instances of showing-itself or not? The key lies in the qualification: "as the appearance 'of something'. The idea, here, is this: A phenomenon can show-itself or not-show-itself. An appearance can also show-itself or not-show-itself. In this sense, it is very similar to a phenomenon in the sense that Heidegger uses the term. The difference lies in that when the appearance is 'of something' else, it is not occupying the role, primarily, of showing-itself but is playing a derivative role. The phenomenon (i.e. the something else) is utilizing the appearance to announce-itself. And when a phenomenon announces-itself in this way, it is in the mode of not-showing-itself. Instead it announces itself through something which does show itself.
We must keep this in mind or we will be tripped up when Heidegger, yet again, says: "Appearing is a not-showing-itself." (BT 52/29) He will go on to draw some distinctions between appearing and semblance, but before getting to that, I want to make clear that in saying this, Heidegger is not denying that appearing is a showing-itself when (for lack of better locutions) considered in itself. Appearings are instances of showing-itself. But when they occupy a certain relationship to some other phenomena, they do not primarily occupy the role of showing-itself but rather that of announcing-itself.
Heidegger goes on to clarify a further sense in which "Appearing is a not-showing-itself. But the 'not' we find here is by no means to be confused with the privative "not" which we used in defining the structure of semblance. What appears does not show itself; and anything which thus fails to show itself, is also something which can never seem. All indications, presentations, symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing, even though they differ among themselves." (BT 52/29)
What Heidegger is doing here is drawing a distinction between 'not-showing-itself' and 'not showing-itself.' The latter is descriptive of semblances, which do not actually show themselves to be what they in fact are. The former is descriptive of the role that the appearance is occupying in virtue of announcing another phenomenon. It is because the appearance is, in this instance, not-showing-itself that it cannot be a semblance for it is not, again in this instance, showing-itself to begin with.
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Heidegger writes, "In spite of the fact that 'appearing' is never a showing-itself in the sense of "phenomenon", appearing is possible only by reason of a showing-itself of something. But that showing-itself, which helps to make possible the appearing, is not the appearing itself. Appearing is an announcing-itself [das Sich-melden] through something that shows itself." (BT 53/29)
Here Heidegger is considering the nature of appearances as appearances, and, therefore, not as showing-thsemselves, but as means of a phenomenon's announcing-itself. Curiously, he writes, "appearing is possible only by reason of a showing-itself of something." Just what is this something? Does it refer to the appearance or to the phenomenon? Heidegger says that it is not the appearing itself, which means that it must be the phenomenon. But this is a strange thing to say because Heidegger has already indicated that it is just in virtue of the phenomenon's announcing-itself by way of the appearance that the phenomenon does not show-itself. Again, to resolve this dilemma, we must look more closely at what Heidegger says. "Appearing is an announcing-itself [das Sich-melden] through something that shows itself." That something is not the "appearing" or the "phenomenon" but that wherein the appearing is achieved. So the appearing must be distinguished from the 'phenomenon' and from that wherein the appearing is achieved.
"If one then says that with the word 'appearance' we allude to something wherein something appears without being itself an appearance, one has not thereby defined the concept of phenomenon: one has rather presupposed it." (BT 53/29-30) Heidegger, here, makes clear that that wherein something appears, even though it is not, itself, the appearance, is also not the phenomenon but, rather, presupposes some separate phenomenon. Note, I think that Heidegger would be comfortable saying that that wherein something appears is a phenomenon, but when it is occupying the role of appearing, it is not treated like a phenomenon--like a showing-itself--but is that whereby the phenomenon in question announces-itself. [2]
What makes the relationship between the appearing, that wherein the appearing is achieved, and the phenomenon that is being announced difficult to understand is the tendency to use 'appears' in many different ways. So Heidegger says that in the phrase, "...that wherein something 'appears' without being itself an "appearance," the two instances need to be distinguished. With qualifications, the entire statement would read something like this: "If one then says that with the word 'appearance' we allude to something wherein something announces itself, and therefore does not show itself, without being itself a showing-itself, it is "perfectly clear" that we are not defining the concept of phenomenon." Heidegger nonetheless maintains that, "this showing-itself belongs essentially to the 'wherein' in which something announces itself. According to this, phenomena are never appearances, though on the other hand every appearance is dependent on phenomena." Appearances are not just dependent on the phenomena that they are announcing but also dependent on the phenomena wherein the appearance is actualized, although in that role the phenomenon-wherein does not show-itself.
This then is our rough taxonomy: first, there is the phenomenon, which can either show-itself or not-show-itself-and-announce-itself-by-means-of-an-appearing. Second, there is the appearing, which is never a showing-itself but is also never not showing-itself. Appearing is not-showing-itself. It is that whereby the phenomenon announces-itself. Finally, there is that wherein something announces itself. This is, I think, also a phenomenon but does not show-itself in the way that we normally think of phenomena showing themselves because it is occupying the role of grounding the appearance. It is that wherein the appearance is actualized or that wherein something (the phenomenon in question) announces itself by way of the appearing.
"So again the expression 'appearance' itself can have a double signification: first, appearing, in the sense of announcing-itself, as not-showing-itself; and next, that which does the announcing [das Meldende selbst]--that which in its showing-itself indicates something which does not show itself. And finally one can use "appearing" as a term for the genuine sense of "phenomenon" as showing-itself. If one designates these three different things as 'appearance', bewilderment is unavoidable." (BT 53/30) I heartily concur (and humbly suggest that Heidegger's treatment is not much better).
The three senses are these: (1) "announcing-itself, as not-showing-itself"; this is what the phenomenon does. It appears or makes itself known by way of an appearance or appearing. (2) that which does the announcing--that is, the appearance or the appearing. It may be that this second sense is supposed to refer to that wherein the announcing and appearing are effected. If this is right then it matches my three-fold distinction above. (3) The third sense refers to the phenomenon itself when it is occupying the role of showing-itself.
At this point, Heidegger introduces a forth possible signification of 'appearance': "That which does the announcing--that which, in its showing-itself, indicates something non-manifest--may be taken as that which emerges in what is itself non-manifest, and which emanates [ausstrahlt] from it in such a way indeed that the non-manifest gets thought of as something that is essentially never manifest." (BT 53/30) Here, then, is a kind of announcing-itself that is achieved by a "bringing forth" or "something brought forth" while the phenomenon in question is kept hidden or non-manifest. This is what Heidegger refers to as a 'mere appearance' and it is to be distinguished from a 'semblance.' "That which does the announcing and is brought forth does, of course, show itself, and in such a way that, as an emanation of what it announces, it keeps this very thing constantly veiled in itself." (BT 53/30)
What Heidegger seems to have in mind here is the relationship between what Kant referred to as phenomena and noumena. "Kant uses the term "appearance" in this twofold way. According to him "appearances" are, in the first place the 'objects of empirical intuition': they are what show itself in such intuitions. But what thus shows itself (the "phenomenon" in the genuine primordial sense) is at the same time an 'appearance' as an emanation of something which hides itself in that appearance--an emanation which announces." (BT 53-54/30) When Heidegger here speaks of "the "phenomenon" in the genuine primordial sense" he is referring to what Kant would label noumena. For Kant, the realm of noumena is unintelligible in and of itself by human agents but it is nonetheless the ground of all the appearances that human beings encounter at the phenomenal level. The derivative relationship, then, between phenomena and noumena is different from the derivative relationship between a symptom and a disease. In the former case, Heidegger wants to speak of 'mere appearances' and 'phenomena,' respectively. In the latter case, he wants to speak of 'appearances' and 'phenomena.' Now one might wonder whether there is not an important disanalogy between Heideggerian 'phenomena'-as-Kantian-noumena and Heideggerian 'phenomena'-as-disease. After all, diseases belong to the Kantian realm of the phenomenal and not the noumenal. Even diseases are (Kantian) phenomena so how can Heidegger use 'phenomenon' to refer to what Kant would speak of as a phenomenon on the one hand and as a noumenon on the other? Perhaps the disease case is supposed to be just a rough analogy. This issue will not be explored here. [3]
At this point, our taxonomy is basically complete. There are (1) phenomena, (2) appearings, (3) that wherein something appears, (4) mere appearances, (5) semblances of phenomena, and (6) semblances of appearances. (We should keep in mind that there can be a semblance of an appearance only insofar as an appearance is a showing-itself. To the extent that it is not-showing-itself it cannot be a semblance because semblances are parasitic on showings.) Heidegger gives this analogy: "In a certain kind of lighting someone can look as if his cheeks were flushed with red; and the redness which shows itself can be taken as an announcement of the Being-present-at-hand of a fever, which in turn indicates some disturbance in the organism." (BT 54/30-31) [4]
Working through this analogy the disease itself is the phenomenon. The presence of a disease or fever (or micro-organisms or infection) is not directly detectable but is rather announced by certain appearances, such as of flushed cheeks or unusual warmth to the touch. The flushing or the warmth may be understood as that wherein the appearing/announcing is made. (I'm not quite sure about this, but it seems roughly right.) These symptoms might be treated as phenomena in their own right, but in this context, they are most notable for the role that they play in announcing the presence of fever or disease that would otherwise be undetectable. I'm not sure whether anything in this scenario qualifies specifically as a 'mere appearance'; it might actually be the case that everything in this scenario is a 'mere appearance' in that it all belongs to what Kant would refer to as the phenomenal realm. I'm not sure about that point either. Now it is possible to be 'deceived' or to encounter a mere semblance at various levels. It is possible that something besides an actual fever causes the flushing and warmth that a doctor misinterprets as indicating the presence of fever. This would be a semblance of the phenomenon. It is also possible that something like a red light might lead one to think that a person is flushed and prompt one to conclude that she has fever. This would be a semblance of the appearance.
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" "Phenomenon", the showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. "Appearance", on the other hand, means a reference-relationship which is in an entity itself, and which is such that what does the referring (or the announcing) can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a 'phenomenon'." (BT 54/31) It is nice to be able to read these later passages as actually confirming the interpretation that I came to earlier but was unsure about because of apparent contradictions in what Heidegger said. Here Heidegger is highlighting just this point about the way in which for something to be an 'appearance' does not preclude it from being a 'phenomenon,' but that in that situation, that thing is playing a particular role as 'appearing'. Heidegger continues to affirm that the understanding of phenomenon as "that which shows itself in itself," is absolutely crucial for keeping distinct all these various concepts.
The sense in which both "phenomena" (strictly speaking) and "appearances" (some characteristic which an entity may have in its Being--I take Heidegger to be referring to appearance by this description) are both phenomena is what Heidegger refers to as the formal conception of "phenomenon." All this captures is that these are accessible through empirical "intuition" in the Kantian sense. This is the ordinary conception of phenomenon and is distinct, says Heidegger, from the phenomenological conception. Now it is possible to give an account of the phenomenological conception of phenomena that is derived from the Kantian (ordinary) conception. Heidegger says it would look something like this: "for we may then say that that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the "phenomenon" as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in every case, can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the 'forms of the intuition') will be the "phenomena" of phenomenology. For manifestly space and time must be able to show themselves in this way--they must be able to become phenomena--if Kant is claiming to make a transcendental assertion grounded in the facts when he says that space is the a priori "inside-which" of an ordering." (BT 54-55/31) The two illustrations that Heidegger gives here of (phenomenological) phenomena are space and time, which are the ground of and always announced in the appearing of (ordinary) phenomena. Clearly (I think Heidegger thinks) Kant had some idea of (phenomenological) phenomena as evidenced by his style of argumentation. But he goes on to say:
"If, however, the phenomenological conception of phenomenon is to be understood at all, regardless of how much closer we may come to determining the nature of that which shows itself, this presupposes inevitably that we must have an insight into the meaning of the formal conception of phenomenon and its legitimate employment in an ordinary signification." (BT 55/31) Heidegger is here taking up, again, an oft-repeated theme: that a full understanding of the primordial phenomenon should enable us to grasp fully the ordinary conception of that phenomenon. The one should follow from the other. But before we can set up our preliminary conception of phenomenology and what is phenomenological, "we must define the signification of LOGOS so as to make clear in what sense phenomenology can be a 'science of' phenomena at all." (BT 55/31)
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The remainder of this blog is devoted to my notes and sketches. When I was trying to work out what Heidegger is saying in this section, I took many wrong turns. Below are the records of my wrong turns. I suggest not reading them.
[What follows is my attempt to wade through exegeting this passage. I will try to lay out how I come to my interpretation, but some may wish to just bypass this and skip to the summary that comes after the next break.]
"This [i.e. "appearance," or, perhaps, "mere appearance"] is what one is talking about when one speaks of the 'symptoms of disease'... . Here one has in mind certain occurrences in the body which show themselves and which, in showing themselves as thus showing themselves, 'indicate'... something which does not show itself." (BT 52/29. Brackets mine.)
Are you confused yet? So far Heidegger has defined 'phenomenon' as "that which shows itself in itself," and has defined 'semblance' as "something that looks like, but in actuality is not, what it gives itself out to be." Now he has chosen to treat 'symptoms of a disease' as 'appearances' that are connected to certain "occurrences in the body which show themselves"--i.e. phenomena--that 'indicate' something that does not show itself. These occurrences that show themselves go together with the disturbances that do not show themselves. [We will discuss them more in a moment.]
Now 'appearance' does not mean "showing-itself," but is rather defined as "the announcing-itself by [von] something which does not show itself." (BT 52/29) Now we must be careful here because the grammar is liable to get confusing. The appearance, in this case, is not announcing itself; i.e. it is not announcing the appearance. Rather, the appearance is that by which the phenomenon (that which does not show itself) announces itself; i.e. announces the phenomenon. Here, Heidegger is treating 'showing-itself' and 'announcing-itself' as to very different kinds of actions or states.
Along these same lines, when Heidegger says, "Appearing is a not-showing-itself," he is not making the point that appearing is different from phenomenon, and that showing-itself belongs only to phenomenon, and that, therefore, appearing is not showing-itself. For Heidegger, saying that "Appearing is a not-showing-itself," is very different from saying, "Appearing is not showing-itself." The characteristic of not being showing-itself already belongs to "semblance." For Heidegger, both showing-itself and not-showing-itself (where each of these is a unified notion) are both involved in the idea of a phenomenon. And appearance is connected a phenomenon's not-showing-itself.
"What appears does not show itself; and anything which thus fails to show itself, is also something which can never seem. All indications, presentations, symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing, even though they differ among themselves." (BT 52/29) So on this understanding, 'symptoms' are the appearances that announce the presence of a particular phenomenon--a disease--that is not-showing-itself and announces-itself by way of the symptoms (i.e. appearances).
To reiterate: "'appearing' is never a showing-itself in the sense of "phenomenon"," but, "appearing is possible only by reason of a showing-itself of something." (BT 53/29) Showing-itself belongs to phenomena and makes possible the appearing without being, itself, the appearing. Appearing is an announcing-itself. To say that a phenomenon 'appears,' without being, itself, an appearance, one has not defined 'phenomenon' but rather presupposed it. This may not be immediately clear for there is a tendency to use 'appear' in two ways. " "That wherein something 'appears' " means that wherein something announces itself, and therefore does not show itself; and in the words [Rede] 'without being itself an "appearance"', "appearance" signifies the showing-itself." (BT 53/30) So, on this construal, a phenomenon 'appears' (i.e., is announced, by way of some appearance) without being itself an "appearance" (i.e. without showing-itself). Phenomena are never appearances but every appearance is dependent on phenomena. This order must be kept in mind. [5]
Heidegger adds to this account a fourth signification of 'appearance'. "That which does the announcing--that which, in its showing-itself, indicates something non-manifest--may be taken as that which emerges in what is itself non-manifest, and which emanates [ausstrahlt] from it in such a way indeed that the non-manifest gets thought of as something that is essentially never manifest. When that which does the announcing is taken this way, "appearance" is tantamount to a "bringing forth" or "something brought forth", but something which does not make up the real Being of what brings it forth: here we have an appearance in the sense of 'mere appearance'." (BT 53/30) This kind of announcing actually conceals and veils what does the announcing behind an "emanation" that is the "mere appearance."
"He goes on to say, "In so far as a phenomenon is constitutive for 'appearance' in the signification of announcing itself through something which shows itself, though such a phenomenon can privatively take the variant form of semblance, appearance too can become mere semblance. In a certain kind of lighting someone can look as if his cheeks were flushed with red; and the redness which shows itself can be taken as an announcement of the Being-present-at-hand of a fever, which in turn indicates some disturbance in the organism." (BT 54/30-31) EXEGETE.
""Phenomenon", the showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. "Appearance", on the other hand, means a reference-relationship which is in an entity itself, and which is such that what does the referring (or the announcing) can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a 'phenomenon'." (BT 54/31) This helps to clarify still further the relationship between 'phenomenon' and 'appearance,' both may have the characteristic of showing-itself, but only 'appearances' have the additional reference-relationship that serves to announce some further phenomenon that is not immediately showing-itself but is rather announcing-itself by way of the appearance.
"[F]or we may then say that that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the "phenomenon" as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in every case, can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the 'forms of the intuition') will be the "phenomena" of phenomenology." (BT 54-55/31)
Phenomenon : Semblance
Appearance: Mere semblance
A phenomenon can show itself as something which in itself it is.
A phenomenon can show itself as something which in itself it is not. (Seeming/semblance - something good which looks like, but 'in actuality' is not, what it gives itself out to be.)
Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself--that is, of being a phenomenon--can it show itself as something which it is not; only then can it 'merely look like so-and-so'.
Phenomenon: positive and primordial signification of PAINOMENON
Semblance: privative modification of 'phenomenon'
These meanings are proximally unconnected to 'appearance' and 'mere appearance.'
Appearance: occurrences... which show themselves and which, in showing themselves as thus showing themselves, 'indicate' something which does not show itself.
Appearance: as the appearance 'of something', does not mean showing-itself; it means rather the annoucning-itself by something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself. Appearing is a not-showing-itself.
Such appearances cannot seem to be anything other than they are because they do not purport to show anything to begin with but are rather announcing.
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FOOTNOTES:
[1] Though it would make sense, when speaking ordinarily, to speak of the two senses of PAINOMENON, I have opted to avoid using in a nontechnical way this word that Heidegger imbues with very particular meaning. In this passage, Heidegger does speak of the two significations of PAINOMENON and so, though this term may be a bit more clunky, I have opted to use it.
[2] Here is a substantial interpretive claim that might be disputed by some.
[3] Here is a substantial interpretive claim that might be worth exploring if it is found to have far-reaching implications for Heidegger's view.
[4] Here is the way that Macquarrie and Robinson break down the various classes of 'phenomena.' I believe my treatment above basically matches theirs.
"We are told several times that 'appearance' and 'phenomenon' are to be sharply distinguished; yet we are also reminded that there is a sense in which they coincide, and even this sense seems to be twofold, though it is not clear that Heidegger is fully aware of this. The whole discussion is based upon two further distinctions: the distinction between 'showing' ('zeigen') and 'announcing' ('melden') and 'bringing forth' ('hervorbringen'), and the distinction between ('x') that which 'shows itself' ('das Sichzeigende') or which 'does the announcing' ('das Meldende') orwhich 'gets brought forth' ('das Hervorgebrachte'), and ('y') that which 'announces itself' (das Sichmeldende') or which does the bringing-forth. Heidegger is thus able to introduce the following senses of 'Erscheinung' or 'appearance':
1a. an observable event y, such as a symptom which announces a disease x by showing itself, and in or through which x announces itself without showing itself;
1b. y's showing-itself;
2. x's announcing-itself in or through y;
3a. the 'mere appearance' y which x may bring forth when x is of such a kind that its real nature can never be made manifest;
3b. the 'mere appearance' which is the bringing-forth of a 'mere appearance' in sense 3a.
Heidegger makes abundantly clear that sense 2 is the proper sense of 'appearance' and that senses 3a and 3b are the proper senses of 'mere appearance'. On H. 30 and 31 he concedes that sense 1b corresponds to the primordial sense of 'phenomenon'; but his discussion on H. 28 suggests that 1a corresponds to this more accurately, and he reverts to this position towards the end of H. 30" (BT 51, 1)
[5] "So again the expression 'appearance' itself can have a double signification: first, appearing, in the sense of announcing-itself, as now-showing-itself; and next, that which does the announcing [das Meldende selbst]--that which in its showing-itself indicates something which does not show itself. And finally one can use "appearing" as a term for the genuine sense of "phenomenon" as showing-itself. If one designates these three different things as 'appearance', bewilderment is unavoidable." (BT 53/30)
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God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
Chapter 2. The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being. Method and Design of Our Investigation
Section 07. The Phenomenological Method of Investigation
A. The Concept of Phenomenon
Heidegger traces the etymology of the term 'phenomenon' to Greek roots that bear the following kinds of meanings: "to show itself," "to bring to the light of day, to put in the light," "the light, that which is bright--in other words, that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself." (BT 51/28) He goes on to say, "Thus we must keep in mind that the expression 'phenomenon' signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest." (BT 51/28) He says that the Greeks sometimes identified these as, simply, 'entities.'
We must keep before us Heidegger's very particular definition of 'phenomenon' as that which shows itself in itself. No ordinary or familiar construal of 'phenomenon' will do for us. Heidegger seems to be reaching for something deeper--something that grounds our ordinary concept of 'phenomenon.' He goes on to point out that an entity can show itself from itself in a variety of ways depending on the kind of access we have to it. "Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something which in itself it is not." (BT 51/28) Heidegger refers to this kind of "showing-itself" as "seeming." This is an important second signification of the Greek PAINOMENON from which the word, 'phenomenon,' is derived. [1]
So PAINOMENON has two significations: one that is captured by Heidegger's definition of 'phenomenon' as that which shows itself in itself, and another that he tries to capture by terms like 'semblant' or 'semblance' and means "something good which looks like, but 'in actuality' is not, what it gives itself out to be." (BT 51/29) Both of these significations of 'phenomenon' must be kept in mind, as must their structural interconnectedness. "Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself--that is, of being a phenomenon--can it show itself as something which it is not; only then can it 'merely look like so-and-so'." (BT 51/29) So the first signification of PAINOMENON ('phenomenon') is more primordial then and is already included in the second ('semblance').
One further and extremely important point: "But what both these terms express has proximally nothing at all to do with what is called an 'appearance', or still less a 'mere appearance'." (BT 51/29) Consider, for instance, that in connection with certain epistemological questions, some philosophers will speak of 'phenomenal experiences.' Examples of phenomenal experiences include, "Being appeared to redly," or "Feeling pain." Especially in the first case--imagine that you are looking at an apple on the table in front of you--there might be a question about whether there actually is a red object in front of you. You might suspect, for instance, that the apple is really just the product of an hallucination. You might doubt that there is a red object in front of you, however, it seems that you could not doubt that you are being appeared to redly. The 'phenomenal experience' is beyond doubt. Now this very familiar (in philosophical speak) use of the term 'phenomenal' is not what Heidegger has in mind. He explicitly rejects the interpretation of 'phenomenon' as 'appearance' or 'mere appearance.' Again, he is trying to get at something deeper. We will try to get clear about what the difference between 'phenomenon,' 'semblance,' and 'appearance,' is, but we shall first have to wade a bit deeper into Heidegger's understanding of 'appearance'.
The remainder of this passage is devoted to "clarifying" the differences between the concepts of 'phenomenon,' 'semblance,' 'appearance,' and 'mere appearance.' I say, "clarifying," because Heidegger's treatment is actually not that clear. Macquarrie and Robinson indicate in their footnote, "Though... the ensuing discussion presents relatively few difficulties... for the translator, the passage shows some signs of hasty construction..." (BT 51 Footnote 1) After going through this section several times, I think some sense can be made of it, and I will try to present that by looking at the remainder of this passage in three sections.
--
"This [i.e. "appearance," or, perhaps, "mere appearance"] is what one is talking about when one speaks of the 'symptoms of disease'... . Here one has in mind certain occurrences in the body which show themselves and which, in showing themselves as thus showing themselves, 'indicate'... something which does not show itself." (BT 52/29. Brackets mine.)
Are you confused yet? So far Heidegger has defined 'phenomenon' as "that which shows itself in itself," and has defined 'semblance' as "something that looks like, but in actuality is not, what it gives itself out to be." Now he has chosen to treat 'symptoms of a disease' as 'appearances' that are connected to certain "occurrences in the body which show themselves"--i.e. phenomena--that 'indicate' something that does not show itself. Heidegger seems to be saying, at this point, that 'appearances' show-themselves and by doing so indicate the presence of some 'phenomenon' that does not show-itself. But this reading seems to be contradicted by the very next line:
"The emergence [Auftreten] of such occurrences, their showing-themselves, goes together with the Being-present-at-hand of disturbances which do not show themselves. Thus appearance, as the appearance 'of something', does not mean showing-itself; it means rather the announcing-itself by [von] something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself." (BT 52/29)
Heidegger just finished saying that when speaking of appearances, one has in mind "certain occurrences in the body which show themselves" (emphasis mine). He even goes on to refer to the emergence of these occurrences as "their showing-themselves." Then he turns completely around and says, "Thus appearance, as the appearance 'of something', does not mean showing-itself". What are we to make of this. Are appearances instances of showing-itself or not? The key lies in the qualification: "as the appearance 'of something'. The idea, here, is this: A phenomenon can show-itself or not-show-itself. An appearance can also show-itself or not-show-itself. In this sense, it is very similar to a phenomenon in the sense that Heidegger uses the term. The difference lies in that when the appearance is 'of something' else, it is not occupying the role, primarily, of showing-itself but is playing a derivative role. The phenomenon (i.e. the something else) is utilizing the appearance to announce-itself. And when a phenomenon announces-itself in this way, it is in the mode of not-showing-itself. Instead it announces itself through something which does show itself.
We must keep this in mind or we will be tripped up when Heidegger, yet again, says: "Appearing is a not-showing-itself." (BT 52/29) He will go on to draw some distinctions between appearing and semblance, but before getting to that, I want to make clear that in saying this, Heidegger is not denying that appearing is a showing-itself when (for lack of better locutions) considered in itself. Appearings are instances of showing-itself. But when they occupy a certain relationship to some other phenomena, they do not primarily occupy the role of showing-itself but rather that of announcing-itself.
Heidegger goes on to clarify a further sense in which "Appearing is a not-showing-itself. But the 'not' we find here is by no means to be confused with the privative "not" which we used in defining the structure of semblance. What appears does not show itself; and anything which thus fails to show itself, is also something which can never seem. All indications, presentations, symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing, even though they differ among themselves." (BT 52/29)
What Heidegger is doing here is drawing a distinction between 'not-showing-itself' and 'not showing-itself.' The latter is descriptive of semblances, which do not actually show themselves to be what they in fact are. The former is descriptive of the role that the appearance is occupying in virtue of announcing another phenomenon. It is because the appearance is, in this instance, not-showing-itself that it cannot be a semblance for it is not, again in this instance, showing-itself to begin with.
--
Heidegger writes, "In spite of the fact that 'appearing' is never a showing-itself in the sense of "phenomenon", appearing is possible only by reason of a showing-itself of something. But that showing-itself, which helps to make possible the appearing, is not the appearing itself. Appearing is an announcing-itself [das Sich-melden] through something that shows itself." (BT 53/29)
Here Heidegger is considering the nature of appearances as appearances, and, therefore, not as showing-thsemselves, but as means of a phenomenon's announcing-itself. Curiously, he writes, "appearing is possible only by reason of a showing-itself of something." Just what is this something? Does it refer to the appearance or to the phenomenon? Heidegger says that it is not the appearing itself, which means that it must be the phenomenon. But this is a strange thing to say because Heidegger has already indicated that it is just in virtue of the phenomenon's announcing-itself by way of the appearance that the phenomenon does not show-itself. Again, to resolve this dilemma, we must look more closely at what Heidegger says. "Appearing is an announcing-itself [das Sich-melden] through something that shows itself." That something is not the "appearing" or the "phenomenon" but that wherein the appearing is achieved. So the appearing must be distinguished from the 'phenomenon' and from that wherein the appearing is achieved.
"If one then says that with the word 'appearance' we allude to something wherein something appears without being itself an appearance, one has not thereby defined the concept of phenomenon: one has rather presupposed it." (BT 53/29-30) Heidegger, here, makes clear that that wherein something appears, even though it is not, itself, the appearance, is also not the phenomenon but, rather, presupposes some separate phenomenon. Note, I think that Heidegger would be comfortable saying that that wherein something appears is a phenomenon, but when it is occupying the role of appearing, it is not treated like a phenomenon--like a showing-itself--but is that whereby the phenomenon in question announces-itself. [2]
What makes the relationship between the appearing, that wherein the appearing is achieved, and the phenomenon that is being announced difficult to understand is the tendency to use 'appears' in many different ways. So Heidegger says that in the phrase, "...that wherein something 'appears' without being itself an "appearance," the two instances need to be distinguished. With qualifications, the entire statement would read something like this: "If one then says that with the word 'appearance' we allude to something wherein something announces itself, and therefore does not show itself, without being itself a showing-itself, it is "perfectly clear" that we are not defining the concept of phenomenon." Heidegger nonetheless maintains that, "this showing-itself belongs essentially to the 'wherein' in which something announces itself. According to this, phenomena are never appearances, though on the other hand every appearance is dependent on phenomena." Appearances are not just dependent on the phenomena that they are announcing but also dependent on the phenomena wherein the appearance is actualized, although in that role the phenomenon-wherein does not show-itself.
This then is our rough taxonomy: first, there is the phenomenon, which can either show-itself or not-show-itself-and-announce-itself-by-means-of-an-appearing. Second, there is the appearing, which is never a showing-itself but is also never not showing-itself. Appearing is not-showing-itself. It is that whereby the phenomenon announces-itself. Finally, there is that wherein something announces itself. This is, I think, also a phenomenon but does not show-itself in the way that we normally think of phenomena showing themselves because it is occupying the role of grounding the appearance. It is that wherein the appearance is actualized or that wherein something (the phenomenon in question) announces itself by way of the appearing.
"So again the expression 'appearance' itself can have a double signification: first, appearing, in the sense of announcing-itself, as not-showing-itself; and next, that which does the announcing [das Meldende selbst]--that which in its showing-itself indicates something which does not show itself. And finally one can use "appearing" as a term for the genuine sense of "phenomenon" as showing-itself. If one designates these three different things as 'appearance', bewilderment is unavoidable." (BT 53/30) I heartily concur (and humbly suggest that Heidegger's treatment is not much better).
The three senses are these: (1) "announcing-itself, as not-showing-itself"; this is what the phenomenon does. It appears or makes itself known by way of an appearance or appearing. (2) that which does the announcing--that is, the appearance or the appearing. It may be that this second sense is supposed to refer to that wherein the announcing and appearing are effected. If this is right then it matches my three-fold distinction above. (3) The third sense refers to the phenomenon itself when it is occupying the role of showing-itself.
At this point, Heidegger introduces a forth possible signification of 'appearance': "That which does the announcing--that which, in its showing-itself, indicates something non-manifest--may be taken as that which emerges in what is itself non-manifest, and which emanates [ausstrahlt] from it in such a way indeed that the non-manifest gets thought of as something that is essentially never manifest." (BT 53/30) Here, then, is a kind of announcing-itself that is achieved by a "bringing forth" or "something brought forth" while the phenomenon in question is kept hidden or non-manifest. This is what Heidegger refers to as a 'mere appearance' and it is to be distinguished from a 'semblance.' "That which does the announcing and is brought forth does, of course, show itself, and in such a way that, as an emanation of what it announces, it keeps this very thing constantly veiled in itself." (BT 53/30)
What Heidegger seems to have in mind here is the relationship between what Kant referred to as phenomena and noumena. "Kant uses the term "appearance" in this twofold way. According to him "appearances" are, in the first place the 'objects of empirical intuition': they are what show itself in such intuitions. But what thus shows itself (the "phenomenon" in the genuine primordial sense) is at the same time an 'appearance' as an emanation of something which hides itself in that appearance--an emanation which announces." (BT 53-54/30) When Heidegger here speaks of "the "phenomenon" in the genuine primordial sense" he is referring to what Kant would label noumena. For Kant, the realm of noumena is unintelligible in and of itself by human agents but it is nonetheless the ground of all the appearances that human beings encounter at the phenomenal level. The derivative relationship, then, between phenomena and noumena is different from the derivative relationship between a symptom and a disease. In the former case, Heidegger wants to speak of 'mere appearances' and 'phenomena,' respectively. In the latter case, he wants to speak of 'appearances' and 'phenomena.' Now one might wonder whether there is not an important disanalogy between Heideggerian 'phenomena'-as-Kantian-noumena and Heideggerian 'phenomena'-as-disease. After all, diseases belong to the Kantian realm of the phenomenal and not the noumenal. Even diseases are (Kantian) phenomena so how can Heidegger use 'phenomenon' to refer to what Kant would speak of as a phenomenon on the one hand and as a noumenon on the other? Perhaps the disease case is supposed to be just a rough analogy. This issue will not be explored here. [3]
At this point, our taxonomy is basically complete. There are (1) phenomena, (2) appearings, (3) that wherein something appears, (4) mere appearances, (5) semblances of phenomena, and (6) semblances of appearances. (We should keep in mind that there can be a semblance of an appearance only insofar as an appearance is a showing-itself. To the extent that it is not-showing-itself it cannot be a semblance because semblances are parasitic on showings.) Heidegger gives this analogy: "In a certain kind of lighting someone can look as if his cheeks were flushed with red; and the redness which shows itself can be taken as an announcement of the Being-present-at-hand of a fever, which in turn indicates some disturbance in the organism." (BT 54/30-31) [4]
Working through this analogy the disease itself is the phenomenon. The presence of a disease or fever (or micro-organisms or infection) is not directly detectable but is rather announced by certain appearances, such as of flushed cheeks or unusual warmth to the touch. The flushing or the warmth may be understood as that wherein the appearing/announcing is made. (I'm not quite sure about this, but it seems roughly right.) These symptoms might be treated as phenomena in their own right, but in this context, they are most notable for the role that they play in announcing the presence of fever or disease that would otherwise be undetectable. I'm not sure whether anything in this scenario qualifies specifically as a 'mere appearance'; it might actually be the case that everything in this scenario is a 'mere appearance' in that it all belongs to what Kant would refer to as the phenomenal realm. I'm not sure about that point either. Now it is possible to be 'deceived' or to encounter a mere semblance at various levels. It is possible that something besides an actual fever causes the flushing and warmth that a doctor misinterprets as indicating the presence of fever. This would be a semblance of the phenomenon. It is also possible that something like a red light might lead one to think that a person is flushed and prompt one to conclude that she has fever. This would be a semblance of the appearance.
--
" "Phenomenon", the showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. "Appearance", on the other hand, means a reference-relationship which is in an entity itself, and which is such that what does the referring (or the announcing) can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a 'phenomenon'." (BT 54/31) It is nice to be able to read these later passages as actually confirming the interpretation that I came to earlier but was unsure about because of apparent contradictions in what Heidegger said. Here Heidegger is highlighting just this point about the way in which for something to be an 'appearance' does not preclude it from being a 'phenomenon,' but that in that situation, that thing is playing a particular role as 'appearing'. Heidegger continues to affirm that the understanding of phenomenon as "that which shows itself in itself," is absolutely crucial for keeping distinct all these various concepts.
The sense in which both "phenomena" (strictly speaking) and "appearances" (some characteristic which an entity may have in its Being--I take Heidegger to be referring to appearance by this description) are both phenomena is what Heidegger refers to as the formal conception of "phenomenon." All this captures is that these are accessible through empirical "intuition" in the Kantian sense. This is the ordinary conception of phenomenon and is distinct, says Heidegger, from the phenomenological conception. Now it is possible to give an account of the phenomenological conception of phenomena that is derived from the Kantian (ordinary) conception. Heidegger says it would look something like this: "for we may then say that that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the "phenomenon" as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in every case, can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the 'forms of the intuition') will be the "phenomena" of phenomenology. For manifestly space and time must be able to show themselves in this way--they must be able to become phenomena--if Kant is claiming to make a transcendental assertion grounded in the facts when he says that space is the a priori "inside-which" of an ordering." (BT 54-55/31) The two illustrations that Heidegger gives here of (phenomenological) phenomena are space and time, which are the ground of and always announced in the appearing of (ordinary) phenomena. Clearly (I think Heidegger thinks) Kant had some idea of (phenomenological) phenomena as evidenced by his style of argumentation. But he goes on to say:
"If, however, the phenomenological conception of phenomenon is to be understood at all, regardless of how much closer we may come to determining the nature of that which shows itself, this presupposes inevitably that we must have an insight into the meaning of the formal conception of phenomenon and its legitimate employment in an ordinary signification." (BT 55/31) Heidegger is here taking up, again, an oft-repeated theme: that a full understanding of the primordial phenomenon should enable us to grasp fully the ordinary conception of that phenomenon. The one should follow from the other. But before we can set up our preliminary conception of phenomenology and what is phenomenological, "we must define the signification of LOGOS so as to make clear in what sense phenomenology can be a 'science of' phenomena at all." (BT 55/31)
--
--
The remainder of this blog is devoted to my notes and sketches. When I was trying to work out what Heidegger is saying in this section, I took many wrong turns. Below are the records of my wrong turns. I suggest not reading them.
[What follows is my attempt to wade through exegeting this passage. I will try to lay out how I come to my interpretation, but some may wish to just bypass this and skip to the summary that comes after the next break.]
"This [i.e. "appearance," or, perhaps, "mere appearance"] is what one is talking about when one speaks of the 'symptoms of disease'... . Here one has in mind certain occurrences in the body which show themselves and which, in showing themselves as thus showing themselves, 'indicate'... something which does not show itself." (BT 52/29. Brackets mine.)
Are you confused yet? So far Heidegger has defined 'phenomenon' as "that which shows itself in itself," and has defined 'semblance' as "something that looks like, but in actuality is not, what it gives itself out to be." Now he has chosen to treat 'symptoms of a disease' as 'appearances' that are connected to certain "occurrences in the body which show themselves"--i.e. phenomena--that 'indicate' something that does not show itself. These occurrences that show themselves go together with the disturbances that do not show themselves. [We will discuss them more in a moment.]
Now 'appearance' does not mean "showing-itself," but is rather defined as "the announcing-itself by [von] something which does not show itself." (BT 52/29) Now we must be careful here because the grammar is liable to get confusing. The appearance, in this case, is not announcing itself; i.e. it is not announcing the appearance. Rather, the appearance is that by which the phenomenon (that which does not show itself) announces itself; i.e. announces the phenomenon. Here, Heidegger is treating 'showing-itself' and 'announcing-itself' as to very different kinds of actions or states.
Along these same lines, when Heidegger says, "Appearing is a not-showing-itself," he is not making the point that appearing is different from phenomenon, and that showing-itself belongs only to phenomenon, and that, therefore, appearing is not showing-itself. For Heidegger, saying that "Appearing is a not-showing-itself," is very different from saying, "Appearing is not showing-itself." The characteristic of not being showing-itself already belongs to "semblance." For Heidegger, both showing-itself and not-showing-itself (where each of these is a unified notion) are both involved in the idea of a phenomenon. And appearance is connected a phenomenon's not-showing-itself.
"What appears does not show itself; and anything which thus fails to show itself, is also something which can never seem. All indications, presentations, symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing, even though they differ among themselves." (BT 52/29) So on this understanding, 'symptoms' are the appearances that announce the presence of a particular phenomenon--a disease--that is not-showing-itself and announces-itself by way of the symptoms (i.e. appearances).
To reiterate: "'appearing' is never a showing-itself in the sense of "phenomenon"," but, "appearing is possible only by reason of a showing-itself of something." (BT 53/29) Showing-itself belongs to phenomena and makes possible the appearing without being, itself, the appearing. Appearing is an announcing-itself. To say that a phenomenon 'appears,' without being, itself, an appearance, one has not defined 'phenomenon' but rather presupposed it. This may not be immediately clear for there is a tendency to use 'appear' in two ways. " "That wherein something 'appears' " means that wherein something announces itself, and therefore does not show itself; and in the words [Rede] 'without being itself an "appearance"', "appearance" signifies the showing-itself." (BT 53/30) So, on this construal, a phenomenon 'appears' (i.e., is announced, by way of some appearance) without being itself an "appearance" (i.e. without showing-itself). Phenomena are never appearances but every appearance is dependent on phenomena. This order must be kept in mind. [5]
Heidegger adds to this account a fourth signification of 'appearance'. "That which does the announcing--that which, in its showing-itself, indicates something non-manifest--may be taken as that which emerges in what is itself non-manifest, and which emanates [ausstrahlt] from it in such a way indeed that the non-manifest gets thought of as something that is essentially never manifest. When that which does the announcing is taken this way, "appearance" is tantamount to a "bringing forth" or "something brought forth", but something which does not make up the real Being of what brings it forth: here we have an appearance in the sense of 'mere appearance'." (BT 53/30) This kind of announcing actually conceals and veils what does the announcing behind an "emanation" that is the "mere appearance."
"He goes on to say, "In so far as a phenomenon is constitutive for 'appearance' in the signification of announcing itself through something which shows itself, though such a phenomenon can privatively take the variant form of semblance, appearance too can become mere semblance. In a certain kind of lighting someone can look as if his cheeks were flushed with red; and the redness which shows itself can be taken as an announcement of the Being-present-at-hand of a fever, which in turn indicates some disturbance in the organism." (BT 54/30-31) EXEGETE.
""Phenomenon", the showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. "Appearance", on the other hand, means a reference-relationship which is in an entity itself, and which is such that what does the referring (or the announcing) can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a 'phenomenon'." (BT 54/31) This helps to clarify still further the relationship between 'phenomenon' and 'appearance,' both may have the characteristic of showing-itself, but only 'appearances' have the additional reference-relationship that serves to announce some further phenomenon that is not immediately showing-itself but is rather announcing-itself by way of the appearance.
"[F]or we may then say that that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the "phenomenon" as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in every case, can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the 'forms of the intuition') will be the "phenomena" of phenomenology." (BT 54-55/31)
Phenomenon : Semblance
Appearance: Mere semblance
A phenomenon can show itself as something which in itself it is.
A phenomenon can show itself as something which in itself it is not. (Seeming/semblance - something good which looks like, but 'in actuality' is not, what it gives itself out to be.)
Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself--that is, of being a phenomenon--can it show itself as something which it is not; only then can it 'merely look like so-and-so'.
Phenomenon: positive and primordial signification of PAINOMENON
Semblance: privative modification of 'phenomenon'
These meanings are proximally unconnected to 'appearance' and 'mere appearance.'
Appearance: occurrences... which show themselves and which, in showing themselves as thus showing themselves, 'indicate' something which does not show itself.
Appearance: as the appearance 'of something', does not mean showing-itself; it means rather the annoucning-itself by something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself. Appearing is a not-showing-itself.
Such appearances cannot seem to be anything other than they are because they do not purport to show anything to begin with but are rather announcing.
--
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Though it would make sense, when speaking ordinarily, to speak of the two senses of PAINOMENON, I have opted to avoid using in a nontechnical way this word that Heidegger imbues with very particular meaning. In this passage, Heidegger does speak of the two significations of PAINOMENON and so, though this term may be a bit more clunky, I have opted to use it.
[2] Here is a substantial interpretive claim that might be disputed by some.
[3] Here is a substantial interpretive claim that might be worth exploring if it is found to have far-reaching implications for Heidegger's view.
[4] Here is the way that Macquarrie and Robinson break down the various classes of 'phenomena.' I believe my treatment above basically matches theirs.
"We are told several times that 'appearance' and 'phenomenon' are to be sharply distinguished; yet we are also reminded that there is a sense in which they coincide, and even this sense seems to be twofold, though it is not clear that Heidegger is fully aware of this. The whole discussion is based upon two further distinctions: the distinction between 'showing' ('zeigen') and 'announcing' ('melden') and 'bringing forth' ('hervorbringen'), and the distinction between ('x') that which 'shows itself' ('das Sichzeigende') or which 'does the announcing' ('das Meldende') orwhich 'gets brought forth' ('das Hervorgebrachte'), and ('y') that which 'announces itself' (das Sichmeldende') or which does the bringing-forth. Heidegger is thus able to introduce the following senses of 'Erscheinung' or 'appearance':
1a. an observable event y, such as a symptom which announces a disease x by showing itself, and in or through which x announces itself without showing itself;
1b. y's showing-itself;
2. x's announcing-itself in or through y;
3a. the 'mere appearance' y which x may bring forth when x is of such a kind that its real nature can never be made manifest;
3b. the 'mere appearance' which is the bringing-forth of a 'mere appearance' in sense 3a.
Heidegger makes abundantly clear that sense 2 is the proper sense of 'appearance' and that senses 3a and 3b are the proper senses of 'mere appearance'. On H. 30 and 31 he concedes that sense 1b corresponds to the primordial sense of 'phenomenon'; but his discussion on H. 28 suggests that 1a corresponds to this more accurately, and he reverts to this position towards the end of H. 30" (BT 51, 1)
[5] "So again the expression 'appearance' itself can have a double signification: first, appearing, in the sense of announcing-itself, as now-showing-itself; and next, that which does the announcing [das Meldende selbst]--that which in its showing-itself indicates something which does not show itself. And finally one can use "appearing" as a term for the genuine sense of "phenomenon" as showing-itself. If one designates these three different things as 'appearance', bewilderment is unavoidable." (BT 53/30)
--
God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
posted by Metaphysician_delta | 11:08 AM
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