Introduction. Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being
Chapter 2. The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being. Method and Design of Our Investigation
Section 07. The Phenomenological Method of Investigation
C. The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology
In drawing together the preceding "Interpretations" of 'phenomenon' and 'logos,' Heidegger is struck by the "inner relationship between the things meant by these terms." (BT 58/34) He concludes: "Thus, "phenomenology" means APOPHAINESTHAI TA PHAINOMENA--to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning of that branch of research which calls itself "phenomenology". But here we are expressing nothing else than the maxim formulated above: 'To the things themselves!'" (BT 58/34) [1]
[It would be good to make more explicit the 'inner relationship' through looking at LOGOS and PHAINOMENON. Promissory.]
From this definition, we can see that "phenomenology," on Heidegger's interpretation, does not designate that object of study in the way that "theology" does. "The word merely informs us of the "how" with which what is to be treated in this science gets exhibited and handled. To have a science 'of' phenomena means to grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly." (BT 59/35) Caught up in this concept is an implicit prohibition against characterizing anything without such a demonstration.
One may wonder, at this point, just what Heidegger has in mind when speaking of 'descriptions' and 'demonstrations'. That is a question we should keep in mind as we continue to read. Heidegger says: "The character of this description itself, the specific meaning of the LOGOS, can be established first of all in terms of the 'thinghood' ["Sachheit"] of what is to be 'described'--that is to say, of what is to be given scientific definiteness as we encounter it phenomenally. The signification of "phenomenon", as conceived both formally and in the ordinary manner, is such that any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself, may be called "phenomenology" with formal justification." (BT 59/35) What Heidegger is doing here is clarifying the pertinent (for his investigation) sense in which something can be encountered phenomenally. You may recall from earlier sections (See Graduate 136.) that Heidegger recognizes several different conceptions of phenomenon. Any act of exhibiting an entity as it shows itself in itself may be dubbed "phenomenology" in the formal (ordinary) signification of that word. But there is also the phenomenological conception and that is what Heidegger is mainly concerned with. So he asks: "Now what must be taken into account if the formal conception of phenomenon is to be deformalized into the phenomenological one, and how is this latter to be distinguished from the ordinary conception?" (BT 59/35)
Heidegger believes that there is a close relationship between the formal (ordinary) conception and the phenomenological conception of phenomenon. (See Graduate 136.) The latter is the ground of the former. So it is always present whenever something is exhibited formally, but it also remains hidden. So Heidegger writes: "What is it that by its very essence is necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit something explicitly? Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground." (BT 59/35)
Here is the answer to that riddle: "Yet that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets covered up again, or which shows itself only 'in disguise', is not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities, as our previous observations have shown. This Being can be covered up so extensively that is becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or about its meaning. Thus that which demands that it become a phenomenon, and which demands this in a distinctive sense and in terms of its ownmost content as a thing, is what phenomenology has taken into its grasp thematically as its object." (BT 59/35)
We saw in the Introduction to section 07 (See Graduate 135.) that Heidegger thinks that phenomenology is the proper method for investigating the being of entities or the meaning [sense] of being in general. "The task of ontology," he writes, "is to explain Being itself and to make the Being of entities stand out in full relief." (BT 49/27) But if that is the task of ontology, then it must proceed by the phenomenological method, since "phenomenology" means "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself." (BT 58/34) But notice: what is the object of the phenomenological investigation? Heidegger says, "Thus that which demands that it (i.e. being) become a phenomenon, and which demands this in a distinctive sense and in terms of its ownmost content as a thing, is what phenomenology has taken into its grasp thematically as its object." (BT 59/35, Italics mine.) So the object of this phenomenology is not, directly, the being of entities. Rather, the object of the phenomenological investigation is Dasein, since Dasein is that which seeks to understand the being of entities and to do so in terms of its ownmost content as a thing. This point will be further clarified later. [2]
Heidegger continues: "Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible. In the phenomenological conception of "phenomenon" what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives. And this showing-itself is not just any showing-itself, nor is it some such thing as appearing. Least of all can the Being of entities ever be anything such that 'behind it' stands something else 'which does not appear'. (BT 60/35-36)
Here Heidegger begins to weave together themes and ideas from his earlier treatments of 'phenomenon' and 'logos'. It is in this context that one must be careful how one treats expressions like "appearing" and "uncovering" since those terms have been introduced in very particular contexts. In laying out all the various senses of 'phenomenon,' Heidegger notes a number of these senses in which the way that something shows itself is indicative or reflective of some underlying phenomenon that gives rise to that showing. His point here is that the kind of showing-itself that we are interested in--that is connected with the Being of entities--is not any one of these other kinds of showings. Rather, it is fundamental. There is nothing 'behind' them and just because they are 'for the most part not given, there is need for phenomenology.' (BT 60/36)
Heidegger goes on to say that "Covered-up-ness is the counter-concept to 'phenomenon'." (60/36) And he examines the various ways in which a phenomenon may be covered up. First, he says, a phenomenon can be covered up in the sense that it is still undiscovered. It is neither known or unknown. [3] Second, he says that a phenomenon can be buried over. It was at some point discovered but then "deteriorated" to the point of getting covered up again. In this sense, something may be covered over completely or else remain visible only as a semblance. This is the third way that something may be covered-up. "Yet so much semblance, so much 'Being'. This covering-up as 'disguising' is both the most frequent and the most dangerous, for here the possibilities of deceiving and misleading are especially stubborn." (BT 60/36) He goes on to suggest that those structures of being may remain clear in some sense when bound up in a system. (At this point, I am not sure whether this is a sincere or ironic statement. He could be mocking the idea of systems and saying that they actually contribute to the disguising, or he could be pointing out that within rigorous systems, phenomena may retain certain important features and characteristics.)
"The covering-up itself, whether in the sense of hiddenness, burying-over, or disguise, has in turn two possibilities. There are coverings-up which are accidental; there are also some which are necessary, grounded in what the thing discovered consists in [der Bestandart des Entdeckten]. Whenever a phenomenological concept is drawn from primordial sources, there is a possibility that it may degenerate if communicated in the form of an assertion. It gets understood in an empty way and is thus passed on, losing its indigenous character, and becoming a free-floating thesis. Even in the concrete work of phenomenology itself there lurks the possibility that what has been primordially 'within our grasp' may become hardened so that we can no longer grasp it. And the difficulty of this kind of research lies in making it self-critical in a positive sense." (BT 60-61/36) A comment about my parenthetical note in the preceding paragraph: It seems that Heidegger was sincere in pointing to the way in which the 'structures of being' may "claim their right" or "present themselves as something 'clear'" within a system. In this quotation he seems to be pointing to the way in which assertions divorced from their context become dangerous in the sense that they can more easily be misconstrued and lead to disguising.
Heidegger says, "The way in which Being and its structures are encountered in the mode of phenomenon is one which must first of all be wrested from the objects of phenomenology." (BT 61/37) (I confess that this claim is less clear to me. What is the 'mode of phenomenon' and isn't being, itself, the object of phenomenology... or does phenomenology describe a method. Hmm...) He says that the point of departure, the way of access, and the passage through the covering up must be carefully secured by proper method. Interestingly, he says, "The idea of grasping and explicating phenomena in a way which is 'original' and 'intuitive' ["originaren" und "intuitiven"] is directly opposed to the naivete of a haphazard, 'immediate', and unreflective 'beholding'. ["Schauen"]." (BT 61/37) So 'intuitive' is not the same is 'immediate' or 'unreflective'.
Now we are in a position to fix the significations or meanings of 'phenomenal' and 'phenomenological'. "That which is given and explicable in the way the phenomenon is encountered is called 'phenomenal'... Everything which belongs to the species of exhibiting and explicating and which goes to make up the way of conceiving demanded by this research, is called 'phenomenological'. (BT 61/37)
[*] Heidegger says that phenomena, understood phenomenologically, are never anything but what goes to make up being, and he says that being is in every case the being of some entity. So if our aim is that being should be 'laid bare' we must carefully select the entity that we will serve as an adequate point of departure for this investigation. "These entities must... show themselves with the kind of access which genuinely belongs to them. ... If our analysis is to be authentic, its aim is such that the prior task of assuring ourselves 'phenomenologically' of that entity which is to serve as our example, has already been prescribed as our point of departure." (BT 61/37) What is that point of departure? Dasein.
"With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities--ontology. In explaining the tasks of ontology we found it necessary that there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme that entity which is ontologico-ontically distinctive, Dasein, in order to confront the cardinal problem--the question of the meaning of Being in general. Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation. The LOGOS of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a ERMENEUEIN, through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structure of Being which Dasein itself posses are made known to Dasein's understanding of Being. The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting." It is also 'hermeneutic' in the sense that it is working out the conditions for the possibility of any ontological investigation (especially of entities other than Dasein). 'Hermeneutic' also has the sense of "an analytic of the existentiality of existence; and this is the sense which is philosophically primary. Then so far as this hermeneutic works out Dasein's historicality ontologically as the ontical condition for the possibility of historiology, it contains the roots of what can be called 'hermeneutic' only in a derivative sense: the methodology of those humane sciences which are historiological in character." (BT 61-62/37-38)
Heidegger reminds his readers that being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is not a class or genus of entities. Rather, it pertains to every entity and so is 'universal'. "Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being is a transcendens pure and simple. And the transcendence of Dasein's Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation. Every disclosure of Being as the transcendens is transcedental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritaas transcendentalis." (BT 62/38)
Ontology and phenomenology are not distinct philosophical disciplines or just one among many other philosophical disciplines. Rather, for Heidegger, philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, "and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns." (BT 62/38)
As he closes this section, Heidegger acknowledges his debt to Edmund Husserl in whose work phenomenology first emerged. He writes, "Our commentts on the preliminary conception of phenomenology have shown that what is essential in it does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical 'movement' ["Richtung"]. Higher than actuality stands possibility. We can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility." (BT 62-63/38) [4] He goes on to make a few 'disclaimers' about the difficulty of the material that will follow, pointing out that the task of grasping entities in their being is one for which "we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 'grammar'." (BT 63/39) He cites Plato's Parmenides and Aristotle's Metaphysics (bk. 7, ch. 4) as places where the analysis of being is taken up, but indicates that his own investigation will delve more deeply.
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FOOTNOTES:
[1] "[T]he maxim formulated above" refers to BT 50/28. See Graduate 135.
[2] Indeed, this point is clarified at the bottom of BT 61/37. See the paragraph marked with [*].
[3] Macquarrie and Robinson offer the following footnote to the, admittedly cryptic line, "It is neither known no unknown": "'Uber seinen Bestand gibt es weder Kenntnis noch Unkenntnis.' The earllier editions have 'Erkenntnis' where the latter ones have 'Unkenntnis'. The word Bestand' always presents difficulties in Heidegger; here it permits either of two interpretations, which we have deliberately steered between: 'Whether there is any such thing, is neither known nor unknown', and 'What it comprises is something of which we have neither knowledge nor ignorance.'"
[4] What Heidegger is saying about 'possibility' here is not clear to me.
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God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
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