Graduate 143: BT 15: Sec. 09
Part I. The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being
Division 1. Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein
Chapter 1. Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein
Section 09. The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein
It is necessary at the very outset to make clear how the investigation of the being of Dasein differs from the investigation of the being of any other kind of entity. It is necessary to make clear how the being of Dasein differs from that of other kinds of entities. Heidegger first gestures at this point by saying, "The Being of any such entity [as we ourselves] is in each case mine." (BT 67/41) This is not meant to point to any kind of solipsism but rather points to the fact that Dasein is different from other entities because it has a relationship to its own being that other kinds of entities do not have toward their own being. "These entities [i.e. Dasein], in their Being, comport themselves towards their Being. ... Being is that which is an issue for every such entity." (BT 67/41-42)
Here, as noted at the end of section 07, we face the challenge of a language inadequate to strictly capture the relationships that Heidegger is trying to describe, but we shall do our best to make headway. He says that two consequences follow from this initial characterization of Dasein's being. The first consequence is that the being of Dasein cannot be construed in terms of existentia as that has traditionally been understood. "The 'essence' ["Wesen"] of this entity lies in its "to be" [Zu-sein]. Its Being-what-it-is [Was-sein] (essentia) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia). But here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the Being of this entity as "existence" [Existenz], this term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the traditional term "existentia"." (BT 67/42) The kind of being or existence that has traditionally been ascribed to entities in the world is the kind of being that Heidegger refers to as being-present-at-hand. But whether or not this kind of being belongs to Dasein (and I cannot claim to know at this point whether Heidegger thinks it does or can), it is the case that it is not the kind of being that makes Dasein distinctive. So, hereafter, Heidegger accepts the convention of using the expression being-present-at-hand to stand for the kind of being that has traditionally been referred to by the expression "existentia", and using the expression "existence", to designate the being that belongs solely to Dasein.
"The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence." Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that." (BT 67/42) Here, again, we see Heidegger emphasizing the place of 'possibilities' and differentiating these from 'properties' as we often speak of them--as things that some entity possesses. "So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being." (BT 67/42) (It may be that we are to draw a close connection between Dasein's being and Dasein's way of being. I cannot say at this point.)
The second consequence of this preliminary characterization of the being of Dasein is this: "That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine." (BT 67/42) Heidegger emphasizes that Dasein is not just one member of a larger genus of entities that are present-at-hand. He says, "To entities such as these [i.e. present-at-hand], their Being is 'a matter of indifference'; or more precisely, they 'are' such that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite." (BT 68/42) This is related to the idea that being is an issue for Dasein. Entities that are merely present-at-hand are not just indifferent to the question of being, in contrast to Dasein, which are concerned about that question; rather, entities that are merely present-at-hand are not the kinds of things that could be either concerned or indifferent about the question in the first place. This is the great contrast.
Heidegger continues: "Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decisions as to the way in which it is in each case mine [je meines]. That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-at-hand would." (BT 68/42) One of the peculiar things to note about Heidegger's way of speaking of Dasein is the tendencies to objectify it--to speak of that Dasein that is mine as if it were separate from me. We must be careful here, for it may well be that Heidegger this objectification is not intended to reflect the actual relationship that I bear to 'my' Dasein, but is just a function of the language. If we sense a recursiveness or circularity in the relationship between an Dasein and its being, that is probably right. We should look for ways to make this relationship clear.
In speaking of possibilities, Heidegger says that Dasein is, in each case, essentially its own possibilities. He speaks of it as being able either to 'win' itself or 'lose' itself. He goes on: "But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic--that is, something of its own--can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity--when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment." (BT 68/43)
The idea of authenticity has been raised before, though it has not been (and remains to be) made really clear what Heidegger means by that. However, one important clue does come to us from thinking about the original German. 'Authentic' or 'real' are the familiar English translations of the German 'eigentlich' which is etymologically related to the word 'eigen' which means 'own'. So, for Heidegger, included in the idea of eigentlich is the idea of owning or ownership. For this reason, some have preferred to translate 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity' as 'own-li-ness' and 'un-own-li-ness'. Translating it in this way makes clearer Heidegger's comments in the above quotation like, "something of its own," "chosen terminologically in a strict sense," "Dasein is characterized by mineness." I will plan, in general, on continuing to follow the Macquarrie and Robinson translation, but may insert comments about the alternative translation where I think it is appropriate or helpful.
Part of what will need to be explicated is the relationship between being, possibilities, and authenticity (own-li-ness). When Heidegger says that Dasein comports itself towards its being as its ownmost possibility, is that descriptive of Dasein under the own-ly mode of being, or under the un-own-ly mode of being or in general? There seems to be something essential to Dasein that is not lost or altered just by virtue of its being own-ly or un-own-ly. We shall have to watch out for this.
Heidegger continues: "The two characteristics of Dasein which we have sketched--the priority of 'existentia' over essentia, and the fact that Dasein is in each case mine [die Jemeinigkeit]--have already indicated that in the analytic of this entity we are facing a peculiar phenomenal domain." (BT 68/47) [1] Dasein does not have the kind of being which belongs to something merely present-at-hand, and so it cannot be approached in that way for the purposes of theoretical (or thematical) explication. He goes on: "The right way of presenting it is so far from self-evident that to determine what form it shall take is itself an essential part of the ontological analytic of this entity. Only by presenting this entity in the right way can we have any understanding of its Being. No matter how provisional our analysis may be, it always requires the assurance that we have started correctly." (BT 69/43)
On this point, Heidegger continues: "In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands. This is the formal meaning of Dasein's existential constitution. But this tells us that if we are to Interpret this entity ontologically, the problematic of its Being must be developed from the existentiality of its existence." (BT 69/43) What it means for Dasein to be a possibility is still unclear. (Again, I think it has to do with the idea of there being different ways of being.) But Heidegger makes clear that Dasein should not be understood in terms of any particular possible idea of existence. Instead, Heidegger says, Dasein should be Interpreted and uncovered in the "undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part. This undifferentiated character of Dasein's everydayness is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity. Out of this kind of Being--and back into it again--is all existing, such as it is. We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein "averageness" [Durchschnittlichkeit]." (BT 69/43) It may strike as strange that Heidegger would say that the undifferentiated character of Dasein's ordinary way of being has a positive phenomenal content. In order to understand what he means by 'undifferentiated', it seems, we need to have a certain context in mind. Just as he earlier drew a distinction between two senses of 'indifferent', so we must watch out for multiple senses of 'undifferentiated'.
His characterization of this 'undifferentiated' character of Dasein's everydayness and averageness will have important implications for what follows. The first thing to note about it is that it's very familiarity has stood as a hindrance to its being taken seriously and carefully considered. Heidegger says, "And because this average everydayness makes up what is ontically proximal for this entity, it has again and again been passed over in explicating Dasein. That which is ontically closest and well known, is ontologically the farthest and not known at all; and its ontological signification is constantly overlooked." (BT 69/43) In a previous entry, I used the analogy of one's relationship to one's own face which is, in one sense, closest to me in that it is my own face, and yet there may be an important sense in which I know my own face (and am able to know my face) less well than I can the face of a person standing in front of me. Similarly, Heidegger suggests that our average everyday way of being is so familiar that we often overlook it and consequently fail to recognize its significance for understanding our own ontology. In looking to the ontological task, then, Heidegger says, "not only must this entity not be missed in that kind of Being in which it is phenomenally closest, but it must be made accessible by a positive characterization." (BT 69/44)
In the next paragraph, he writes: "Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies a priori. And here too Dasein's Being is an issue for it in definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof." [2] (BT 69/44) Here we see that existentiality must be differentiated from either own-li-ness or un-own-li-ness. Existentiality, as such, is identical to neither of these stances. More will have to be said later about the relationship of un-own-li-ness to 'fleeing' and 'forgetfulness'.
"But the explication of Dasein in its average everydayness does not give us just average structures in the sense of a hazy indefiniteness. Anything which, taken ontically, is in an average way, can be very well grasped ontologically in pregnant structures which may be structurally indistinguishable from certain ontological characteristics [Bestimmungen] of an authentic Being of Dasein." (BT 70/44) Here Heidegger is pointing to the way in which consideration of Dasein's average everydayness can serve as a guide to understanding the being of Dasein as such. Look at the average structures does not just give us information about those structures. Dasein, which can be viewed ontically and as existing in an average way, can be considered in such a way as to illuminate those structures that underly both the un-own-ly and the own-ly (authentic) being of Dasein.
"All explicata to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by considering Dasein's existence-structure. Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them "existentialia". These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call "categories"--characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein." (BT 70/44) Here is a vocabulary point that we must keep in mind: existentialia are the characters of Dasein's being defined in terms of existentiality. It is possible to define the characters of a certain entity's being in some other terms; for instance, in terms of categories. But to do so in Dasein's case would be to approach Dasein as just another entity present-at-hand, and though one might come away with true information, one would not have identified what is distinctive of Dasein and sets it apart from all other kinds of entities. It is crucial to remember that our approach to the investigation of the being of Dasein follows from considering its "existence-structure."
Categories and existentialia must be kept distinct. Heidegger says that the ancients took the entities that they encountered in the world as the basic examples for the interpretation of being. NOEIN [Gk. perceive] was accepted as the way of access to those things. But Heidegger points out, "[T]he Being of these entities must be something which can be grasped in a distinctive kind of LEGEIN (letting something be seen), so that this Being becomes intelligible in advance as that which it is--and as that which it is already in every entity." (BT 70/44) For Heidegger there must be some way of access to entities in the world that is prior to perception or NOEIN. Previous discussion of the being of entities have always involved categorization [from the Gk. kategopeisthai and kategopiai]. The categories and categorizations that result, Heidegger says, "include the various ways in which the nature of those entities which can be addressed and discussed in a LOGOS may be determined a priori." (BT 70-71/ 45) (It is not clear to me whether Heidegger accepts that such limits can be set a priori. If he does accept that, at least he is not committed to the idea that those categories are exhaustive or definitive, for there is still the other category of existentialia to consider.)
"Existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of Being. The entities which correspond to them require different kinds of primary interrogation respectively: any entity is either a "who" (existence) or a "what" (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense). The connection between these two modes of the characters of Being cannot be handled until the horizon for the question of Being has been clarified." (BT 71/45)
Heidegger concludes this section by reminding us that in the course of laying out this existential analytic of Dasein, we move toward another goal that is as pressing as that of the question of being itself. That other task is the "laying bare that a priori basis which must be visible before the question of 'what man is' can be discussed philosophically." (BT 71/45) Before Dasein can be considered philosophically, psychologically, anthropologically, or biologically, it must be understood in terms of its most fundamental being. Everything else will follow from that. The theme of the present analytic may be grasped more clearly by differentiating it from all these other investigations. And this contrast also serves to bring into sharper relief the necessity of this investigation.
--
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Regarding the priority of 'existentia' over essentia: by this, to remind, Heidegger is emphasizing that the being-what-it-is-ness of Dasein can only be understood by grasping the being of Dasein, or its existence (or, perhaps, its way of existing). In some sense, perhaps, what Dasein is is supposed to be grounded in how Dasein is. Heidegger may be pushing the idea that Dasein essentially is a certain kind of thing with different ways of being, and he wants to emphasize that Dasein's different ways of being make it what it is. Or, put another way, Dasein cannot be understood apart from the availability of real possibilities to it.
[2] Macquarrie and Robinson indicate that for further discussion of this point, one should look at section 40.
--
God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
Division 1. Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein
Chapter 1. Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein
Section 09. The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein
It is necessary at the very outset to make clear how the investigation of the being of Dasein differs from the investigation of the being of any other kind of entity. It is necessary to make clear how the being of Dasein differs from that of other kinds of entities. Heidegger first gestures at this point by saying, "The Being of any such entity [as we ourselves] is in each case mine." (BT 67/41) This is not meant to point to any kind of solipsism but rather points to the fact that Dasein is different from other entities because it has a relationship to its own being that other kinds of entities do not have toward their own being. "These entities [i.e. Dasein], in their Being, comport themselves towards their Being. ... Being is that which is an issue for every such entity." (BT 67/41-42)
Here, as noted at the end of section 07, we face the challenge of a language inadequate to strictly capture the relationships that Heidegger is trying to describe, but we shall do our best to make headway. He says that two consequences follow from this initial characterization of Dasein's being. The first consequence is that the being of Dasein cannot be construed in terms of existentia as that has traditionally been understood. "The 'essence' ["Wesen"] of this entity lies in its "to be" [Zu-sein]. Its Being-what-it-is [Was-sein] (essentia) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia). But here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the Being of this entity as "existence" [Existenz], this term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the traditional term "existentia"." (BT 67/42) The kind of being or existence that has traditionally been ascribed to entities in the world is the kind of being that Heidegger refers to as being-present-at-hand. But whether or not this kind of being belongs to Dasein (and I cannot claim to know at this point whether Heidegger thinks it does or can), it is the case that it is not the kind of being that makes Dasein distinctive. So, hereafter, Heidegger accepts the convention of using the expression being-present-at-hand to stand for the kind of being that has traditionally been referred to by the expression "existentia", and using the expression "existence", to designate the being that belongs solely to Dasein.
"The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence." Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that." (BT 67/42) Here, again, we see Heidegger emphasizing the place of 'possibilities' and differentiating these from 'properties' as we often speak of them--as things that some entity possesses. "So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being." (BT 67/42) (It may be that we are to draw a close connection between Dasein's being and Dasein's way of being. I cannot say at this point.)
The second consequence of this preliminary characterization of the being of Dasein is this: "That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine." (BT 67/42) Heidegger emphasizes that Dasein is not just one member of a larger genus of entities that are present-at-hand. He says, "To entities such as these [i.e. present-at-hand], their Being is 'a matter of indifference'; or more precisely, they 'are' such that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite." (BT 68/42) This is related to the idea that being is an issue for Dasein. Entities that are merely present-at-hand are not just indifferent to the question of being, in contrast to Dasein, which are concerned about that question; rather, entities that are merely present-at-hand are not the kinds of things that could be either concerned or indifferent about the question in the first place. This is the great contrast.
Heidegger continues: "Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decisions as to the way in which it is in each case mine [je meines]. That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-at-hand would." (BT 68/42) One of the peculiar things to note about Heidegger's way of speaking of Dasein is the tendencies to objectify it--to speak of that Dasein that is mine as if it were separate from me. We must be careful here, for it may well be that Heidegger this objectification is not intended to reflect the actual relationship that I bear to 'my' Dasein, but is just a function of the language. If we sense a recursiveness or circularity in the relationship between an Dasein and its being, that is probably right. We should look for ways to make this relationship clear.
In speaking of possibilities, Heidegger says that Dasein is, in each case, essentially its own possibilities. He speaks of it as being able either to 'win' itself or 'lose' itself. He goes on: "But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic--that is, something of its own--can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity--when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment." (BT 68/43)
The idea of authenticity has been raised before, though it has not been (and remains to be) made really clear what Heidegger means by that. However, one important clue does come to us from thinking about the original German. 'Authentic' or 'real' are the familiar English translations of the German 'eigentlich' which is etymologically related to the word 'eigen' which means 'own'. So, for Heidegger, included in the idea of eigentlich is the idea of owning or ownership. For this reason, some have preferred to translate 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity' as 'own-li-ness' and 'un-own-li-ness'. Translating it in this way makes clearer Heidegger's comments in the above quotation like, "something of its own," "chosen terminologically in a strict sense," "Dasein is characterized by mineness." I will plan, in general, on continuing to follow the Macquarrie and Robinson translation, but may insert comments about the alternative translation where I think it is appropriate or helpful.
Part of what will need to be explicated is the relationship between being, possibilities, and authenticity (own-li-ness). When Heidegger says that Dasein comports itself towards its being as its ownmost possibility, is that descriptive of Dasein under the own-ly mode of being, or under the un-own-ly mode of being or in general? There seems to be something essential to Dasein that is not lost or altered just by virtue of its being own-ly or un-own-ly. We shall have to watch out for this.
Heidegger continues: "The two characteristics of Dasein which we have sketched--the priority of 'existentia' over essentia, and the fact that Dasein is in each case mine [die Jemeinigkeit]--have already indicated that in the analytic of this entity we are facing a peculiar phenomenal domain." (BT 68/47) [1] Dasein does not have the kind of being which belongs to something merely present-at-hand, and so it cannot be approached in that way for the purposes of theoretical (or thematical) explication. He goes on: "The right way of presenting it is so far from self-evident that to determine what form it shall take is itself an essential part of the ontological analytic of this entity. Only by presenting this entity in the right way can we have any understanding of its Being. No matter how provisional our analysis may be, it always requires the assurance that we have started correctly." (BT 69/43)
On this point, Heidegger continues: "In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands. This is the formal meaning of Dasein's existential constitution. But this tells us that if we are to Interpret this entity ontologically, the problematic of its Being must be developed from the existentiality of its existence." (BT 69/43) What it means for Dasein to be a possibility is still unclear. (Again, I think it has to do with the idea of there being different ways of being.) But Heidegger makes clear that Dasein should not be understood in terms of any particular possible idea of existence. Instead, Heidegger says, Dasein should be Interpreted and uncovered in the "undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part. This undifferentiated character of Dasein's everydayness is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity. Out of this kind of Being--and back into it again--is all existing, such as it is. We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein "averageness" [Durchschnittlichkeit]." (BT 69/43) It may strike as strange that Heidegger would say that the undifferentiated character of Dasein's ordinary way of being has a positive phenomenal content. In order to understand what he means by 'undifferentiated', it seems, we need to have a certain context in mind. Just as he earlier drew a distinction between two senses of 'indifferent', so we must watch out for multiple senses of 'undifferentiated'.
His characterization of this 'undifferentiated' character of Dasein's everydayness and averageness will have important implications for what follows. The first thing to note about it is that it's very familiarity has stood as a hindrance to its being taken seriously and carefully considered. Heidegger says, "And because this average everydayness makes up what is ontically proximal for this entity, it has again and again been passed over in explicating Dasein. That which is ontically closest and well known, is ontologically the farthest and not known at all; and its ontological signification is constantly overlooked." (BT 69/43) In a previous entry, I used the analogy of one's relationship to one's own face which is, in one sense, closest to me in that it is my own face, and yet there may be an important sense in which I know my own face (and am able to know my face) less well than I can the face of a person standing in front of me. Similarly, Heidegger suggests that our average everyday way of being is so familiar that we often overlook it and consequently fail to recognize its significance for understanding our own ontology. In looking to the ontological task, then, Heidegger says, "not only must this entity not be missed in that kind of Being in which it is phenomenally closest, but it must be made accessible by a positive characterization." (BT 69/44)
In the next paragraph, he writes: "Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies a priori. And here too Dasein's Being is an issue for it in definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof." [2] (BT 69/44) Here we see that existentiality must be differentiated from either own-li-ness or un-own-li-ness. Existentiality, as such, is identical to neither of these stances. More will have to be said later about the relationship of un-own-li-ness to 'fleeing' and 'forgetfulness'.
"But the explication of Dasein in its average everydayness does not give us just average structures in the sense of a hazy indefiniteness. Anything which, taken ontically, is in an average way, can be very well grasped ontologically in pregnant structures which may be structurally indistinguishable from certain ontological characteristics [Bestimmungen] of an authentic Being of Dasein." (BT 70/44) Here Heidegger is pointing to the way in which consideration of Dasein's average everydayness can serve as a guide to understanding the being of Dasein as such. Look at the average structures does not just give us information about those structures. Dasein, which can be viewed ontically and as existing in an average way, can be considered in such a way as to illuminate those structures that underly both the un-own-ly and the own-ly (authentic) being of Dasein.
"All explicata to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by considering Dasein's existence-structure. Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them "existentialia". These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call "categories"--characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein." (BT 70/44) Here is a vocabulary point that we must keep in mind: existentialia are the characters of Dasein's being defined in terms of existentiality. It is possible to define the characters of a certain entity's being in some other terms; for instance, in terms of categories. But to do so in Dasein's case would be to approach Dasein as just another entity present-at-hand, and though one might come away with true information, one would not have identified what is distinctive of Dasein and sets it apart from all other kinds of entities. It is crucial to remember that our approach to the investigation of the being of Dasein follows from considering its "existence-structure."
Categories and existentialia must be kept distinct. Heidegger says that the ancients took the entities that they encountered in the world as the basic examples for the interpretation of being. NOEIN [Gk. perceive] was accepted as the way of access to those things. But Heidegger points out, "[T]he Being of these entities must be something which can be grasped in a distinctive kind of LEGEIN (letting something be seen), so that this Being becomes intelligible in advance as that which it is--and as that which it is already in every entity." (BT 70/44) For Heidegger there must be some way of access to entities in the world that is prior to perception or NOEIN. Previous discussion of the being of entities have always involved categorization [from the Gk. kategopeisthai and kategopiai]. The categories and categorizations that result, Heidegger says, "include the various ways in which the nature of those entities which can be addressed and discussed in a LOGOS may be determined a priori." (BT 70-71/ 45) (It is not clear to me whether Heidegger accepts that such limits can be set a priori. If he does accept that, at least he is not committed to the idea that those categories are exhaustive or definitive, for there is still the other category of existentialia to consider.)
"Existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of Being. The entities which correspond to them require different kinds of primary interrogation respectively: any entity is either a "who" (existence) or a "what" (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense). The connection between these two modes of the characters of Being cannot be handled until the horizon for the question of Being has been clarified." (BT 71/45)
Heidegger concludes this section by reminding us that in the course of laying out this existential analytic of Dasein, we move toward another goal that is as pressing as that of the question of being itself. That other task is the "laying bare that a priori basis which must be visible before the question of 'what man is' can be discussed philosophically." (BT 71/45) Before Dasein can be considered philosophically, psychologically, anthropologically, or biologically, it must be understood in terms of its most fundamental being. Everything else will follow from that. The theme of the present analytic may be grasped more clearly by differentiating it from all these other investigations. And this contrast also serves to bring into sharper relief the necessity of this investigation.
--
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Regarding the priority of 'existentia' over essentia: by this, to remind, Heidegger is emphasizing that the being-what-it-is-ness of Dasein can only be understood by grasping the being of Dasein, or its existence (or, perhaps, its way of existing). In some sense, perhaps, what Dasein is is supposed to be grounded in how Dasein is. Heidegger may be pushing the idea that Dasein essentially is a certain kind of thing with different ways of being, and he wants to emphasize that Dasein's different ways of being make it what it is. Or, put another way, Dasein cannot be understood apart from the availability of real possibilities to it.
[2] Macquarrie and Robinson indicate that for further discussion of this point, one should look at section 40.
--
God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
posted by Metaphysician_delta | 1:19 PM
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