Graduate 137: BT 11: Sec. 07, Part 3
Introduction. Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being
Chapter 2. The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being. Method and Design of Our Investigation
Section 07. The Phenomenological Method of Investigation
B. The Concept of the Logos
Having concluded his preliminary treatment of the concept of PAINOMENON and 'phenomenon,' Heidegger now turn to consider LOGOS. But the situation, in this case, is particularly complicated by the fact that there are so many meanings and significations associated with the word LOGOS. Heidegger speaks of this as a semblance, "which will maintain itself as long as our Interpretation is unable to grasp the basic signification properly in its primary content." (BT 55/32)
Heidegger writes: "If we say that the basic signification of LOGOS is "discourse", then this word-for-word translation will not be validated until we have determined what is meant by "discourse" itself. The real signification of "discourse", which is obvious enough, gets constantly covered up by the later history of the word LOGOS, and especially by the numerous and arbitrary Interpretations which subsequent philosophy has provided." (BT 55/32) Though Heidegger seems to present it here in a much more tentative way, we should note that he is committed to "discourse" being the primary signification of LOGOS. But, having said that, it still remains for him to account for the multiplicity of uses that have covered over this signification. He points out that LOGOS gets translated and interpreted as 'reason,' 'judgment,' 'concept,' 'definition,' 'ground,' and 'relationship,' and it seems that no single meaning can adequately encompass all the others.
One popular view (or at least, I suspect it was popular since Heidegger addresses it directly) is that LOGOS means, fundamentally, "assertion," understood as a kind of "judgment." This might cover a lot of meanings, but particularly because of the danger of interpreting this meaning in light of some contemporary 'theory of judgment,' Heidegger also rejects it. "LOGOS does not mean "judgment", and it certainly does not mean this primarily--if one understands by "judgment" a way of 'binding' something with something else, or the 'taking of a stand' (whether by acceptance or by rejection)." (BT 55-56/32)
"LOGOS as "discourse" means rather the same as DELOUN: to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's discourse. Aristotle has explicated this function of discourse more precisely as APOPHAINESTHAI. The LOGOS lets something be seen (PHAINESTHAI), namely, what the discourse is about; and it does so either for the one who is doing the talking (the medium) or for persons who are talking with one another, as the case may be." (BT 56/33) As with so many other things, what Heidegger is interested in and referring to by way of the word "discourse," is not what we normally pick out by our use of that word. Heidegger is much more interested in that which makes (ordinary) discourse possible, and he refers to that thing (that enabling condition or ground), also, as "discourse." "Discourse," in this deeper sense, involves the making manifest what one is 'discoursing about' in one's (ordinary) discourse. (Ordinary) discourse then, is just one manifestation of this (deeper) discourse--the latter of which involves letting something be seen. That is why Heidegger refers to the one doing the talking as a medium. The speaker is the one that is doing the (ordinary) discoursing. But at a deeper level, he is the means by which (deeper) discourse--this showing--is effected.
"Discourse 'lets something be seen' APO...: that is, it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about. In discourse (APOPHANSIS), so far as it is genuine, what is said [was geredet ist] is drawn from what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, in what it says [in ihrem Gesagten], makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes this accessible to the other party. This is the structure of LOGOS as APOPHANSIS." (BT 56/33) You might get the sense from passages like this that Heidegger thinks of discourse as something wholly independent of human beings--as something that can, in itself 'make things manifest' or 'make things accessible'. This is a highly nuanced issue; it is dangerous to head toward either extreme. But I think it would be right to say something like this: for Heidegger, when people engage in discourse with one another, they are participating in something that is larger than just their little exchange and are conducting their discourse in a context that, in important ways, shapes their discourse and is not completely under either of their control. Heidegger will treat discourse more thoroughly in later sections of Being and Time and language will take on an even more prominent role in Heidegger's thought in the later decades of his life and work. So I will not dwell too much on speculation at this point.
That Heidegger thinks of ordinary discourse as, somehow, derivative of this more fundamental kind of "discourse" is also brought out by the fact that he does not think of all (ordinary) discourse as manifesting the kind of "letting be seen" that he is interested in. For instance, he says, "requesting" makes manifest, but in a different way.
"When fully concrete, discoursing (letting something be seen) has the character of speaking [Sprechens]--vocal proclamation in words. The LOGOS is PHONE, and indeed, PHONE META PHANTASIAS--an utterance in which something is sighted in each case." (BT 56/32-33) I am hesitant to read this as straightforwardly as might be suggested by initial appearances. This seems to suggest that there is a sense in which LOGOS just is the spoken word--the vocalization, the sound. But we must keep in mind that this is only the case in the most fully concrete form of discoursing--and, by that, I take Heidegger to be referring to the most 'physical' as opposed to the most 'fundamental'. At the concrete, physical level, LOGOS is manifested in those utterances that bring something to sight. Hopefully this helps to make clear the very real but derivative relationship that ordinary vocal discourse has to "discourse."
--
At this point, Heidegger begins to lay out how this fundamental signification of LOGOS is connected to its various other and derivative uses.
"And only because the function of the LOGOS as APOPHANSIS lies in letting something be seen by pointing it out, can the LOGOS have the structural form of SYNTHESIS. Here "synthesis" does not mean a binding and linking together of representations, a manipulation of psychical occurrences where the 'problem' arises of how these bindings, as something inside, agree with something physical outside. Here the SYN has a purely apophantical signification and means letting something be seen in its togetherness [Beisammen] with something--letting it be seen as something." (BT 56/33)
We pointed out earlier that one traditional interpretation of LOGOS is as judgment. Heidegger was not satisfied with such an interpretation "if one understands by "judgment" a way of 'binding' something with something else, or the 'taking of a stand' (whether by acceptance or by rejection)." Probably what Heidegger has in mind in this description is the judgment that we make when we bring together a word in our language and some phenomenon in the world and 'judge' the one to adequately represent another. Or when we make an assertion about the world and 'judge' whether it is correct by comparing the content of that assertion to the actual state of the world. In Heidegger's view, this process of binding presupposes some prior ability to engage with the parts in themselves--a presupposition that has not been adequately made clear in the past. Clarifying that point is what he wants to do here. So in the above quotation, LOGOS, understood as letting something be pointed out, is what makes possible the kind of binding or synthesis that is associated with LOGOS, understood as a kind of judgment. But even as he is giving some ground to the concept of LOGOS as judgment, it is not fully the familiar concept of judgment that we use in everyday discourse that he has in mind, for he says that he is not referring to the "binding and linking together of representations," or the mere "manipulation of psychical occurrences." This is the way that judgment has long been construed and it has always been accompanied by the problem of ensuring that our internal representations actually do correspond to something in the world. Viewed in this way, judgment and synthesis always carry with them some degree of uncertainty. But that is not what Heidegger has in mind. "Here the SYN has a purely apophantical signification and means letting something be seen in its togetherness... with something--letting it be seen as something." [1]
Heidegger then turns to consider the interpretation of LOGOS as "truth." Heidegger insists that our ordinary conception of truth as an 'agreement' between propositions or ideas about the world and the actual way the world is, is actually not fundamental but derivative of a deeper kind of truth. "Furthermore, because the LOGOS is a letting-something-be-seen, it can therefore be true or false." (BT 56/33) The conventional way of thinking about truth as agreement between propositions and reality, Heidegger connects to the Greek, ALETHEIA. But he says that this sense of truth depends upon the deeper meaning of LOGOS as discourse. Only at that level are entities in the world 'unhidden' or 'undisclosed' in such a way that it is possible to make any judgments at all about them in the first place. [2]
Heidegger says that to draw too close a connection between LOGOS and 'truth' (as it is conventionally understood, as related fundamentally and inextricably to 'judgment') leads to basic misunderstanding. Moreover, he insists that those who read this into Aristotle have erred fundamentally. Our concept of 'truth' is more closely connected to the Greek AISTHESIS--"the sheer sensory perception of something" (BT 57/33)--than it is to LOGOS as discourse. But even in the case of AISTHESIS, apparently, truth is not just one of two possible conditions (the other being falsehood) for a proposition. Rather, truth is connected fundamentally to AISTHESIS.
"Just as seeing aims at colours, any AISTHESIS aims at its IDIA (those entities which are genuinely accessible only through it and for it); and to that extent this perception is always true. This means that seeing always discovers colours, and hearing always discovers sounds. Pure NOEIN is the perception of the simplest determinate ways of Being which entities as such may possess, and it perceives them just by looking at them. This NOEIN is what is 'true' in the purest and most primordial sense; that is to say, it merely discovers, and it does so in such a way that it can never cover up. This NOEIN can never cover up; it can never be false; it can at worst remain a non-perceiving, AGNOEIN, not sufficing for straightforward and appropriate access." (BT 57/33)
For Heidegger, there is a fundamental relationship (I like to think of it as a relationship of appropriateness) between a sensory faculty and the entities that it is able to pick out. This is not just the case with physical sensory faculties but with all our ways of encountering and engaging the world. This is not a radically new suggestion, though we should be mindful to see where Heidegger goes with it. He seems to want to say that within the context of considering this relationship, there is no room for falsehood, strictly speaking. For to posit the possibility of falseness would just be to deny that a given faculty is capable of perceiving the things that we suppose it to be perceiving. It is not the case that our ears give false color reports or that our eyes give false auditory reports. Rather, our ears simply do not pick up on color and our eyes do not pick up on sounds. Thought of in this way, we can, perhaps, see how Heidegger would come to the conclusion that our eyes always give true reports and our ears also. Now this does seem to raise, again, the question of correspondence that Heidegger tried to dismiss earlier. When we say that our eyes always give true reports are we referring to the percepts themselves or to the entities in the world. Heidegger seems to be pointing to the former, though we should be careful about denying that he is also trying to say something about the latter. [3]
"When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that it lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesis-structure, and with this it takes over the possibility of covering up. The 'truth of judgments', however, is merely the opposite of this covering-up, a secondary phenomenon of truth, with more than one kind of foundation." (BT 57/34)
There's a point that needs to be clarified here that has to do with the idea of letting "something be seen as something". Heidegger connects this idea with synthesis and judgment, but we need to keep in mind that these are not our ordinary concepts of synthesis and judgment to which he is appealing. To see something as something is not to see it in such a way that one might be mistaken about what that something is. I think Heidegger would insist that to see something as something is a basic and not a derived ability. Our most basic perceptions necessarily involve seeing something as something. How else could we possibly see it? It is in virtue of this basic ability that the kind of synthesis and judgment that may be evaluated in terms of truth or falsity becomes a possibility. But that, I take it, is supposed to be a secondary phenomenon.
"Both realism and idealism have--with equal thoroughness--missed the meaning of the Greek conception of truth, in terms of which only the possibility of something like a 'doctrine of ideas' can be understood as philosophical knowledge." (BT 58/34)
Heidegger concludes by gesturing at the way in which the grasp of LOGOS as "discourse" grounds the various other interpretations of LOGOS. "And because the function of LOGOS lies in merely letting something be seen, in letting entities be perceived [im Vernehmenlassen des Seienden], LOGOS can signify the reason [Vernunft]..., the ratio...[, and the] relation and relationship." (BT 58/34)
"This interpretation of 'apophantical discourse' may suffice to clarify the primary function of the LOGOS." (BT 58/34)
--
Many of the points that have been touched on, only in passing, in this passage, will be developed much more extensively in later chapters. "Discourse," "Uncovering," "truth," "realism and idealism," and others. Also, in Heidegger's later work, he develops, in particular, points about the nature of discourse. One of my suggestions, earlier, was that Heidegger viewed discourse as a process into which people enter and exit by way of 'discourse,' but which is, itself, ongoing. We will not explore these points further here, but will now turn to consider Heidegger's preliminary conception of 'phenomenology'.
--
Footnotes:
[1] I'm not sure what "apophantical" means. It doesn't seem illuminating to read it as a misspelling of "apophatical."
[2] "The Greek words for 'truth' (E ALETHEIA, TO ALETHES) are compounded of the privative prefix A- ('not') and the verbal stem -LATH- ('to escape notice', 'to be concealed'). The truth may thus be looked upon as that which is un-concealed, that which gets discovered or uncovered ('entdeckt')." (BT 57, footnote 1)
"Similarly, 'Being false' (PSEUDESTHAI) amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering up [verdecken] : putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not." (BT 57/33)
[3] Here is a fascinating point that warrants further attention.
--
God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
Chapter 2. The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being. Method and Design of Our Investigation
Section 07. The Phenomenological Method of Investigation
B. The Concept of the Logos
Having concluded his preliminary treatment of the concept of PAINOMENON and 'phenomenon,' Heidegger now turn to consider LOGOS. But the situation, in this case, is particularly complicated by the fact that there are so many meanings and significations associated with the word LOGOS. Heidegger speaks of this as a semblance, "which will maintain itself as long as our Interpretation is unable to grasp the basic signification properly in its primary content." (BT 55/32)
Heidegger writes: "If we say that the basic signification of LOGOS is "discourse", then this word-for-word translation will not be validated until we have determined what is meant by "discourse" itself. The real signification of "discourse", which is obvious enough, gets constantly covered up by the later history of the word LOGOS, and especially by the numerous and arbitrary Interpretations which subsequent philosophy has provided." (BT 55/32) Though Heidegger seems to present it here in a much more tentative way, we should note that he is committed to "discourse" being the primary signification of LOGOS. But, having said that, it still remains for him to account for the multiplicity of uses that have covered over this signification. He points out that LOGOS gets translated and interpreted as 'reason,' 'judgment,' 'concept,' 'definition,' 'ground,' and 'relationship,' and it seems that no single meaning can adequately encompass all the others.
One popular view (or at least, I suspect it was popular since Heidegger addresses it directly) is that LOGOS means, fundamentally, "assertion," understood as a kind of "judgment." This might cover a lot of meanings, but particularly because of the danger of interpreting this meaning in light of some contemporary 'theory of judgment,' Heidegger also rejects it. "LOGOS does not mean "judgment", and it certainly does not mean this primarily--if one understands by "judgment" a way of 'binding' something with something else, or the 'taking of a stand' (whether by acceptance or by rejection)." (BT 55-56/32)
"LOGOS as "discourse" means rather the same as DELOUN: to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's discourse. Aristotle has explicated this function of discourse more precisely as APOPHAINESTHAI. The LOGOS lets something be seen (PHAINESTHAI), namely, what the discourse is about; and it does so either for the one who is doing the talking (the medium) or for persons who are talking with one another, as the case may be." (BT 56/33) As with so many other things, what Heidegger is interested in and referring to by way of the word "discourse," is not what we normally pick out by our use of that word. Heidegger is much more interested in that which makes (ordinary) discourse possible, and he refers to that thing (that enabling condition or ground), also, as "discourse." "Discourse," in this deeper sense, involves the making manifest what one is 'discoursing about' in one's (ordinary) discourse. (Ordinary) discourse then, is just one manifestation of this (deeper) discourse--the latter of which involves letting something be seen. That is why Heidegger refers to the one doing the talking as a medium. The speaker is the one that is doing the (ordinary) discoursing. But at a deeper level, he is the means by which (deeper) discourse--this showing--is effected.
"Discourse 'lets something be seen' APO...: that is, it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about. In discourse (APOPHANSIS), so far as it is genuine, what is said [was geredet ist] is drawn from what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, in what it says [in ihrem Gesagten], makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes this accessible to the other party. This is the structure of LOGOS as APOPHANSIS." (BT 56/33) You might get the sense from passages like this that Heidegger thinks of discourse as something wholly independent of human beings--as something that can, in itself 'make things manifest' or 'make things accessible'. This is a highly nuanced issue; it is dangerous to head toward either extreme. But I think it would be right to say something like this: for Heidegger, when people engage in discourse with one another, they are participating in something that is larger than just their little exchange and are conducting their discourse in a context that, in important ways, shapes their discourse and is not completely under either of their control. Heidegger will treat discourse more thoroughly in later sections of Being and Time and language will take on an even more prominent role in Heidegger's thought in the later decades of his life and work. So I will not dwell too much on speculation at this point.
That Heidegger thinks of ordinary discourse as, somehow, derivative of this more fundamental kind of "discourse" is also brought out by the fact that he does not think of all (ordinary) discourse as manifesting the kind of "letting be seen" that he is interested in. For instance, he says, "requesting" makes manifest, but in a different way.
"When fully concrete, discoursing (letting something be seen) has the character of speaking [Sprechens]--vocal proclamation in words. The LOGOS is PHONE, and indeed, PHONE META PHANTASIAS--an utterance in which something is sighted in each case." (BT 56/32-33) I am hesitant to read this as straightforwardly as might be suggested by initial appearances. This seems to suggest that there is a sense in which LOGOS just is the spoken word--the vocalization, the sound. But we must keep in mind that this is only the case in the most fully concrete form of discoursing--and, by that, I take Heidegger to be referring to the most 'physical' as opposed to the most 'fundamental'. At the concrete, physical level, LOGOS is manifested in those utterances that bring something to sight. Hopefully this helps to make clear the very real but derivative relationship that ordinary vocal discourse has to "discourse."
--
At this point, Heidegger begins to lay out how this fundamental signification of LOGOS is connected to its various other and derivative uses.
"And only because the function of the LOGOS as APOPHANSIS lies in letting something be seen by pointing it out, can the LOGOS have the structural form of SYNTHESIS. Here "synthesis" does not mean a binding and linking together of representations, a manipulation of psychical occurrences where the 'problem' arises of how these bindings, as something inside, agree with something physical outside. Here the SYN has a purely apophantical signification and means letting something be seen in its togetherness [Beisammen] with something--letting it be seen as something." (BT 56/33)
We pointed out earlier that one traditional interpretation of LOGOS is as judgment. Heidegger was not satisfied with such an interpretation "if one understands by "judgment" a way of 'binding' something with something else, or the 'taking of a stand' (whether by acceptance or by rejection)." Probably what Heidegger has in mind in this description is the judgment that we make when we bring together a word in our language and some phenomenon in the world and 'judge' the one to adequately represent another. Or when we make an assertion about the world and 'judge' whether it is correct by comparing the content of that assertion to the actual state of the world. In Heidegger's view, this process of binding presupposes some prior ability to engage with the parts in themselves--a presupposition that has not been adequately made clear in the past. Clarifying that point is what he wants to do here. So in the above quotation, LOGOS, understood as letting something be pointed out, is what makes possible the kind of binding or synthesis that is associated with LOGOS, understood as a kind of judgment. But even as he is giving some ground to the concept of LOGOS as judgment, it is not fully the familiar concept of judgment that we use in everyday discourse that he has in mind, for he says that he is not referring to the "binding and linking together of representations," or the mere "manipulation of psychical occurrences." This is the way that judgment has long been construed and it has always been accompanied by the problem of ensuring that our internal representations actually do correspond to something in the world. Viewed in this way, judgment and synthesis always carry with them some degree of uncertainty. But that is not what Heidegger has in mind. "Here the SYN has a purely apophantical signification and means letting something be seen in its togetherness... with something--letting it be seen as something." [1]
Heidegger then turns to consider the interpretation of LOGOS as "truth." Heidegger insists that our ordinary conception of truth as an 'agreement' between propositions or ideas about the world and the actual way the world is, is actually not fundamental but derivative of a deeper kind of truth. "Furthermore, because the LOGOS is a letting-something-be-seen, it can therefore be true or false." (BT 56/33) The conventional way of thinking about truth as agreement between propositions and reality, Heidegger connects to the Greek, ALETHEIA. But he says that this sense of truth depends upon the deeper meaning of LOGOS as discourse. Only at that level are entities in the world 'unhidden' or 'undisclosed' in such a way that it is possible to make any judgments at all about them in the first place. [2]
Heidegger says that to draw too close a connection between LOGOS and 'truth' (as it is conventionally understood, as related fundamentally and inextricably to 'judgment') leads to basic misunderstanding. Moreover, he insists that those who read this into Aristotle have erred fundamentally. Our concept of 'truth' is more closely connected to the Greek AISTHESIS--"the sheer sensory perception of something" (BT 57/33)--than it is to LOGOS as discourse. But even in the case of AISTHESIS, apparently, truth is not just one of two possible conditions (the other being falsehood) for a proposition. Rather, truth is connected fundamentally to AISTHESIS.
"Just as seeing aims at colours, any AISTHESIS aims at its IDIA (those entities which are genuinely accessible only through it and for it); and to that extent this perception is always true. This means that seeing always discovers colours, and hearing always discovers sounds. Pure NOEIN is the perception of the simplest determinate ways of Being which entities as such may possess, and it perceives them just by looking at them. This NOEIN is what is 'true' in the purest and most primordial sense; that is to say, it merely discovers, and it does so in such a way that it can never cover up. This NOEIN can never cover up; it can never be false; it can at worst remain a non-perceiving, AGNOEIN, not sufficing for straightforward and appropriate access." (BT 57/33)
For Heidegger, there is a fundamental relationship (I like to think of it as a relationship of appropriateness) between a sensory faculty and the entities that it is able to pick out. This is not just the case with physical sensory faculties but with all our ways of encountering and engaging the world. This is not a radically new suggestion, though we should be mindful to see where Heidegger goes with it. He seems to want to say that within the context of considering this relationship, there is no room for falsehood, strictly speaking. For to posit the possibility of falseness would just be to deny that a given faculty is capable of perceiving the things that we suppose it to be perceiving. It is not the case that our ears give false color reports or that our eyes give false auditory reports. Rather, our ears simply do not pick up on color and our eyes do not pick up on sounds. Thought of in this way, we can, perhaps, see how Heidegger would come to the conclusion that our eyes always give true reports and our ears also. Now this does seem to raise, again, the question of correspondence that Heidegger tried to dismiss earlier. When we say that our eyes always give true reports are we referring to the percepts themselves or to the entities in the world. Heidegger seems to be pointing to the former, though we should be careful about denying that he is also trying to say something about the latter. [3]
"When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that it lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesis-structure, and with this it takes over the possibility of covering up. The 'truth of judgments', however, is merely the opposite of this covering-up, a secondary phenomenon of truth, with more than one kind of foundation." (BT 57/34)
There's a point that needs to be clarified here that has to do with the idea of letting "something be seen as something". Heidegger connects this idea with synthesis and judgment, but we need to keep in mind that these are not our ordinary concepts of synthesis and judgment to which he is appealing. To see something as something is not to see it in such a way that one might be mistaken about what that something is. I think Heidegger would insist that to see something as something is a basic and not a derived ability. Our most basic perceptions necessarily involve seeing something as something. How else could we possibly see it? It is in virtue of this basic ability that the kind of synthesis and judgment that may be evaluated in terms of truth or falsity becomes a possibility. But that, I take it, is supposed to be a secondary phenomenon.
"Both realism and idealism have--with equal thoroughness--missed the meaning of the Greek conception of truth, in terms of which only the possibility of something like a 'doctrine of ideas' can be understood as philosophical knowledge." (BT 58/34)
Heidegger concludes by gesturing at the way in which the grasp of LOGOS as "discourse" grounds the various other interpretations of LOGOS. "And because the function of LOGOS lies in merely letting something be seen, in letting entities be perceived [im Vernehmenlassen des Seienden], LOGOS can signify the reason [Vernunft]..., the ratio...[, and the] relation and relationship." (BT 58/34)
"This interpretation of 'apophantical discourse' may suffice to clarify the primary function of the LOGOS." (BT 58/34)
--
Many of the points that have been touched on, only in passing, in this passage, will be developed much more extensively in later chapters. "Discourse," "Uncovering," "truth," "realism and idealism," and others. Also, in Heidegger's later work, he develops, in particular, points about the nature of discourse. One of my suggestions, earlier, was that Heidegger viewed discourse as a process into which people enter and exit by way of 'discourse,' but which is, itself, ongoing. We will not explore these points further here, but will now turn to consider Heidegger's preliminary conception of 'phenomenology'.
--
Footnotes:
[1] I'm not sure what "apophantical" means. It doesn't seem illuminating to read it as a misspelling of "apophatical."
[2] "The Greek words for 'truth' (E ALETHEIA, TO ALETHES) are compounded of the privative prefix A- ('not') and the verbal stem -LATH- ('to escape notice', 'to be concealed'). The truth may thus be looked upon as that which is un-concealed, that which gets discovered or uncovered ('entdeckt')." (BT 57, footnote 1)
"Similarly, 'Being false' (PSEUDESTHAI) amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering up [verdecken] : putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not." (BT 57/33)
[3] Here is a fascinating point that warrants further attention.
--
God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
posted by Metaphysician_delta | 11:22 AM
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