Graduate 153: BT 20: Sec. 14

Part I. The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being
Division 1. Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein
Chapter 3. The Worldhood of the World
Section 12. The Idea of the Worldhood of the World in General

In section 12, Heidegger indicated that chapters 3, 4, and 5 would be dedicated to examining the three-fold structure of being-in-the-world. Chapter 3 concerns the 'in-the-world'; chapter 4 concerns that entity which in every case has being-in-the-world as the way in which it is; and chapter 5 looks in more depth at 'being-in'. Here we will focus on 'in-the-world.' Heidegger begins by saying, "Being-in-the-world shall first be made visible with regard to that item of its structure which is the 'world' itself." (BT 91/63)

Trying to understand the 'world' itself might seem to be a very straightforward task; one would naturally begin by enumerating the things that are in the world and examining their structure, etc., etc. But this is actually the wrong approach. "Such a description is always confined to entities. It is ontical. But what we are seeking is Being. And we have formally defined 'phenomenon' in the phenomenological sense as that which shows itself as Being and as a structure of Being." (BT 91/63)

We might take a different approach. We are not so interested in enumerating the entities that are found in the world as we are interested in exhibiting the being of those entities which are present-at-hand in the world. We must appeal to categorial considerations for this task. "Now the entities within the world are Things--Things of Nature, and Things 'invested with value' ["wertbehaftete" Dinge]. Their Thinghood becomes a problem; and to the extent that the Thinghood of Things 'invested with value' is based upon the Thinghood of Nature, our primary theme is the Being of Things of Nature--Nature as such. That characteristic of Being which belongs to Things of Nature (substances), and upon which everything is founded, is substantiality." (BT 91-92/63) The idea, here, is that the being of entities in the world--that in virtue of which they appear and are disclosed as the things that they are--can be divided into two broad categories. Entities in the world can be divided into those that are what they are by nature and those that are what they are because they have been 'invested with value' (or have been treated in certain ways) by human beings. On such a construal, the former way of being would seem to be more fundamental, and on this picture of things, the challenge becomes one of trying to understand just what Nature is. What is this 'Nature' in virtue of which things are what they are in the world. Now traditional metaphysics has resorted to the concept of substance and substantiality, but Heidegger is not satisfied with this approach.

Heidegger criticizes the last approach by pointing out, "But even if this ontology should itself succeed in explicating the Being of Nature in the very purest manner, in conformity with the basic assertions about this entity, which the mathematical natural sciences provide, it will never reach the phenomenon that is the 'world'. Nature is itself an entity which is encountered within the world and which can be discovered in various ways and at various stages." (BT 92/63) It should be fairly clear that Heidegger has something particular in mind when he speaks of 'world' and it is not just the physical spatio-temporal reality that we inhabit. We will soon lay out more clearly just how he thinks these approaches to understanding the world fall short.

A third approach would be to treat entities 'invested with value' as prior to entities in Nature. We could treat the former as disclosing more clearly the 'world'. But Heidegger points out, "[T]hese Things too are entities 'within' the world. As a consequence, they cannot give us the clue to understanding the 'world' itself.

Heidegger concludes these introductory remarks by saying, "Neither the ontical depiction of entities within-the-world nor the ontological Interpretation of their Being is such as to reach the phenomenon of the 'world.' In both of these ways of access to 'Objective Being', the 'world' has already been 'presupposed', and indeed in various ways." (BT 92/64)

We're gradually getting more hints as to what is involved in the idea of 'world.' The 'world' is that which already includes all the entities that we investigate. It is the context and backdrop against which entities are able to appear as they are. Thus, whenever we encounter any entity, the 'world' is always in the background and grounding that encounter, yet it also remains invisible in each of these encounters when our focus is usually (or always) on the particular entity in question. At this point, Heidegger considers a fourth approach to his investigation.

"It is possible that ultimately we cannot address ourselves to 'the world' as determining the nature of the entity we have mentioned? Yet we call this entity one which is "within-the-world"." (BT 92/64) The problem is that we want to understand the 'world' but every attempt to do so by looking at the 'world' proves inadequate. Yet the thing we hope to understand, i.e. 'the world,' has the being of 'within-the-world'. Where else could we look to find out about it? One place we might look is in Dasein. "Is 'world' perhaps a characteristic of Dasein's Being?" (BT 92/64) The problem with this view is that it suggests a kind of subjectivism. On such a view, we seem to lose altogether the idea of a world that we share in common with other people. Having rejected this fourth way approaching our investigation, Heidegger concludes by raising and answering the crucial question: "And if we raise the question of the 'world', what world do we have in view? Neither the common world nor the subjective world, but the worldhood of the world as such." (BT 92/64) We are not so much interested in grasping any particular world; rather, we are interested in understanding what it is in virtue of which any world is the way it is. We are interested in understanding worldhood. How can we meet this phenomenon?

"'Worldhood' is an ontological concept, and stands for the structure of one of the constitutive items of Being-in-the-world. But we know Being-in-the-world as a way in which Dasein's character is defined existentially. Thus worldhood itself is an existentiale." (BT 92/64) (Recall, we said at the beginning of this post that 'world' could not be interpreted categorially.) What this helps us to see is that 'world' is not primarily a way of characterizing what Dasein is not (i.e. entities in the world, non-Dasein); rather, it is a characteristic of Dasein itself.

Now we have already pointed out that Heidegger is using 'world' in a very particular way. In fact, he distinguishes four meanings of world and each is important for understanding his view.

"1. "World" is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world." (BT 93/64) This is probably the most familiar use of the word, world. It is used to pick out the totality of all physical entities.

"2. "World" functions as an ontological term, and signifies the Being of those entities which we have just mentioned." (BT 93/64) In this case, 'world' is a more generic term that picks out the totality of entities within a particular domain. It is able to do this because it captures something of the being that all those entities share. So one may speak of the 'world' of physical objects (as in 1, above) or one may speak of the 'world' of mathematics, for instance.

"3. "World" can be understood in another ontical sense---not, however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as that 'wherein' a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'. "World" has here a pre-ontological existentiell signification." (BT 93/65) Recall from Graduate 132, that existence is that kind of being that is distinctive of Dasein. "Existentiell" refers to that understanding in virtue of which one comes to understand that being by stepping into different possibilities. The understanding of oneself which leads along the way to answering the question of existence just by existing in a certain way--that understanding is called existentiell. "World," in this sense, refers to that context and domain in which Dasein does its existing. It has an existentiell signification because it concerns Daseins existence. In this sense, one may speak of the 'public' we-world, the world of one's home, or the world of one's circle of close friends.

"4. Finally, "world" designates the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood." (BT 93/65) This expression refers to the a priori character of worldhood that belongs to all 'worlds' regardless of their particular mode or structure.

Hereafter, 'world' will signify the first meaning of that word and "world" will signify the third meaning of that word. Also "worldly" will apply to a kind of being that belongs to Dasein. The kind of being that belongs to entities present-at-hand will be referred to as "belonging to the world" or "within-the-world".

--

Heidegger returns to comment on some of the points that he made at the beginning of this section, with his four-fold clarification in the background. He points out that previous attempts to Interpret the world have done so in terms merely of the being of those entities which are present-at-hand within-the-world. But only as a definite mode of its own being-in-the-world can Dasein ever discover anything like the entity called Nature. So if one starts by trying to understand worldhood in terms of nature, one will never reach one's goal.

Heidegger writes: "When it comes to the problem of analysing the world's worldhood ontologically, traditional ontology operates in a blind alley, if, indeed, it sees this problem at all. On the other hand, if we are to Interpret the worldhood of Dasein and the possible ways in which Dasein is made worldly [Verweltlichung], we must show why the kind of Being with which Dasein knows the world is such that it passes over the phenomenon of worldhood both ontically and ontologically." (BT 94/66) We have noticed this point before, that Heidegger thinks that an adequate account of Dasein's ontological and existential character will actually explain why Dasein has so long gone astray in its attempts to understand these very fundamental features of its own nature. The awareness of these past errors, however, also serves the straightforward purpose of reminding the investigator to be alert and to be careful in selecting the point of departure for his investigation. On this last point, Heidegger says the following.

"Our method has already been assigned [Anweisung]. The theme of our analytic is to be Being-in-the-world, and accordingly the very world itself; and these are to be considered within the horizon of average everydayness--the kind of Being which is closest to Dasein. We must make a study of everyday Being-in-the-world; with the phenomenal support which this give us, something like the world must come into view." (BT 94/66)

Beginning with the world that is closest to everyday Dasein--its environment--and the existential character of average being-in-the-world, we shall move toward investigating the idea of worldhood in general. The first part of this investigation, looking at the worldhood of the environment (environmentality) will involve going through an ontological Interpretation of those entities within-the-environment which we encounter as closest to us. As we do so, we must keep in mind that though 'environment' is often used as a spatial notion, it is not fundamentally that and will not be used in that way for our purposes. "Instead, the spatial character which incontestably belongs to any environment, can be clarified only in terms of the structure of worldhood." (BT 94/66) Only when properly oriented does Dasein's spatiality become phenomenally visible. In ontology, there have been tendencies to try to interpret the being of the 'world' fundamentally in terms of spatiality, as a res extensa (i.e. an extended thing). The most extreme case of this is Descartes. "The analysis of worldhood which we are here attempting can be made clearer if we show how it differs from such an ontological tendency. Our analysis will be completed in three stages: (A) the analysis of environmentality and worldhood in general; (B) an illustrative contrast between our analysis of worldhood and Descartes' ontology of the 'world'; (C) the aroundness [das Umhafte] of the environment, and the 'spatiality' of Dasein." (BT 95/66)

(A) is treated in sections 15-18, (B) in sections 19-21, and (C) in sections 22-24.

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God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 152: Five Reflections for the Church, Part 5

The word of God--a mirror.
Composed: 21 June 2009.

Have you ever had the experience, after visiting a barber or beautician, of being startled when you look at yourself in a mirror? For some time, I've been in the habit of getting my hair cut only once a year. As a consequence, each time, the change in my appearance is rather dramatic, and it's surprising to me how long it takes for me to get used to it. Sometimes for a week or more after getting my hair cut, I will still be surprised when I look in the bathroom mirror in the morning. And when I encounter friends at school or church who stare at the top of my head, it often takes me a few moments to realize what it is that they're reacting to. Why am I talking about haircuts and my peculiar streak of absent-mindedness? Because there's a (biblical) analogy here that may be helpful for thinking about discipleship and the Christian life. James writes, in his epistle:

For if anyone is a hearer of the word and not a doer, he is like a man who looks at his natural face in a mirror; for once he has looked at himself and gone away, he has immediately forgotten what kind of person he was. But one who looks intently at the perfect law, the law of liberty, and abides by it, not having become a forgetful hearer but an effectual doer, this man shall be blessed in what he does. (1:23-25)

James compares the person, who merely hears the word and does not act on it, to a person who looks into a mirror and, after doing so, promptly forgets what he looks like. The mirror, here, serves as a symbol for the word of God. James' choice of this particular metaphor is extremely interesting, as can be seen when we consider what the function of a mirror is. Put simply the primary function of a mirror is to show us what we look like. Notice, that its primary function is not to show us what we should look like. We often focus on this aspect of God's word----the Bible. We focus on the fact that it reveals to us how we should live. And while that is one of its functions, in this passage James chooses to focus on the way that God's word simply reveals who and what we are.

If we want to know what direction we should go, we have to have some idea of where we're at right now. And if we want to have some idea of where we're at right now, then we need to be able to look past superficial appearances and external actions into our very hearts. How can we do that? God's word is the key. The author of Hebrews writes, "For the word of God is living and active and sharper than any two-edged sword, and piercing as far as the division of soul and spirit, of both joints and marrow, and able to judge the thoughts and intentions of the heart." (4:12) The NLT paraphrases the last part of that verse: "It [i.e. the word of God] exposes us for what we really are." But if we are to gain this important insight and understanding, then we must approach God's word with the proper attitude. If a person has no desire to know the truth and no intention of being conformed to the image of Christ, then looking into the word of God will do as much good for him as looking into a mirror and promptly forgetting what he looks like. On the other hand, the person who looks intently at the perfect law, the law of liberty, and actually takes seriously what he looks like, and takes steps to act on what the law reveals, and is open to being transformed by the power of the Spirit and the grace of God, "this man shall be blessed in what he does."

Unfortunately, many people don't want to face the truth about who and what they really are. One reason is that they have become convinced that the only truth that they will find is that they're really, really bad. Such a perspective not only neglects the truth about the image of God and Christ's redemptive work. It also fails to take seriously Jesus'' wonderful promise: "If you abide in my word (that is, if you put into practice what I teach), then you are truly disciples of Mine; and you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." (John 8:31) Jesus Christ has opened the way so that we can confront the truth about who we are without any fear of condemnation; and once we do that, then we can approach the throne of grace in confidence to receive all the good things that God has for us. (Romans 8:1, 29-30; Hebrews 4:16)

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God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 151: Five Reflections for the Church, Part 4

The God who is There.
Composed: 07 June 2009.

What does it mean to say that God is everywhere? What do we mean when we speak of God's omnipresence? On a Christian radio station, this week, I heard a grandmother share about how she tried to convey this idea to her granddaughter. She listed all kinds of places around the house and around the world where God is present, and she ended by talking about how God is even in her granddaughter's heart. After hearing this, her granddaughter looked down toward her heart, thought for a moment, and then asked, "Is He even in my tummy?"

The story is an amusing illustration of how children's minds so often run in different directions than we expect. And yet, I sometimes wonder: When we think about God's omnipresence, are our thoughts much more mature or sophisticated? Do we sometimes miss the point as completely as that little girl did?

What does it mean to say that God is everywhere? It means that there is nothing happening on this earth or elsewhere of which God is not aware and in which He is not involved. It means that wherever you find yourself, right now, or later today, or sometime this week--in whatever situation or circumstance you find yourself--God is there with you. Moreover, He is not just "with you" in the sense that a complete stranger might be sitting in the same room "with you"--where there might be a total lack of interest or involvement in what you are doing. Rather, God is deeply interested in who you are and what you are doing, and He has chosen to involve Himself in your life. If you are facing some great need, He is there to help. If you are lonely or afraid or doubtful, He is there to comfort you. If you are doing work or engaged in ministry, He is ready to provide you with the ability and resources to accomplish that. When you consider the troubles that face our country and our world and wonder, "Is God involved? Is God aware?"--the answer is, "Yes." When you face pain or sorrow or stress or shame, and you wonder, "Does God care?"--the answer is, "Yes." When you look at your life and your family and your situation and your circumstances and wonder, "Does God have a good plan for me?"--the answer is, "Yes."

The Psalmist writes,
"Where can I go from Thy Spirit?
Or where can I flee from Thy presence?
If I ascend to heaven, Thou art there;
If I make my bed in Sheol, behold, Thou art there.
If I take the wings of the dawn,
If I dwell in the remotest part of the sea,
Even there Thy hand will lead me,
And Thy right hand will lay hold of me. (139:7-10)

Why is it so important to spend time meditating on this familiar truth? Because it is foundational for everything that we hope to accomplish as followers of Jesus. The person who forgets or neglects this truth will never muster the wherewithal to pursue the kind of significant change in her life that will allow her to experience fully the grace and love of God. The person who cannot meaningfully conceive of God being with him and watching faithfully over him will not have the courage to take his eyes off of himself and actually focus them on the needs of other people. Besides that, everything that we hope to accomplish in our city and in our world depends upon God already being present there. What we desire just is to become involved in the work that He is already doing.

Pray that we would all come to understand this truth and reality in the fullest possible way. Pray in confidence to the God who is everywhere and knows all and sees all and who loves you and me.

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 150: Five Reflections for the Church, Part 3

The power of the Spirit.
Composed: 17 May 2009.

Recently I've been thinking a lot about the life of Moses. His experience of walking and partnering with God is instructive on several points and offers useful insights for us to consider when reflecting on what it means for us to walk with God. Clearly God's hand was on Moses' life from the very beginning, keeping him safe and training him for service. But when the time came and God called on Moses to lead the Israelites out of Egypt, he resisted. Though God promised to be with him and to provide for him, Moses had serious trouble getting past his own fears and doubts. Even after he agreed to follow, his relationship with God was far from smooth. Moses understood well that partnering with God is not a bed of roses and he regularly vented to God about his anger and frustration. His angry outbursts got him into trouble and even kept him out of the promised land; and yet, when the leadership of Moses was challenged, this is what God had to say about him:

"If there is a prophet among you [people of Israel],
I, the LORD, shall make Myself known to him in a vision.
I shall speak with him in a dream.
Not so, with My servant Moses,
He is faithful in all My household;
With him I speak mouth to mouth,
Even openly, and not in dark sayings,
And he beholds the form of the LORD." (Numbers 12:6-8)

Moses not only bore witness to some of the most spectacular manifestations of God's power and greatness; he also played a part in bringing them about. On a daily basis for almost forty years, he saw and participated in God's work of providing for and protecting His people.

Would it be worth it, to you, to go through all the pain and toil and trials that Moses went through, if what God said of Moses in the passage above could be said of you? Would you be willing to go through all of that, in order to see God work in the ways that Moses saw Him work? Perhaps we should be careful not to answer too quickly, for this question is not academic or hypothetical. In Colossians 1, Paul writes that the image of the invisible God and His fullness have been revealed in Christ Jesus; and the author of Hebrews says that through Christ we are all alike enabled to approach the throne of grace. (4:16) In Romans 8:15, Paul reminds us that we can call out to Him as Father, and Jesus, Himself, speaks in John 14-16 about the intimate relationship that we can have with God. The anointing of the Holy Spirit is to be accompanied by power (Acts 1:8) and through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, the way has been opened for anyone who wishes to come, to walk with God and partner with God and see God work.

The question and challenge that we face, then, is this: Will I choose to follow God? Will I choose, as Moses chose, to step out in faith and obedience, and trust in God, and open myself up to seeing Him work? This is the opportunity and challenge that we must consider and that we want to offer to the world.

Ultimately, in reaching out to our community, what we want to offer just is the opportunity to enter into this kind of Spirit-filled, grace-empowered life with Christ. But to do that we need to look, first, inside ourselves and consider whether we are committed to pursuing this same kind of life.

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 149: Five Reflections for the Church, Part 2

God's heart for the lost sheep.
Composed: 03 May 2009.

"What man among you, if he has a hundred sheep and has lost one of them, does not leave the ninety-nine in the open pasture, and go after the one which is lost, until he finds it? And when he has found it, he lays it on his shoulders, rejoicing. And when he comes home, he calls together his friends and his neighbors, saying to them, 'Rejoice with me, for I have found my sheep which was lost!' I tell you that in the same way, there will be more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents, than over ninety-nine righteous persons who need no repentance." (Luke 15:4-7)

This is one of a series of parables in which Jesus reveals the heart of God for the lost people of the world. a friend of mine referred to this passage during a prayer and worship service a couple weeks back, and I've been meditating on it off-and-on ever since. For many in Jesus' audience, this parable presented a new and startling picture of God—as One who is seeking sinners out. Other Jewish teachers taught about God's readiness to forgive and to receive the repentant. But the idea that God would actually go out of his way to pursue, and look for, and reach out to sinners—that was news.

Is that news to us? Perhaps we are very well acquainted with this truth about God. After all, we have the Biblical record to look back on. Paul writes, in Romans 5:8, "But God demonstrates His own love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." And Jesus tells the religious leaders, in Luke 19:10, "For the Son of Man has come to seek and to save that which was lost." That God was and is in the business of seeking out sinners is written all over the pages of Scripture. It may not be news to us, but think for a moment: do we really understand that truth and its implications for our lives?

Do you grasp or understand God's desire to know and be in relationship with each and every lost person? He wants to save your next-door neighbor. He loves that co-worker who has the desk next to yours. He wants to embrace your supervisor. He knows the name of that person you pass every time you walk your dog. He wants to adopt every man and woman in your fitness club as His son or daughter. He wants to heal and restore the clerks and managers at the grocery store. He wants to pour out His Spirit on the couple at that bus stop. The people you meet and pass throughout your day--the customers and clients, the old friends and new acquaintances, the people on the golf course and the fans at the baseball game, the kids at the park and the folks at the senior center, the waiter and host at your favorite restaurant, the bus-boy, the janitor, the receptionist, the colleague, the woman who's watering her lawn and the man who's mowing his, that teenager on his bicycle, and that girl walking with her little sister--God knows each and every one of them by name and He is seeking after them and reaching out to them and desires to save them. Is that your desire as well? Is that your desire: that they would come to a saving relationship with Jesus Christ?

In John 3:16, Jesus says, "For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son…". And the question that's hitting me right between the eyes is: What am I doing to reach out to a world of lost people--of lost sheep? After all, there was a time when I was one of those lost sheep; and God came looking for me; and Christian people came looking for me. Pray that we would all catch a vision of God’s heart for the lost in our neighborhoods, communities, city, nation, and world.

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 148: Five Reflections for the Church, Part 1

The glory and challenge of Easter.
Composed: 19 April 2009.

He is risen!

Jesus Christ has conquered the grave! Against all odds and opposition, against the plans and devices of the Pharisees and Sadducees, against the best efforts of the Roman military, against all the powers of Satan, He has broken the power of sin and death!

On Easter Sunday, the pastors at my church spoke about the initial impact that this news had on the people who heard it. The Roman guards, the women at the tomb, the disciples, and religious leaders were all, alike, filled with fear. Christ's resurrection had completely undermined all their expectations. Some of the people wanted Him dead. Others wanted Him to remain alive, but none of them believed that His purpose and agenda could be so radically different from theirs. Paul would later say of Him that He "was declared the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead, according to the Spirit of holiness, Jesus Christ our Lord, through whom we have received grace and apostleship to bring about the obedience of faith among all the Gentiles, for His name's sake". (Romans 1:4-5, italics mine) Even His disciples did not fully grasp that Jesus' mission was to reach the world—and to reach the world through His disciples.

The question that confronted the people then, and the question that we face now: What will you do with this resurrected Jesus? What will you do with this risen messiah and Lord who simply refuses to stay dead, who will not pander to the expectations of even His own well-meaning followers, but rather insists on pursuing His own agenda, challenging everyone He encounters, and who has the audacity to claim that, "All authority has been given to Me in heaven and on earth"? Will you try to ignore Him? Will you try to explain Him away? Will you continue to try to live life as usual? Or will you acknowledge that Christ's resurrection really changes everything and surrender your life to Him and commit to following Him in obedience? The commission that He spoke then is still for us today: "Go therefore and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the age." (Matthew 17:18-20, italics mine)

The glory of Easter is not limited to the single event of Christ's resurrection or even to that forty-days that followed leading up to His ascension. Rather, the glory of Easter encompasses all that the resurrection began. We have received the call to bring the good news of salvation in Jesus Christ to the world. And we can do so in confidence, without fear, and in the power of the Holy Spirit, because Jesus Christ has been raised from the dead. What a great time of year to be reminded, not just that Jesus Christ has called us, but also that He is the one who empowers us to accomplish the work He has given us.

" 'O death, where is your victory? O death, where is your sting?' The sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law; but thanks be to God, who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, my beloved brethren, be steadfast, immovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, knowing that your toil is not in vain in the Lord." (1 Corinthians 15:55-58, italics mine)

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God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 147: BT 19: Sec. 13

Part 1, Division 1, Chapter 2. Being-in-the-World in General as the Basic State of Dasein
Section 13. A Founded Mode in which Being-in is Exemplified. Knowing the World. [1]

The last section concluded with Heidegger's drawing a distinction between the phenomenon of being-in and some of its manifestations, as in knowing the world. There has been a tendency to interpret the former in terms of the latter and thus to actually miss the essential character of being-in. In this section, Heidegger looks more closely at the case of 'knowing the world'.

Heidegger begins by reminding us that being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein and one in which Dasein operates pre-eminently in the mode of everydayness. It follows that in every ontical experience, Dasein is also experiencing being-in-the-world. Since Dasein has an understanding of its own being, it also has some understanding (perhaps non-theoretical) of its being-in-the-world, but that understanding is only indefinite and easily concealed. He then writes, "But no sooner was the 'phenomenon of knowing the world' grasped than it got interpreted in a 'superficial', formal manner." (BT 86-87/60) This superficial interpretation is seen in the customary way of setting up knowledge as a relation between subject and object, where Dasein is taken to be the subject and the world to be the object.

He continues: "Even if it were feasible to give an ontological definition of "Being-in" primarily in terms of a Being-in-the-world which knows, it would still be our first task to show that knowing has the phenomenal character of a Being which is in and towards the world." (BT 87/60) ...it would still be our first task to show that knowing has the phenomenal character of a way of existing which is in and towards the world. In other words it would be necessary to show that knowing involves presupposing an essential relationship between the knower and the known. It cannot be the case that Dasein exists completely separately from the world and then comes into contact with it. Rather, in order to know, Dasein must already be "in" or "towards" the world. So Heidegger emphasizes that 'knowing' does not 'exist' between the subject and object. "If knowing 'is' at all, it belongs solely to those entities which know." (BT 87/60)

He goes on to remind us that knowing is not present-at-hand in Dasein. It is not a 'property' of Dasein. Now this idea that 'knowing' belongs solely to those entities that know might suggest that knowing must be 'inside' that entity. But then the problem arises: how can this knowing subject reach outside of itself to access what is 'other and external'? How can it reach any object at all? We could spend a great deal of time exploring this question, but Heidegger cuts that investigation short. "But in any of the numerous varieties which this approach may take, the question of the kind of Being which belongs to this knowing subject is left entirely unasked, though whenever its knowing gets handled, its way of Being is already included tacitly in one's theme." (BT 87/60) Other philosophers may be careful to point out that the 'inside' should not be conceived like a box or cabinet, but it not so clear what positive view they have of the matter. Knowing will remain problematical "unless one has previously clarified how it is and what it is." (BT 87/61)

At the outset, if one is to understand the phenomenon of knowing, one must grasp, first, "that knowing is a mode of Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, and is founded ontically upon this state of Being." (BT 88/61) This definition may be helpful to keep in mind. Heidegger continues, "But if, as we suggest, we thus find phenomenally that knowing is a kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the-world, one might object that with such an Interpretation of knowing, the problem of knowledge is nullified; for what is left to be asked if one presupposes that knowing is already 'alongside' its world, when it is not supposed to reach that world except in the transcending of the subject?" (BT 88/61) Heidegger is comfortable with setting this question aside. In his view, having exhibited the phenomenon of knowing reveals that there is no problem of knowledge, then one should not feel compelled to answer a question that arose from a fundamentally misguided understanding of knowing.

Heidegger goes on to look at just what shows itself in the phenomenal findings about knowing. To do this, he says, we must keep inn mind that knowing is grounded beforehand in a being-already-alongside-the-world, which is essentially constitutive for Dasein's being. Being-already-alongside carries with it the idea of involvement, engagement, "fascination," and concern. "If knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the present-at-hand by observing it, then there must first be a deficiency in our having-to-do with the world concernfully." (BT 88/61) Here it may be helpful to think of "knowing" as "mere knowing" or as a way of knowing about something just by looking at it as opposed to by using it. Heidegger continues: "When concern holds back [Sichenthalten] from any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into what is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just tarrying alongside.... [das Nur-noch-verweilen bei...]" (BT 88/61)

This kind of being towards the world--i.e. tarrying-alongside--lets us encounter entities purely in the way they look (EIDOS); in this way (i.e. on the basis of this kind of being and as a mode of it) it is possible to just look (and to look explicitly) at what we encounter. Looking at something is a way of taking up a stance toward it. Heidegger describes it as entering "the mode of dwelling autonomously alongside entities within-the-world." (BT 88-89/61) Looking-at involves holding-oneself-back from manipulation or utilization of the object; in this way the perception of the present-at-hand is "consummated." "Perception is consummated when on addresses oneself to something as something and discusses it as such. This amounts to interpretation in the broadest sense; and on the basis of such interpretation, perception becomes an act of making determinate. What is thus perceived and made determinate can be expressed in propositions, and can be retained and preserved as what has thus been asserted. This perceptive retention of an assertion about something is itself a way of Being-in-the-world; it is not to be Interpreted as a 'procedure' by which a subject provides itself with representations [Vorstellungen] of something which remain stored up 'inside' as having been thus appropriated, and with regard to which the question of how they 'agree' with actuality can occasionally arise." (BT 89/62)

Here Heidegger has just described one way of knowing, which is itself a kind of being which belongs to being-in-the-world. This way of knowing presupposes that one is already-in- and already-alongside-the-world. From this position it is possible to be related to entities within-the-world in a variety of ways, involving varying degrees of engagement or involvement. One way that involves a minimum of involvement is looking-at. But it must be remembered that this is a way of encountering an entity in-the-world, in a sense continuous with all the other ways of encountering an entity, presupposing a condition of already-being-alongside those entities. It is not to be treated as a way of reaching outside of oneself to grasp things that are external. It is also not the kind of thing for which a question about correspondence and agreement can arise, in Heidegger's view.

Heidegger rejects the idea that Dasein is somehow encapsulated in a self and then reaches outside to grasp objects, "but even in this 'Being-outside' alongside the object, Dasein is still 'inside', if we understand this in the correct sense; that is to say, it is itself 'inside' as a Being-in-the-world which knows." (BT 89/62) Furthermore, he says, Dasein does not bring what is outside to the inside. "[E]ven in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows remains outside, and it does so as Dasein. If I 'merely' know [Wissen] about some way in which the Being of entities is interconnected, if I 'only' represent them, if I 'do no more' than 'think' about them, I am no less alongside the entities outside in the world than when I originally grasp them." (BT 89-90/62) Heidegger goes so far as to say that even where error or delusion or forgetfulness is involved, these are modifications of the primordial being-in. He will develop this idea in later sections. It certainly raises questions about Heidegger's view.

We have now gotten a glimpse of how knowing the world is founded upon a series of interconnected modes of being-in-the-world. Knowing, then, is a distinctive (even novel) way of approaching a world ("a new status of Being [Seinsstand]") which has already been discovered in Dasein. The relationship of knowing does not bring Dasein into contact with the world but is rather founded upon Dasein already having a relationship to the world--a relationship of being-in-the-world. "This new possibility of Being [that is, knowing] can develop itself autonomously; it can become a task to be accomplished, and as scientific knowledge it can take over the guidance for Being-in-the-world." (BT 90/62, bracket my own) In other words, it is possible that knowing, this particular possibility of being, becomes the primary way in which Dasein encounters the world (and it may be argued that this has, to some extent, become the case in our modern scientific era). But if we are to be clear and to understand knowing properly, we must keep in mind that "Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world. Thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be Interpreted beforehand." (BT 90/62)

In the next chapter, we shall turn to interpreting the basic state of being-in-the-world.



--

FOOTNOTES:

[1] "The conception of 'founded' modes is taken from Husserl, who introduces the concept of 'founding' in his Logische Untersuchungen... . ...[A] founded mode of Being-in is simply a mode which can subsist only when connected with something else." (BT 86/59, footnote 1) See this reference for still further clarification of the concept of foundedness.

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 146: BT 18: Sec. 12

Part I. The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being
Division 1. Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein
Chapter 2. Being-in-the-World in General as the Basic State of Dasein
Section 12. A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World, in terms of an Orientation towards Being-in as such

"In our preparatory discussions (section 9) we have brought out some characteristics of Being which will provide us with a steady light for our further investigation, but which will at the same time become structurally concrete as that investigation continues. Dasein is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being. In saying this, we are calling attention to the formal concept of existence. Dasein exists. Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. In each case Dasein exists in one or the other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated." (BT 78/52-53)

(1) Dasein comports itself understandingly towards its own being. It's being is an issue for it. It can bear a relationship to its own being that no other kind of entity has towards its own being. (2) Dasein exists. It does not just exist in the way that a table or a chair exists but in a manner that is distinctive of Dasein. (3) Mineness [Jemeinigkeit] belongs to any existent Dasein in such a way that it is possible for it to either own itself or not own itself. Own-li-ness [Eigentlichkeit] and un-own-li-ness [Uneigentlichkeit] are possibilities for Dasein because Dasein has mineness. [1]

Own-li-ness and un-own-li-ness are ways that Dasein's being takes on a definite character and they are both grounded on the state of being which we have called "Being-in-the-world". So if we are to understand being in general and the being of Dasein, then we should look at this particular state of being.

Being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon and must be taken as a whole, even though it has and we are able to look at its complex structure. To understand what is involved in being-in-the-world, it is not enough to understand what is meant by 'being,' 'in,' 'the,' and 'world,' and piece those pieces of information together. Consider, for example, if we understood by "in" the relationship that water has to a cup that contains it. If we were to try to understand human beings' way of existing in the world just in terms of this physical containment picture of "in," we would miss out on something important. So we must try to capture the whole concept and experience and reality that are denoted by "being-in-the-world," even as we examine its structure.

In looking at its structure, Heidegger emphasizes three items. First, he will look at the 'in-the-world'. This investigation will involved looking at the ontological structure of the 'world' and defining the idea of worldhood. Second, he will look at "that entity which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it is. ... By a phenomenological demonstration we shall determine who is in the mode of Dasein's average everydayness." (BT 79/53) Third, he will look at being-in [In-sein] as such, examining the constitution of "inhood" [Inheit] itself.

Each of these elements will be treated in the third, fourth, and fifth chapters of this division--respectively. Because they are interconnected--that is, because being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon--examining each in turn will necessarily involve pointing to aspects of the others. Heidegger writes, "Emphasis upon any one of these constitutive items signifies that the others are emphasized along with it; this means that in any such case the whole phenomenon gets seen. Of course Being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein which is necessary a priori, but it is far from sufficient for completely determining Dasein's Being." (BT 79/53) The language here is reminiscent of an attempt to define Dasein definitively. Heidegger acknowledges that Being-in-the-world is necessary a priori, but he denies that it is sufficient for defining Dasein definitively. What are the sufficient conditions? It may turn out that this is the wrong kind of question to ask, but having it in mind can help us to appreciate the distinctive approach that Heidegger takes to understanding the character of Dasein and the meaning of being.

Before turning to consider each of the three elements of being-in-the-world, Heidegger attempts to orient the discussion by looking a bit more closely at the third element--"being-in." Heidegger acknowledges that our first impulse, when trying to understand "being-in" is to resort to a spatial notion: "...we are inclinde to understand this Being-in as 'Being in something' ["Sein in..."]. This latter term designates the kind of Being which an entity has when it is 'in' another one, as the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is 'in' the cupboard." (BT 79/54) Heidegger says that every entity that is capable of bearing this relationship--either to another entity or to the 'world-space' has the same kind of being--"that of Being-present-at-hand--as Things occurring 'within' the world." (BT 79/54)

He goes on to say: "Being-present-at-hand 'in' something which is likewise present-at-hand, and Being-present-at-hand-along-with [Mitvorhandensein] in the sense of a definite location-relationship with something else which has the same kind of Being, are ontological characteristics which we call "categorial": they are of such a sort as to belong to entities whose kind of Being is not of the character of Dasein." (BT 79/54) [2]

Here is the contrast: "Being-in, on the other hand, is a state of Dasein's Being; it is an existentiale." (BT 79/54) Recall from Section 09 (Graduate [ ]) that existentialia (the plural form of existentiale) are those characteristics of Dasein defined in terms of Dasein's existentiality. 'Being-in,' as an existentiale cannot be grasped or understood if construed spatially or categorially. Heidegger traces the derivation of the word 'in' to words that refer to residing, dwelling, being accustomed to, being familiar with, and looking after. These series of derivations leads Heidegger to conclude: "an so 'ich bin' ['I am'] means in its turn "I reside" or "dwell alongside" the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. "Being" [Sein], as the infinitive of 'ich bin' (that is to say, when it is understood as an existentiale), signifies "to reside alongside...", "to be familiar with...". "Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state." (BT 80/54)

So 'being-in,' when used to describe Dasein does not describe Dasein's spatial relationship to the world or to any objects in the world. Rather, it connotes a relationship of familiarity, at-homeness, embeddedness, and involvement. "Being-in" is the formal existential expression for the being of Dasein. Dasein possesses "being-in" because it has being-in-the-world as its essential state. [3]

Heidegger goes on to discuss "being-alongside"--an existentiale founded upon being-in. Keep in mind, at this point, that being-in is also an existentiale and is a state of Dasein's being. So Dasein has being-in-the-world as its essential state. Being-in is the formal existential expression for the being of Dasein. And being-alongside is also an existentiale that is founded upon being-in. We shall discuss the character of being-alongside in a moment, but first Heidegger takes a moment to discuss his methodology.

"In these analyses the issue is one of seeing a primordial structure of Dasein's Being--a structure in accordance with whose phenomenal content the concepts of Being must be Articulated; because of this, and because this structure is in principle one which cannot be grasped by the traditional ontological categories, this 'Being-alongside' must be examined still more closely." (BT 81/54-55) Recall that the reason we are investigating the being of Dasein is so that we can get a clue to the meaning of being in itself. So we must be very careful that we approach the explication of the being of Dasein and its structure in an appropriate way. "We shall again choose the method of contrasting it with a relationship of Beinng which is essentially different ontologically--viz. categorial--but which we express by the same linguistic means." (BT 81/55) This is precisely why this investigation is so difficult. We can express both categorial and existential notions using the same words, like "in" and "alongside." Keeping clear the difference involves stating the obvious in many cases. This may seem tedious but it is necessary. Heidegger thinks that failure to be so meticulous has led metaphysics and ontology astray and has had the result that "we are even farther from possessing a stable coinge for the appropriate structural concepts." (BT 81/55)

Returning to the main topic: "As an existentiale, 'Being alongside' the world never means anything like the Being-present-at-hand-together of Things that occur. There is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world'." (BT 81/55) This may seem a radical statement since we very regularly and easily speak of people standing next to objects or inside of rooms. Heidegger recognizes this, of course, but goes on to say some even more startling things. After admitting that we regularly say things like, "The table stands "by" ['bei'] the door' or 'The chair "touches" ['beruhrt'] the wall'" he says, "Taken strictly, 'touching' is never what we are talking about in such cases, not because accurate reexamination will always eventually establish that there is a space between the chair and the wall, but because in principle the chair can never touch the wall, even if the space between them should be equal to zero." (BT 81/55) Heidegger insists that for one object to touch another the one must be the sort of thing 'for' which the other could and would be encounterable. Something that is present-at-hand can only be touched by something that has being-in as its own kind of being so that objects in the world can become accessible as being-present-at-hand. "When two entities are present-at-hand within the world, and furthermore are worldless in themselves, they can never 'touch' each other, nor can either of them 'be' 'alongside' the other." (BT 81-82/55) It should be fairly clear that Heidegger is treating expressions like "next to" and "touching" in ways other than they are normally used or understood. The idea seems to be that one object can only be related to another object if it is able to comport itself toward or encounter that object in some way. Does this mean that Heidegger denies that physical objects ever or under any description can bear the relationship of 'touching' to one another. I do not think this is necessarily the case, but he is trying to capture, with limited language, a certain relationship that human beings have to objects in virtue of their kind of being that is not open or available to just any object in the world.

Heidegger goes on to concede that there is a sense in which Dasein (which is not worldless) "can with some right and within certain limits be taken as merely present-at-hand. To do this, one must completely disregard or just not see the existential state of Being-in." (BT 82/56) Here Heidegger makes the, probably obvious, point that even though Dasein has a distinctive way of being that is not shared with entities in the world, it is possible to conceive of and think about the entity that is Dasein just in terms of the kind of being of presence-at-hand. But Heidegger throws in one further distinction that will take some work to understand.

"But the fact that 'Dasein' can be taken as something which is present-at-hand and just present-at-hand, is not to be confused with a certain way of 'presence-at-hand' which is Dasein's own. This latter kind of presence-at-hand becomes accessible not by disregarding Dasein's specific structures but only by understanding them in advance. Dasein understands its ownmost Being in the sense of a certain 'factual Being-present-at-hand'. And yet the 'factuality' of the fact [Tatsache] of one's own Dasein is at bottom quite different ontologically from the factual occurrence of some kind of mineral, for example. Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein's "facticity". (BT 82/55-56) Regarding facticity, it is also useful to look at H. 7 (Section 02) and H. 135 (Section 29). It will be necessary to distinguish the 'factual' from the 'factical' and the 'actual.' Note that there is a way of conceiving of Dasein as present-at-hand that does not involve stripping it of its essential being. Rather, there is a kind of presence-at-hand that arises from Dasein's structure and its facticity. Heidegger says that facticity is a definite way of being with a complicated structure that cannot be treated (or even grasped as a problem) until Dasein's basic existential states have been worked out. (The topic will be taken up again in chapter five of this section when the analysis of being-in is fully developed.) For now he leaves us with this idea: "The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world." (BT 82/56) It's not yet clear what is meant by 'destiny' but this may be the necessary clue for understanding fully why Heidegger denies that worldless objects can be related to one another. [4]

Heidegger reminds us, at this point, that characterizing being-in as an existentiale does not exclude a kind of spatiality to Dasein. But, he does insist that this spatiality or 'being-in-space' is possible only on the basis of being-in-the-world in general. So, he rejects the idea that the existential being-in is a property of the spiritual whereas the spatial being-in is a property of the corporeal. Such a view would involve treating both the spiritual and the corporeal as occurrent present-at-hand. "Not until we understand Being-in-the-world as an essential structure of Dasein can we have any insight into Dasein's existential spatiality. Such an insight will keep us from failing to see this structure or from previously cancelling it out--a procedure motivated not ontologically but rather 'metaphysically' by the naive supposition that man is in the first instance, a spiritual Thing which subsequently gets misplaced 'into' a space." (BT 83/56)

Here we get a hint at what Heidegger has in mind when speaking of Dasein's existential spatiality as being derivative of its being-in-the-world. He writes, "Dasein's facticity is such that is Beinng-in-the-world has always dispersed [zerstreut] itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making us of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining.... All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being--a kind of Being which we have yet to characterize in detail." (BT 83/56-57) All of these ways of being-in are derivative of or arise from Dasein's fundamental character of being-in-the-world. Heidegger also speaks of leaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, and taking a rest as deficient modes of concern, in which concern is just barely involved.

Now there are familiar colloquial uses of the word, 'concern,' but the expression will be used in this investigation as an ontological term for an existentiale (i.e. for a state of Dasein's being--remember that being-in and being-alongside are other examples of existentialia) and will designate the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world. The expression 'concern' has been chosen because of its close relationship to 'care'. In chapter six of this division, 'care' will be disclosed as an ontological structural concept. To be understood in its ontical sense (either positively or deficiently) is only possible for 'care' because Dasein, understood ontologically, is care. "Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world [Sein zur Welt] is essentially concern." (BT 84/57)

Heidegger emphasizes that being-in is not a mere property of Dasein. It is not the case that Dasein exists as some kind of entity that may or may not have the property of being-in or a relationship-of-being towards the 'world'. Rather, "Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is. This state of Being does not arise just because some other entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can 'meet up with' Dasein only in so far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a world." (BT 84/57)

Heidegger comments on the familiar way of speaking of 'man's having an environment' but points out that this says nothing ontologically as long as 'having' is left indefinite. The ability or possibility of 'having' is founded upon the existential state of being-in. [5] Because Dasein is essentially an entity with being-in, it is possible for it to discover and encounter entities environmentally. "To talk about 'having an environment' is ontically trivial, but ontologically it presents a problem. To solve it requires nothing else than defining the Being of Dasein, and doing so in a way that is ontologically adequate." (BT 84/58) The idea is that when speaking of human beings as entities, describing them as having an environment is obvious and trivial. But Heidegger is wondering what it is about human nature that makes it possible for human beings to have an environment. That is a much more puzzling question and requires the ontological analytic to resolve it. He again emphasizes that this state cannot be reduced to or construed merely in terms of a single discipline like biology. "For the environment is a structure which even biology as a positive science can never find and can never define, but must presuppose and constantly employ. Yet, even as an a priori condition for the objects which biology takes for its theme, this structure itself can be explained philosophically only if it has been conceived beforehand as a structure of Dasein." (BT 84/58)

Then he makes a highly interesting comment: "Only in terms of an orientation towards the ontological structure thus conceived can 'life' as a state of Being be defined a priori, and this must be done in a privative manner. Ontically as well as ontologically, the priority belongs to Being-in-the-world as concern." (BT 84-85/58) Macquarrie and Robinson include this footnote: "The point is that in order to understand life merely as such, we must make abstraction from the fuller life of Dasein. See H. 50 above." (BT 85, footnote 1) Following this reference takes us back to section 10, where Heidegger writes, "In the order which any possible comprehension and interpretation must follow, biology as a 'science of life' is founded upon the ontology of Dasein, even if not entirely. Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being; but essentially it is accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative Interpretation; it determines what must be the case if there can be anything like mere-aliveness [Nur-noch-leben]. Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein. In turn, Dasein is never to be defined ontologically by regarding it as life (in an ontologically indefinite manner) plus something else." (BT 75/50) Macquarrie and Robinson's interpretation is helpful and, I think, basically correct. Heidegger thinks that if one is to really understand human Life, one must not look to a purely biological definition and then attempt to supplement it in order to build up a concept of Life. Rather, the concept of life that we apply in biology and elsewhere is ultimately derived from the fullest concept of life available to us (and one that has been largely ignored, Heidegger thinks) and that is the life of Dasein. It is this understanding of Life that structures and informs our thinking about all the other forms of life in the world.

[Here I see a close connection to both points in Christian theology and platonism. Though, interestingly, Heidegger has objected to Christian dualism and Greek metaphysics. But Plato's conception of the forms as ideals from which are derived the various particulars and entities that we see and interact seems to have strong affinities with Heidegger's view of life and of these other aspects of Dasein's nature. Heidegger would probably object to what I am describing on the grounds that Dasein cannot access some "higher" notion of being than its own. His account treats the being of Dasein as that in terms of which Dasein approaches the world and as the point of reference from which it orients itself in thinking about being. Christian theology places that point of orientation in God and platonism in the forms. The question that I am interested in: Is it possible for us to recognize the priority of these other points of reference without making the mistake of thinking that we can exhaustively grasp them? As a Christian I'm committed to that idea, but I would like to be able to work it out. One main question that needs to be clarified is exactly what the relationship is between these derivative forms of being-in, of concern, of life, etc? Are these merely modes of discourse or is there something more substantial to them? Just how "substantial" are these ontical derivations?]

Now Heidegger acknowledges that his method of determining the nature of Dasein has, up to this point, consisted only in negative assertions. He says that this is not accidental but rather reveals what is peculiar to this phenomenon in an appropriate way. "When Being-in-the-world is exhibited phenomenologically, disguises and concealments are rejected because this phenomenon itself always gets 'seen' in a certain way in every Dasein. And it thus gets 'seen' because it makes up a basic state of Dasein, and in every case is already disclosed for Dasein's understanding of Being, and disclosed along with that Being itself." (BT 85/58) Unfortunately there has been a tendency to explain this state of being wrongly or to identify it with certain features of its derivative manifestations. However, Heidegger goes on to say, "On the other hand, this 'seeing in a certain way and yet for the most part wrongly explaining' is itself based upon nothing else than this very state of Dasein's Being, which is such that Dasein itself--and this means also its Being-in-the-world--gets its ontological understanding of itself in the first instance from those entities which it itself is not but which it encounters 'within' its world, and from the Being which they possess." (BT 85/58) This is an interesting claim and reflects an interesting idea on Heidegger's part. He takes it to be part of Dasein's character and reflective of that character that Dasein consistently misconstrues the character of its own being when trying to make that explicit. One goal of his analytic is to be able to explain why this is the case and why it is even necessary that the history of the study of being should have unfolded in this way.

[Interestingly, I am not so committed to the idea that Dasein has this tendency to misconstrue its own being as an almost essential characteristic. It is not necessarily natural to man that he should take as his point of reference for understanding himself the physical objects in the world. Rather, that is a result of man's fallenness. Ah, but he seems to have a more thorough explanation:]

The state of being-in-the-world is always familiar to Dasein. "Now if it is also to become known [erkannt], the knowing which such a task explicitly implies takes itself (as a knowing of the world [Welterkennen]) as the chief exemplification of the 'soul's' relationship to the world. Knowing the world (NOEIN)--or rather addressing oneself to the 'world' and discussing it (LOGOS)--thus functions as the primary mode of Being-in-the-world, even though Being-in-the-world does not as such get conceived." (BT 85/58-59) Because of this there is a tendency to mistake being-in-the-world as a relationship between one entity (the world) and another (the soul) and so "one tries to conceive the relationship between world and soul as grounded in these two entities themselves and in the meaning of their Being--namely, to conceive it as Being-present-at-hand." (BT 85-86/59) So even though one has a pre-phenomenological experience of and acquaintance with being-in-the-world, it remains invisible to attempts to interpret it. This misunderstanding and inappropriate interpretation has become the foundation for understanding problems both metaphysical and epistemological. "For what is more obvious than that a 'subject' is related to an 'Object' and vice versa? This 'subject-Object-relationship' must be presupposed. But while this presupposition is unimpeachable in its facticity, this makes it indeed a baleful one, if its ontological necessity and especially its ontological meaning are to be left in the dark." (BT 86/59)

Heidegger concludes this section by saying, "Thus the phenomenon of Being-in has for the most part been represented exclusively by a single exemplar--knowing the world. This has not only been the case in epistemology; for even practical behaviour has been understood as behaviour which is 'non-theoretical' and 'atheoretical'. Because knowing has been given this priority, our understanding of its own-most kind of Being gets led astray, and accordingly Being-in-the-world must be exhibited even more precisely with regard to knowing the world, and must itself be made visible as an existential 'modality' of Being-in." (BT 86/59)

[This last point has very direct application to things I've been thinking about. It may be developed more in Heidegger's own thinking about 'understanding'. The idea is that "knowing the world" is just one way of being-in and that if it is mistakenly taken as primary, then our understanding of all the other ways of being-in will be confused. This will be developed further in the next section.]

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FOOTNOTES:

[1] Watch out for this in the future. There is a question in the literature about what exactly is involved in authenticity or own-li-ness. Must Dasein exist in one or the other of these modes? Are they both modes of some more basic feature of Dasein? Regarding this quote, what does it mean to be 'modally undifferentiated'? "In each case Dasein exists as one or the other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated." (BT 78/53) After all, I take it that Heidegger is not intending to make a vacuously true claim.

[2] In my notes from the Being and Time seminar (Fall '07): "Categorial" is a characteristic exemplified by Kantian and Aristotelian categories. It encompasses the fundamental categories of non-Dasein, including the being of equipment (ready-to-hand) and the being of the occurrent (present-at-hand). It is contrasted with the "Existential." "Existential" is the adjective form. The noun form is existentiale (pl. existentialia) and the contrast case is the category (pl. categories).

[3] I need to remain alert to points where there may be ambiguity, even if it may be painful and laborious to try and rectify. I'm a bit unclear as to what is being referred to by the expression "the being of Dasein." I'm also unclear about the relationship between the being of Dasein and the state of Dasein. Are these very precise notions. It would be wise to get clear on them. Recall that being is that in virtue of which a thing is what it is and is recognizable as the thing it is. It is our innate sensitivity to the different kinds of beings that entities possess that we are able to differentiate them and comport ourselves appropriately to them.

[4] Keep this in mind for the future.

[5] It is interesting that the synonymy of ability and possibility came to me so naturally. This is also a connection that Blattner draws and he interprets possibilities in terms of abilities. But I actually wonder whether that construal is correct. This is something to watch out for. I have left both in here for future reference.

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God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 145: BT 17: Sec. 11

Part 1, Division 1, Chapter 1. Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein.
Section 11. The Existential Analytic and the Interpretation of Primitive Dasein. The Difficulties of Achieving a 'Natural Conception of the World'

We have already indicated that Heidegger's investigation will involve examining Dasein in its most proximal mode of being--that is, everydayness. [1] Here Heidegger attempts to clarify what is involved in this. The first major point that he makes it that everydayness is not the same thing as primitiveness. He is not attempting to give an account of human beings in their 'state of nature' or as they were prior to the development of advanced cultures or civilizations. Rather, everydayness belongs to people in very modern societies and the opportunity to pursue other possible ways of being besides everydayness is even open to primitives. There are certain advantages to investigating primitive man--the relevant phenomena are often less concealed by the edifice of accumulated-culture, history, tradition, and self-consciousness over time. "A way of conceiving things which seems, perhaps, rather clumsy and crude from our standpoint, can be positively helpful in bringing out the ontological structures of phenomena in a genuine way." (BT 76/51) But, again, Heidegger will not pursue the investigation of the primitive.

He points out that the information that we have accumulated about primitives has been provided by ethnologyy which presupposes a certain conception and interpretation of human Dasein in general. So there is the same kind of problem in drawing upon the ethnologist's insight as there was in drawing upon the biologist's or psychologist's insight. "Ethnology itself already presupposes as its clue an inadequate analytic of Dasein." (BT 76/51) This is not to say that ethnology should be halted until an adequate ontological foundation of Dasein can be offered; but it does emerge from this, as a goal of our inquiry, that the foundation we offer helps to contextualize ethnology and the other sciences of man.

Heidegger identifies as one of the most persistent problems, facing an investigation of this kind at the outset, the need to "work out the idea of a 'natural conception of the world'". (BT 76/52) It might seem that the vast quantity of knowledge about the many and different cultures of the world would help this process, but that is not actually the case. It is not enough, to grasp the natural conception of the world, to take all the various conceptions that are out there are categorize them and combine them 'syncretistically'. That would not guarantee that we actually understand the things that we are organizing and ordering.

"If an ordering principle is genuine, it has its own content as a thing [Sachgehalt], which is never to be found by means of such ordering, but is already presupposed in it. So if one is to put various pictures of the world in order, one must have an explicit idea of the world as such. And if the 'world' itself is something constitutive for Dasein, one must have an insight into Dasein's basic structures in order to treat the world-phenomenon conceptually." (BT 77/52)

This chapter has been focused on promoting a "correct understanding of the tendency which underlies the following Interpretation and the kind of questions which it poses." (BT 77/52) It will not yield knowledge of entities in the same way that other disciplines do. Rather, it has a goal all of its own, "if indeed, beyond the acquiring of information about entities, the question of Being is the spur for all scientific seeking." (BT 77/52)

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FOOTNOTES:

[1] See Graduate 133: BT 07: Sec. 05 and Graduate 143: BT 15: Sec. 09.

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 144: BT 16: Sec. 10

Part 1, Division 1, Chapter 1. Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein.
Section 10. How the Analytic of Dasein is to be Distinguished from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology

In this section, Heidegger expands on the point he made at the end of the previous section about the importance of distinguishing the analytic of Dasein from other types of investigations into the nature of human beings. "We must show that those investigations and formulations of the question which have been aimed at Dasein heretofore, have missed the real philosophical problem (notwithstanding their objective fertility), and that as long as they persist in missing it, they have no right to claim that they can accomplish that for which they are basically striving. ... Our distinctions will necessarily be inadequate from the standpoint of 'scientific theory' simply because the scientific structure of the above-mentioned disciplines (not, indeed, the 'scientific attitude' of those who work to advance them) is today thoroughly questionable and needs to be attacked in new ways which must have their source in ontological problematics." (BT 71/45) It is important to keep in mind Heidegger's critique of science. The interpretation of human beings that is offered by science arises from certain presuppositions. As Heidegger is trying to get, in a sense, behind those assumptions, those interpretations that science does offer must prove to be inadequate.

In an effort to capture what is distinctive about this investigation, Heidegger appeals, again, to the case of Descartes and to the key way in which his investigation fell short of its goal. "He investigates the "cogitare" of the "ego", at least within certain limits. On the other hand, he leaves the "sum'" completely undiscussed, even though it is regarded as no less primordial than the cogito. Our analytic raises the ontological question of the Being of the "sum"." (BT 71-72/46) [1] The idea is that Descartes, in his famous formulation--"I think, therefore, I am"--he focused on the meaning of "I think," but took for granted what is meant by "I am." This is exactly what is constantly being unreflectively taken for granted and this is exactly where Heidegger wants to focus.

Heidegger is concerned that there is too much content already presupposed in our ideas of the "I" or the subject. "Ontologically, every idea of a 'subject'--unless refined by a previous ontological determination of its basic character--still posits the subjectum (HUPOKEIMENON) along with it, no matter how vigorous one's ontical protestations against the 'soul substance' or the 'reification of consciousness'." (BT 72/46) The same concern holds when speaking of the soul, the consciousness, the spirit, the person, the life, or the man. We need to get at the "Thinghood" that is presupposed in all these ways of speaking about the "self". The ontological origin of this Thinghood must be demonstrated if we are to be in a position to ask what we are to understand positively when we think of the unreified being that stands behind each of these conceptualizations.

Heidegger is concerned that there is too much content already presupposed in our ideas of the "I" or the subject. "Ontologically, every idea of a 'subject'--unless refined by a previous ontological determination of its basic character--still posits the subjectum (HUPOKEIMENON) along with it, no matter how vigorous one's ontical protestations against the 'soul substance' or the 'reification of consciousness'." (BT 72/46) The same concern holds when speaking of the soul, the consciousness, the spirit, the person, the life, or the man. We need to get at the "Thinghood" that is presupposed in all these ways of speaking about the "self". The ontological origin of this Thinghood must be demonstrated "if we are to be in a position to ask what we are to understand positively when we think of the unreified Being that stands behind each of these conceptualizations." (BT 72/47)

This is why even such basic terms as 'life' and 'man' have been set aside for now. And if we were to describe our investigation as 'the philosophy of life', that would presuppose a certain stable conception of 'life,' just as a stable concept of 'plant' is presupposed when speaking of 'the botany of plants'. The whole point of Heidegger's investigation is to call 'life' into question--to make it a philosophical problem.

Heidegger makes reference to the researches of Wilhelm Dilthey which were stimulated by the "perennial question of 'life'." (BT 72/47) In Dilthey, we find an example of someone who sought, not only to understand the various aspects of life (psychical, material, etc.) but who sought to grasp life as a whole. He was, of course, limited in both his goals and in the available concepts he had to work with, but Heidegger denies that this problem is unique to Dilthey. He goes on, "The phenomenological Interpretation of personality is in principle more radical and more transparent; but the question of the Being of Dasein has a dimension which this too fails to enter." (BT 73/47) In speaking of the "phenomenological Interpretation," Heidegger does not mean to refer to his own philosophical method but rather to the pioneering work in phenomenology that came from Husserl and Scheler. Even it, Heidegger says, falls short. "The question of 'personal Being' itself is one which they no longer raise." (BT 73/47)

Here I shall quote a large section of what Heidegger says. He is expounding on the ideas of Scheler and Husserl in ways that, I think, he will expand on throughout the rest of his work: "We have chosen Scheler's Interpretation as an example, not only because it is accessible in print, but because he emphasizes personal Being explicitly as such, and tries to determine its character by defining the specific Being of acts as contrasted with anything 'psychical'. For Scheler, the person is never to be thought of as a Thing or a substance; the person 'is rather the unity of living-through [Er-lebens] which is immediately experienced in and with our Experiences--not a Thing merely thought of behind and outside what is immediately Experienced'. The person is no Thinglike and substantial Being. Nor can the Being of a person be entirely absorbed in being a subject of rational acts which follow certain laws. / The person is not a Thing, not a substance, not an object. Here Scheler is emphasizing what Husserl suggests when he insists that the unity of the person must have a Constitution essentially different from that required for the unity of Things in Nature. What Scheler says of the person, he applies to acts as well: 'But an act is never also an object; for it is essential to the Being of acts that they are Experienced only in their performance itself and given in reflection.' Acts are something non-psychical. Essentially the person aexists only in the performance of intentional acts, and is therefore essentially not an object. Any psychical Objectification of acts, and hence any way of taking them as something psychical, is tantamount to depersonalization." (BT 73/47-48)

Heidegger goes on to say more but what is essential is the kind of contrast that Heidegger wants to appropriate from Scheler. The kind of understanding of Dasein that he is interested in pursuing cannot must be understood as distinct from previous investigations that have purported to have this aim. The pursuit neither of philosophies of life nor of personalism has yielded an understanding of the human being as a whole. He says that even if we could come to an understanding of the different parts of the person--for instance, of the "body," "soul," and "spirit"--in their respective phenomenal domains, understanding the whole human being would involve more than just adding up one's understanding of the different parts. Any attempt to grasp the whole human being must involve presupposing some idea of the being of the whole. Heidegger claims that such an understanding has been cut off because of the acceptance of an inadequate ontological foundation deriving from the anthropology of Christianity and of the ancient world which has gone largely unquestioned. He says that there are two main elements in this traditional anthropology.

The first element: "'Man' is here defined as a ZOON LOGON ECHON, and this is Interpreted to mean an animal rationale, something living which has reason." (BT 74/48) Heidegger says that the kind of being that belongs to ZOON is understood in the sense of occurrring and being-present-at-hand. It is combined with LOGOS, without any clarification of what kind of being belongs to LOGOS or how the two are related to one another.

The second element is the Christian claim that human beings bear the 'image of God'. But what exactly is involved in this idea? It involves something more than just being a thing endowed with intelligence, but it's exact character has received different formulations throughout history. He points to Calvin and Zwingli as speaking of the way in which man seeks to reach beyond himself toward the transcendent. But despite these statements that are full of richness and depth, it has remained the case that the essence of man has been treated as self-evident and consistently not called into question. Moreover, it has commonly been construed as a thing present-at-hand. The two strands from Greek and Christian thought are intertwined in the res cogitans but still remain unquestioned and so the "decisive ontological foundations of anthropological problematics remain undetermined." (BT 75/49)

Heidegger is aware of trends toward defining the traditionally anthropological and psychological aspects of man in biological terms and he rejects this. Such an account would not compensate for the lack of a solid ontological foundation. Heidegger says that biology, as a 'science of life' is founded on the ontology of Dasein, not the other way around. He writes: "The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative Interpretation; it determines what must be the case if there can be anything like mere-aliveness [Nur-noch-leben]. Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein." (BT 75/50) In this quotation, Heidegger uses "life" to refer to what is understood by biology. "Life" in that sense is a much less robust concept than may be found by a consideration of the kind of life that Dasein possesses; it is 'mere-aliveness'. There is a big difference between biological life and the kind of life that belongs to Dasein, and Heidegger thinks that it would be a grave mistake to substitute the former for the latter.

In all of this, Heidegger does not intend to undermine anthropology, psychology, or biology. He simply wishes to highlight their limitations and point out that each discipline actually presupposes some basic grasp of the entities that are its objects. What they cannot give us is an understanding of the "kind of Being which belongs to those entities which we ourselves are" and they cannot account for the ontological foundations that ground their own discipline. (BT 75/50)

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FOOTNOTES:

[1] Before and after his comments about Descartes, Heidegger says the following: "Historiologically, the aim of th eexistential analytic can be made plainer by considering Descartes, who is credited with providing the point of departure for modern philosophical inquiry by his discovery of the "cogito sum". ... At the same time it is of course misleading to exemplify the aim of our analytic historiologically in this way." I will not take the time to recall what is involved in this historiological point and exactly what Heidegger is saying here. He uses Descartes' case as a contrast but recognizes that this method of contrast is not, itself, sufficient to capture the point that he wants to make. I quote it here in case future reference is needed to places where Heidegger cites the "historiological" method.


--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.