Graduate 147: BT 19: Sec. 13
Part 1, Division 1, Chapter 2. Being-in-the-World in General as the Basic State of Dasein
Section 13. A Founded Mode in which Being-in is Exemplified. Knowing the World. [1]
The last section concluded with Heidegger's drawing a distinction between the phenomenon of being-in and some of its manifestations, as in knowing the world. There has been a tendency to interpret the former in terms of the latter and thus to actually miss the essential character of being-in. In this section, Heidegger looks more closely at the case of 'knowing the world'.
Heidegger begins by reminding us that being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein and one in which Dasein operates pre-eminently in the mode of everydayness. It follows that in every ontical experience, Dasein is also experiencing being-in-the-world. Since Dasein has an understanding of its own being, it also has some understanding (perhaps non-theoretical) of its being-in-the-world, but that understanding is only indefinite and easily concealed. He then writes, "But no sooner was the 'phenomenon of knowing the world' grasped than it got interpreted in a 'superficial', formal manner." (BT 86-87/60) This superficial interpretation is seen in the customary way of setting up knowledge as a relation between subject and object, where Dasein is taken to be the subject and the world to be the object.
He continues: "Even if it were feasible to give an ontological definition of "Being-in" primarily in terms of a Being-in-the-world which knows, it would still be our first task to show that knowing has the phenomenal character of a Being which is in and towards the world." (BT 87/60) ...it would still be our first task to show that knowing has the phenomenal character of a way of existing which is in and towards the world. In other words it would be necessary to show that knowing involves presupposing an essential relationship between the knower and the known. It cannot be the case that Dasein exists completely separately from the world and then comes into contact with it. Rather, in order to know, Dasein must already be "in" or "towards" the world. So Heidegger emphasizes that 'knowing' does not 'exist' between the subject and object. "If knowing 'is' at all, it belongs solely to those entities which know." (BT 87/60)
He goes on to remind us that knowing is not present-at-hand in Dasein. It is not a 'property' of Dasein. Now this idea that 'knowing' belongs solely to those entities that know might suggest that knowing must be 'inside' that entity. But then the problem arises: how can this knowing subject reach outside of itself to access what is 'other and external'? How can it reach any object at all? We could spend a great deal of time exploring this question, but Heidegger cuts that investigation short. "But in any of the numerous varieties which this approach may take, the question of the kind of Being which belongs to this knowing subject is left entirely unasked, though whenever its knowing gets handled, its way of Being is already included tacitly in one's theme." (BT 87/60) Other philosophers may be careful to point out that the 'inside' should not be conceived like a box or cabinet, but it not so clear what positive view they have of the matter. Knowing will remain problematical "unless one has previously clarified how it is and what it is." (BT 87/61)
At the outset, if one is to understand the phenomenon of knowing, one must grasp, first, "that knowing is a mode of Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, and is founded ontically upon this state of Being." (BT 88/61) This definition may be helpful to keep in mind. Heidegger continues, "But if, as we suggest, we thus find phenomenally that knowing is a kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the-world, one might object that with such an Interpretation of knowing, the problem of knowledge is nullified; for what is left to be asked if one presupposes that knowing is already 'alongside' its world, when it is not supposed to reach that world except in the transcending of the subject?" (BT 88/61) Heidegger is comfortable with setting this question aside. In his view, having exhibited the phenomenon of knowing reveals that there is no problem of knowledge, then one should not feel compelled to answer a question that arose from a fundamentally misguided understanding of knowing.
Heidegger goes on to look at just what shows itself in the phenomenal findings about knowing. To do this, he says, we must keep inn mind that knowing is grounded beforehand in a being-already-alongside-the-world, which is essentially constitutive for Dasein's being. Being-already-alongside carries with it the idea of involvement, engagement, "fascination," and concern. "If knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the present-at-hand by observing it, then there must first be a deficiency in our having-to-do with the world concernfully." (BT 88/61) Here it may be helpful to think of "knowing" as "mere knowing" or as a way of knowing about something just by looking at it as opposed to by using it. Heidegger continues: "When concern holds back [Sichenthalten] from any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into what is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just tarrying alongside.... [das Nur-noch-verweilen bei...]" (BT 88/61)
This kind of being towards the world--i.e. tarrying-alongside--lets us encounter entities purely in the way they look (EIDOS); in this way (i.e. on the basis of this kind of being and as a mode of it) it is possible to just look (and to look explicitly) at what we encounter. Looking at something is a way of taking up a stance toward it. Heidegger describes it as entering "the mode of dwelling autonomously alongside entities within-the-world." (BT 88-89/61) Looking-at involves holding-oneself-back from manipulation or utilization of the object; in this way the perception of the present-at-hand is "consummated." "Perception is consummated when on addresses oneself to something as something and discusses it as such. This amounts to interpretation in the broadest sense; and on the basis of such interpretation, perception becomes an act of making determinate. What is thus perceived and made determinate can be expressed in propositions, and can be retained and preserved as what has thus been asserted. This perceptive retention of an assertion about something is itself a way of Being-in-the-world; it is not to be Interpreted as a 'procedure' by which a subject provides itself with representations [Vorstellungen] of something which remain stored up 'inside' as having been thus appropriated, and with regard to which the question of how they 'agree' with actuality can occasionally arise." (BT 89/62)
Here Heidegger has just described one way of knowing, which is itself a kind of being which belongs to being-in-the-world. This way of knowing presupposes that one is already-in- and already-alongside-the-world. From this position it is possible to be related to entities within-the-world in a variety of ways, involving varying degrees of engagement or involvement. One way that involves a minimum of involvement is looking-at. But it must be remembered that this is a way of encountering an entity in-the-world, in a sense continuous with all the other ways of encountering an entity, presupposing a condition of already-being-alongside those entities. It is not to be treated as a way of reaching outside of oneself to grasp things that are external. It is also not the kind of thing for which a question about correspondence and agreement can arise, in Heidegger's view.
Heidegger rejects the idea that Dasein is somehow encapsulated in a self and then reaches outside to grasp objects, "but even in this 'Being-outside' alongside the object, Dasein is still 'inside', if we understand this in the correct sense; that is to say, it is itself 'inside' as a Being-in-the-world which knows." (BT 89/62) Furthermore, he says, Dasein does not bring what is outside to the inside. "[E]ven in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows remains outside, and it does so as Dasein. If I 'merely' know [Wissen] about some way in which the Being of entities is interconnected, if I 'only' represent them, if I 'do no more' than 'think' about them, I am no less alongside the entities outside in the world than when I originally grasp them." (BT 89-90/62) Heidegger goes so far as to say that even where error or delusion or forgetfulness is involved, these are modifications of the primordial being-in. He will develop this idea in later sections. It certainly raises questions about Heidegger's view.
We have now gotten a glimpse of how knowing the world is founded upon a series of interconnected modes of being-in-the-world. Knowing, then, is a distinctive (even novel) way of approaching a world ("a new status of Being [Seinsstand]") which has already been discovered in Dasein. The relationship of knowing does not bring Dasein into contact with the world but is rather founded upon Dasein already having a relationship to the world--a relationship of being-in-the-world. "This new possibility of Being [that is, knowing] can develop itself autonomously; it can become a task to be accomplished, and as scientific knowledge it can take over the guidance for Being-in-the-world." (BT 90/62, bracket my own) In other words, it is possible that knowing, this particular possibility of being, becomes the primary way in which Dasein encounters the world (and it may be argued that this has, to some extent, become the case in our modern scientific era). But if we are to be clear and to understand knowing properly, we must keep in mind that "Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world. Thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be Interpreted beforehand." (BT 90/62)
In the next chapter, we shall turn to interpreting the basic state of being-in-the-world.
--
FOOTNOTES:
[1] "The conception of 'founded' modes is taken from Husserl, who introduces the concept of 'founding' in his Logische Untersuchungen... . ...[A] founded mode of Being-in is simply a mode which can subsist only when connected with something else." (BT 86/59, footnote 1) See this reference for still further clarification of the concept of foundedness.
--
God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
Section 13. A Founded Mode in which Being-in is Exemplified. Knowing the World. [1]
The last section concluded with Heidegger's drawing a distinction between the phenomenon of being-in and some of its manifestations, as in knowing the world. There has been a tendency to interpret the former in terms of the latter and thus to actually miss the essential character of being-in. In this section, Heidegger looks more closely at the case of 'knowing the world'.
Heidegger begins by reminding us that being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein and one in which Dasein operates pre-eminently in the mode of everydayness. It follows that in every ontical experience, Dasein is also experiencing being-in-the-world. Since Dasein has an understanding of its own being, it also has some understanding (perhaps non-theoretical) of its being-in-the-world, but that understanding is only indefinite and easily concealed. He then writes, "But no sooner was the 'phenomenon of knowing the world' grasped than it got interpreted in a 'superficial', formal manner." (BT 86-87/60) This superficial interpretation is seen in the customary way of setting up knowledge as a relation between subject and object, where Dasein is taken to be the subject and the world to be the object.
He continues: "Even if it were feasible to give an ontological definition of "Being-in" primarily in terms of a Being-in-the-world which knows, it would still be our first task to show that knowing has the phenomenal character of a Being which is in and towards the world." (BT 87/60) ...it would still be our first task to show that knowing has the phenomenal character of a way of existing which is in and towards the world. In other words it would be necessary to show that knowing involves presupposing an essential relationship between the knower and the known. It cannot be the case that Dasein exists completely separately from the world and then comes into contact with it. Rather, in order to know, Dasein must already be "in" or "towards" the world. So Heidegger emphasizes that 'knowing' does not 'exist' between the subject and object. "If knowing 'is' at all, it belongs solely to those entities which know." (BT 87/60)
He goes on to remind us that knowing is not present-at-hand in Dasein. It is not a 'property' of Dasein. Now this idea that 'knowing' belongs solely to those entities that know might suggest that knowing must be 'inside' that entity. But then the problem arises: how can this knowing subject reach outside of itself to access what is 'other and external'? How can it reach any object at all? We could spend a great deal of time exploring this question, but Heidegger cuts that investigation short. "But in any of the numerous varieties which this approach may take, the question of the kind of Being which belongs to this knowing subject is left entirely unasked, though whenever its knowing gets handled, its way of Being is already included tacitly in one's theme." (BT 87/60) Other philosophers may be careful to point out that the 'inside' should not be conceived like a box or cabinet, but it not so clear what positive view they have of the matter. Knowing will remain problematical "unless one has previously clarified how it is and what it is." (BT 87/61)
At the outset, if one is to understand the phenomenon of knowing, one must grasp, first, "that knowing is a mode of Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, and is founded ontically upon this state of Being." (BT 88/61) This definition may be helpful to keep in mind. Heidegger continues, "But if, as we suggest, we thus find phenomenally that knowing is a kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the-world, one might object that with such an Interpretation of knowing, the problem of knowledge is nullified; for what is left to be asked if one presupposes that knowing is already 'alongside' its world, when it is not supposed to reach that world except in the transcending of the subject?" (BT 88/61) Heidegger is comfortable with setting this question aside. In his view, having exhibited the phenomenon of knowing reveals that there is no problem of knowledge, then one should not feel compelled to answer a question that arose from a fundamentally misguided understanding of knowing.
Heidegger goes on to look at just what shows itself in the phenomenal findings about knowing. To do this, he says, we must keep inn mind that knowing is grounded beforehand in a being-already-alongside-the-world, which is essentially constitutive for Dasein's being. Being-already-alongside carries with it the idea of involvement, engagement, "fascination," and concern. "If knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the present-at-hand by observing it, then there must first be a deficiency in our having-to-do with the world concernfully." (BT 88/61) Here it may be helpful to think of "knowing" as "mere knowing" or as a way of knowing about something just by looking at it as opposed to by using it. Heidegger continues: "When concern holds back [Sichenthalten] from any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into what is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just tarrying alongside.... [das Nur-noch-verweilen bei...]" (BT 88/61)
This kind of being towards the world--i.e. tarrying-alongside--lets us encounter entities purely in the way they look (EIDOS); in this way (i.e. on the basis of this kind of being and as a mode of it) it is possible to just look (and to look explicitly) at what we encounter. Looking at something is a way of taking up a stance toward it. Heidegger describes it as entering "the mode of dwelling autonomously alongside entities within-the-world." (BT 88-89/61) Looking-at involves holding-oneself-back from manipulation or utilization of the object; in this way the perception of the present-at-hand is "consummated." "Perception is consummated when on addresses oneself to something as something and discusses it as such. This amounts to interpretation in the broadest sense; and on the basis of such interpretation, perception becomes an act of making determinate. What is thus perceived and made determinate can be expressed in propositions, and can be retained and preserved as what has thus been asserted. This perceptive retention of an assertion about something is itself a way of Being-in-the-world; it is not to be Interpreted as a 'procedure' by which a subject provides itself with representations [Vorstellungen] of something which remain stored up 'inside' as having been thus appropriated, and with regard to which the question of how they 'agree' with actuality can occasionally arise." (BT 89/62)
Here Heidegger has just described one way of knowing, which is itself a kind of being which belongs to being-in-the-world. This way of knowing presupposes that one is already-in- and already-alongside-the-world. From this position it is possible to be related to entities within-the-world in a variety of ways, involving varying degrees of engagement or involvement. One way that involves a minimum of involvement is looking-at. But it must be remembered that this is a way of encountering an entity in-the-world, in a sense continuous with all the other ways of encountering an entity, presupposing a condition of already-being-alongside those entities. It is not to be treated as a way of reaching outside of oneself to grasp things that are external. It is also not the kind of thing for which a question about correspondence and agreement can arise, in Heidegger's view.
Heidegger rejects the idea that Dasein is somehow encapsulated in a self and then reaches outside to grasp objects, "but even in this 'Being-outside' alongside the object, Dasein is still 'inside', if we understand this in the correct sense; that is to say, it is itself 'inside' as a Being-in-the-world which knows." (BT 89/62) Furthermore, he says, Dasein does not bring what is outside to the inside. "[E]ven in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows remains outside, and it does so as Dasein. If I 'merely' know [Wissen] about some way in which the Being of entities is interconnected, if I 'only' represent them, if I 'do no more' than 'think' about them, I am no less alongside the entities outside in the world than when I originally grasp them." (BT 89-90/62) Heidegger goes so far as to say that even where error or delusion or forgetfulness is involved, these are modifications of the primordial being-in. He will develop this idea in later sections. It certainly raises questions about Heidegger's view.
We have now gotten a glimpse of how knowing the world is founded upon a series of interconnected modes of being-in-the-world. Knowing, then, is a distinctive (even novel) way of approaching a world ("a new status of Being [Seinsstand]") which has already been discovered in Dasein. The relationship of knowing does not bring Dasein into contact with the world but is rather founded upon Dasein already having a relationship to the world--a relationship of being-in-the-world. "This new possibility of Being [that is, knowing] can develop itself autonomously; it can become a task to be accomplished, and as scientific knowledge it can take over the guidance for Being-in-the-world." (BT 90/62, bracket my own) In other words, it is possible that knowing, this particular possibility of being, becomes the primary way in which Dasein encounters the world (and it may be argued that this has, to some extent, become the case in our modern scientific era). But if we are to be clear and to understand knowing properly, we must keep in mind that "Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world. Thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be Interpreted beforehand." (BT 90/62)
In the next chapter, we shall turn to interpreting the basic state of being-in-the-world.
--
FOOTNOTES:
[1] "The conception of 'founded' modes is taken from Husserl, who introduces the concept of 'founding' in his Logische Untersuchungen... . ...[A] founded mode of Being-in is simply a mode which can subsist only when connected with something else." (BT 86/59, footnote 1) See this reference for still further clarification of the concept of foundedness.
--
God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
posted by Metaphysician_delta | 2:44 PM
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