Graduate 146: BT 18: Sec. 12
Part I. The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being
Division 1. Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein
Chapter 2. Being-in-the-World in General as the Basic State of Dasein
Section 12. A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World, in terms of an Orientation towards Being-in as such
"In our preparatory discussions (section 9) we have brought out some characteristics of Being which will provide us with a steady light for our further investigation, but which will at the same time become structurally concrete as that investigation continues. Dasein is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being. In saying this, we are calling attention to the formal concept of existence. Dasein exists. Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. In each case Dasein exists in one or the other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated." (BT 78/52-53)
(1) Dasein comports itself understandingly towards its own being. It's being is an issue for it. It can bear a relationship to its own being that no other kind of entity has towards its own being. (2) Dasein exists. It does not just exist in the way that a table or a chair exists but in a manner that is distinctive of Dasein. (3) Mineness [Jemeinigkeit] belongs to any existent Dasein in such a way that it is possible for it to either own itself or not own itself. Own-li-ness [Eigentlichkeit] and un-own-li-ness [Uneigentlichkeit] are possibilities for Dasein because Dasein has mineness. [1]
Own-li-ness and un-own-li-ness are ways that Dasein's being takes on a definite character and they are both grounded on the state of being which we have called "Being-in-the-world". So if we are to understand being in general and the being of Dasein, then we should look at this particular state of being.
Being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon and must be taken as a whole, even though it has and we are able to look at its complex structure. To understand what is involved in being-in-the-world, it is not enough to understand what is meant by 'being,' 'in,' 'the,' and 'world,' and piece those pieces of information together. Consider, for example, if we understood by "in" the relationship that water has to a cup that contains it. If we were to try to understand human beings' way of existing in the world just in terms of this physical containment picture of "in," we would miss out on something important. So we must try to capture the whole concept and experience and reality that are denoted by "being-in-the-world," even as we examine its structure.
In looking at its structure, Heidegger emphasizes three items. First, he will look at the 'in-the-world'. This investigation will involved looking at the ontological structure of the 'world' and defining the idea of worldhood. Second, he will look at "that entity which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it is. ... By a phenomenological demonstration we shall determine who is in the mode of Dasein's average everydayness." (BT 79/53) Third, he will look at being-in [In-sein] as such, examining the constitution of "inhood" [Inheit] itself.
Each of these elements will be treated in the third, fourth, and fifth chapters of this division--respectively. Because they are interconnected--that is, because being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon--examining each in turn will necessarily involve pointing to aspects of the others. Heidegger writes, "Emphasis upon any one of these constitutive items signifies that the others are emphasized along with it; this means that in any such case the whole phenomenon gets seen. Of course Being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein which is necessary a priori, but it is far from sufficient for completely determining Dasein's Being." (BT 79/53) The language here is reminiscent of an attempt to define Dasein definitively. Heidegger acknowledges that Being-in-the-world is necessary a priori, but he denies that it is sufficient for defining Dasein definitively. What are the sufficient conditions? It may turn out that this is the wrong kind of question to ask, but having it in mind can help us to appreciate the distinctive approach that Heidegger takes to understanding the character of Dasein and the meaning of being.
Before turning to consider each of the three elements of being-in-the-world, Heidegger attempts to orient the discussion by looking a bit more closely at the third element--"being-in." Heidegger acknowledges that our first impulse, when trying to understand "being-in" is to resort to a spatial notion: "...we are inclinde to understand this Being-in as 'Being in something' ["Sein in..."]. This latter term designates the kind of Being which an entity has when it is 'in' another one, as the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is 'in' the cupboard." (BT 79/54) Heidegger says that every entity that is capable of bearing this relationship--either to another entity or to the 'world-space' has the same kind of being--"that of Being-present-at-hand--as Things occurring 'within' the world." (BT 79/54)
He goes on to say: "Being-present-at-hand 'in' something which is likewise present-at-hand, and Being-present-at-hand-along-with [Mitvorhandensein] in the sense of a definite location-relationship with something else which has the same kind of Being, are ontological characteristics which we call "categorial": they are of such a sort as to belong to entities whose kind of Being is not of the character of Dasein." (BT 79/54) [2]
Here is the contrast: "Being-in, on the other hand, is a state of Dasein's Being; it is an existentiale." (BT 79/54) Recall from Section 09 (Graduate [ ]) that existentialia (the plural form of existentiale) are those characteristics of Dasein defined in terms of Dasein's existentiality. 'Being-in,' as an existentiale cannot be grasped or understood if construed spatially or categorially. Heidegger traces the derivation of the word 'in' to words that refer to residing, dwelling, being accustomed to, being familiar with, and looking after. These series of derivations leads Heidegger to conclude: "an so 'ich bin' ['I am'] means in its turn "I reside" or "dwell alongside" the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. "Being" [Sein], as the infinitive of 'ich bin' (that is to say, when it is understood as an existentiale), signifies "to reside alongside...", "to be familiar with...". "Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state." (BT 80/54)
So 'being-in,' when used to describe Dasein does not describe Dasein's spatial relationship to the world or to any objects in the world. Rather, it connotes a relationship of familiarity, at-homeness, embeddedness, and involvement. "Being-in" is the formal existential expression for the being of Dasein. Dasein possesses "being-in" because it has being-in-the-world as its essential state. [3]
Heidegger goes on to discuss "being-alongside"--an existentiale founded upon being-in. Keep in mind, at this point, that being-in is also an existentiale and is a state of Dasein's being. So Dasein has being-in-the-world as its essential state. Being-in is the formal existential expression for the being of Dasein. And being-alongside is also an existentiale that is founded upon being-in. We shall discuss the character of being-alongside in a moment, but first Heidegger takes a moment to discuss his methodology.
"In these analyses the issue is one of seeing a primordial structure of Dasein's Being--a structure in accordance with whose phenomenal content the concepts of Being must be Articulated; because of this, and because this structure is in principle one which cannot be grasped by the traditional ontological categories, this 'Being-alongside' must be examined still more closely." (BT 81/54-55) Recall that the reason we are investigating the being of Dasein is so that we can get a clue to the meaning of being in itself. So we must be very careful that we approach the explication of the being of Dasein and its structure in an appropriate way. "We shall again choose the method of contrasting it with a relationship of Beinng which is essentially different ontologically--viz. categorial--but which we express by the same linguistic means." (BT 81/55) This is precisely why this investigation is so difficult. We can express both categorial and existential notions using the same words, like "in" and "alongside." Keeping clear the difference involves stating the obvious in many cases. This may seem tedious but it is necessary. Heidegger thinks that failure to be so meticulous has led metaphysics and ontology astray and has had the result that "we are even farther from possessing a stable coinge for the appropriate structural concepts." (BT 81/55)
Returning to the main topic: "As an existentiale, 'Being alongside' the world never means anything like the Being-present-at-hand-together of Things that occur. There is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world'." (BT 81/55) This may seem a radical statement since we very regularly and easily speak of people standing next to objects or inside of rooms. Heidegger recognizes this, of course, but goes on to say some even more startling things. After admitting that we regularly say things like, "The table stands "by" ['bei'] the door' or 'The chair "touches" ['beruhrt'] the wall'" he says, "Taken strictly, 'touching' is never what we are talking about in such cases, not because accurate reexamination will always eventually establish that there is a space between the chair and the wall, but because in principle the chair can never touch the wall, even if the space between them should be equal to zero." (BT 81/55) Heidegger insists that for one object to touch another the one must be the sort of thing 'for' which the other could and would be encounterable. Something that is present-at-hand can only be touched by something that has being-in as its own kind of being so that objects in the world can become accessible as being-present-at-hand. "When two entities are present-at-hand within the world, and furthermore are worldless in themselves, they can never 'touch' each other, nor can either of them 'be' 'alongside' the other." (BT 81-82/55) It should be fairly clear that Heidegger is treating expressions like "next to" and "touching" in ways other than they are normally used or understood. The idea seems to be that one object can only be related to another object if it is able to comport itself toward or encounter that object in some way. Does this mean that Heidegger denies that physical objects ever or under any description can bear the relationship of 'touching' to one another. I do not think this is necessarily the case, but he is trying to capture, with limited language, a certain relationship that human beings have to objects in virtue of their kind of being that is not open or available to just any object in the world.
Heidegger goes on to concede that there is a sense in which Dasein (which is not worldless) "can with some right and within certain limits be taken as merely present-at-hand. To do this, one must completely disregard or just not see the existential state of Being-in." (BT 82/56) Here Heidegger makes the, probably obvious, point that even though Dasein has a distinctive way of being that is not shared with entities in the world, it is possible to conceive of and think about the entity that is Dasein just in terms of the kind of being of presence-at-hand. But Heidegger throws in one further distinction that will take some work to understand.
"But the fact that 'Dasein' can be taken as something which is present-at-hand and just present-at-hand, is not to be confused with a certain way of 'presence-at-hand' which is Dasein's own. This latter kind of presence-at-hand becomes accessible not by disregarding Dasein's specific structures but only by understanding them in advance. Dasein understands its ownmost Being in the sense of a certain 'factual Being-present-at-hand'. And yet the 'factuality' of the fact [Tatsache] of one's own Dasein is at bottom quite different ontologically from the factual occurrence of some kind of mineral, for example. Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein's "facticity". (BT 82/55-56) Regarding facticity, it is also useful to look at H. 7 (Section 02) and H. 135 (Section 29). It will be necessary to distinguish the 'factual' from the 'factical' and the 'actual.' Note that there is a way of conceiving of Dasein as present-at-hand that does not involve stripping it of its essential being. Rather, there is a kind of presence-at-hand that arises from Dasein's structure and its facticity. Heidegger says that facticity is a definite way of being with a complicated structure that cannot be treated (or even grasped as a problem) until Dasein's basic existential states have been worked out. (The topic will be taken up again in chapter five of this section when the analysis of being-in is fully developed.) For now he leaves us with this idea: "The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world." (BT 82/56) It's not yet clear what is meant by 'destiny' but this may be the necessary clue for understanding fully why Heidegger denies that worldless objects can be related to one another. [4]
Heidegger reminds us, at this point, that characterizing being-in as an existentiale does not exclude a kind of spatiality to Dasein. But, he does insist that this spatiality or 'being-in-space' is possible only on the basis of being-in-the-world in general. So, he rejects the idea that the existential being-in is a property of the spiritual whereas the spatial being-in is a property of the corporeal. Such a view would involve treating both the spiritual and the corporeal as occurrent present-at-hand. "Not until we understand Being-in-the-world as an essential structure of Dasein can we have any insight into Dasein's existential spatiality. Such an insight will keep us from failing to see this structure or from previously cancelling it out--a procedure motivated not ontologically but rather 'metaphysically' by the naive supposition that man is in the first instance, a spiritual Thing which subsequently gets misplaced 'into' a space." (BT 83/56)
Here we get a hint at what Heidegger has in mind when speaking of Dasein's existential spatiality as being derivative of its being-in-the-world. He writes, "Dasein's facticity is such that is Beinng-in-the-world has always dispersed [zerstreut] itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making us of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining.... All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being--a kind of Being which we have yet to characterize in detail." (BT 83/56-57) All of these ways of being-in are derivative of or arise from Dasein's fundamental character of being-in-the-world. Heidegger also speaks of leaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, and taking a rest as deficient modes of concern, in which concern is just barely involved.
Now there are familiar colloquial uses of the word, 'concern,' but the expression will be used in this investigation as an ontological term for an existentiale (i.e. for a state of Dasein's being--remember that being-in and being-alongside are other examples of existentialia) and will designate the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world. The expression 'concern' has been chosen because of its close relationship to 'care'. In chapter six of this division, 'care' will be disclosed as an ontological structural concept. To be understood in its ontical sense (either positively or deficiently) is only possible for 'care' because Dasein, understood ontologically, is care. "Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world [Sein zur Welt] is essentially concern." (BT 84/57)
Heidegger emphasizes that being-in is not a mere property of Dasein. It is not the case that Dasein exists as some kind of entity that may or may not have the property of being-in or a relationship-of-being towards the 'world'. Rather, "Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is. This state of Being does not arise just because some other entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can 'meet up with' Dasein only in so far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a world." (BT 84/57)
Heidegger comments on the familiar way of speaking of 'man's having an environment' but points out that this says nothing ontologically as long as 'having' is left indefinite. The ability or possibility of 'having' is founded upon the existential state of being-in. [5] Because Dasein is essentially an entity with being-in, it is possible for it to discover and encounter entities environmentally. "To talk about 'having an environment' is ontically trivial, but ontologically it presents a problem. To solve it requires nothing else than defining the Being of Dasein, and doing so in a way that is ontologically adequate." (BT 84/58) The idea is that when speaking of human beings as entities, describing them as having an environment is obvious and trivial. But Heidegger is wondering what it is about human nature that makes it possible for human beings to have an environment. That is a much more puzzling question and requires the ontological analytic to resolve it. He again emphasizes that this state cannot be reduced to or construed merely in terms of a single discipline like biology. "For the environment is a structure which even biology as a positive science can never find and can never define, but must presuppose and constantly employ. Yet, even as an a priori condition for the objects which biology takes for its theme, this structure itself can be explained philosophically only if it has been conceived beforehand as a structure of Dasein." (BT 84/58)
Then he makes a highly interesting comment: "Only in terms of an orientation towards the ontological structure thus conceived can 'life' as a state of Being be defined a priori, and this must be done in a privative manner. Ontically as well as ontologically, the priority belongs to Being-in-the-world as concern." (BT 84-85/58) Macquarrie and Robinson include this footnote: "The point is that in order to understand life merely as such, we must make abstraction from the fuller life of Dasein. See H. 50 above." (BT 85, footnote 1) Following this reference takes us back to section 10, where Heidegger writes, "In the order which any possible comprehension and interpretation must follow, biology as a 'science of life' is founded upon the ontology of Dasein, even if not entirely. Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being; but essentially it is accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative Interpretation; it determines what must be the case if there can be anything like mere-aliveness [Nur-noch-leben]. Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein. In turn, Dasein is never to be defined ontologically by regarding it as life (in an ontologically indefinite manner) plus something else." (BT 75/50) Macquarrie and Robinson's interpretation is helpful and, I think, basically correct. Heidegger thinks that if one is to really understand human Life, one must not look to a purely biological definition and then attempt to supplement it in order to build up a concept of Life. Rather, the concept of life that we apply in biology and elsewhere is ultimately derived from the fullest concept of life available to us (and one that has been largely ignored, Heidegger thinks) and that is the life of Dasein. It is this understanding of Life that structures and informs our thinking about all the other forms of life in the world.
[Here I see a close connection to both points in Christian theology and platonism. Though, interestingly, Heidegger has objected to Christian dualism and Greek metaphysics. But Plato's conception of the forms as ideals from which are derived the various particulars and entities that we see and interact seems to have strong affinities with Heidegger's view of life and of these other aspects of Dasein's nature. Heidegger would probably object to what I am describing on the grounds that Dasein cannot access some "higher" notion of being than its own. His account treats the being of Dasein as that in terms of which Dasein approaches the world and as the point of reference from which it orients itself in thinking about being. Christian theology places that point of orientation in God and platonism in the forms. The question that I am interested in: Is it possible for us to recognize the priority of these other points of reference without making the mistake of thinking that we can exhaustively grasp them? As a Christian I'm committed to that idea, but I would like to be able to work it out. One main question that needs to be clarified is exactly what the relationship is between these derivative forms of being-in, of concern, of life, etc? Are these merely modes of discourse or is there something more substantial to them? Just how "substantial" are these ontical derivations?]
Now Heidegger acknowledges that his method of determining the nature of Dasein has, up to this point, consisted only in negative assertions. He says that this is not accidental but rather reveals what is peculiar to this phenomenon in an appropriate way. "When Being-in-the-world is exhibited phenomenologically, disguises and concealments are rejected because this phenomenon itself always gets 'seen' in a certain way in every Dasein. And it thus gets 'seen' because it makes up a basic state of Dasein, and in every case is already disclosed for Dasein's understanding of Being, and disclosed along with that Being itself." (BT 85/58) Unfortunately there has been a tendency to explain this state of being wrongly or to identify it with certain features of its derivative manifestations. However, Heidegger goes on to say, "On the other hand, this 'seeing in a certain way and yet for the most part wrongly explaining' is itself based upon nothing else than this very state of Dasein's Being, which is such that Dasein itself--and this means also its Being-in-the-world--gets its ontological understanding of itself in the first instance from those entities which it itself is not but which it encounters 'within' its world, and from the Being which they possess." (BT 85/58) This is an interesting claim and reflects an interesting idea on Heidegger's part. He takes it to be part of Dasein's character and reflective of that character that Dasein consistently misconstrues the character of its own being when trying to make that explicit. One goal of his analytic is to be able to explain why this is the case and why it is even necessary that the history of the study of being should have unfolded in this way.
[Interestingly, I am not so committed to the idea that Dasein has this tendency to misconstrue its own being as an almost essential characteristic. It is not necessarily natural to man that he should take as his point of reference for understanding himself the physical objects in the world. Rather, that is a result of man's fallenness. Ah, but he seems to have a more thorough explanation:]
The state of being-in-the-world is always familiar to Dasein. "Now if it is also to become known [erkannt], the knowing which such a task explicitly implies takes itself (as a knowing of the world [Welterkennen]) as the chief exemplification of the 'soul's' relationship to the world. Knowing the world (NOEIN)--or rather addressing oneself to the 'world' and discussing it (LOGOS)--thus functions as the primary mode of Being-in-the-world, even though Being-in-the-world does not as such get conceived." (BT 85/58-59) Because of this there is a tendency to mistake being-in-the-world as a relationship between one entity (the world) and another (the soul) and so "one tries to conceive the relationship between world and soul as grounded in these two entities themselves and in the meaning of their Being--namely, to conceive it as Being-present-at-hand." (BT 85-86/59) So even though one has a pre-phenomenological experience of and acquaintance with being-in-the-world, it remains invisible to attempts to interpret it. This misunderstanding and inappropriate interpretation has become the foundation for understanding problems both metaphysical and epistemological. "For what is more obvious than that a 'subject' is related to an 'Object' and vice versa? This 'subject-Object-relationship' must be presupposed. But while this presupposition is unimpeachable in its facticity, this makes it indeed a baleful one, if its ontological necessity and especially its ontological meaning are to be left in the dark." (BT 86/59)
Heidegger concludes this section by saying, "Thus the phenomenon of Being-in has for the most part been represented exclusively by a single exemplar--knowing the world. This has not only been the case in epistemology; for even practical behaviour has been understood as behaviour which is 'non-theoretical' and 'atheoretical'. Because knowing has been given this priority, our understanding of its own-most kind of Being gets led astray, and accordingly Being-in-the-world must be exhibited even more precisely with regard to knowing the world, and must itself be made visible as an existential 'modality' of Being-in." (BT 86/59)
[This last point has very direct application to things I've been thinking about. It may be developed more in Heidegger's own thinking about 'understanding'. The idea is that "knowing the world" is just one way of being-in and that if it is mistakenly taken as primary, then our understanding of all the other ways of being-in will be confused. This will be developed further in the next section.]
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FOOTNOTES:
[1] Watch out for this in the future. There is a question in the literature about what exactly is involved in authenticity or own-li-ness. Must Dasein exist in one or the other of these modes? Are they both modes of some more basic feature of Dasein? Regarding this quote, what does it mean to be 'modally undifferentiated'? "In each case Dasein exists as one or the other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated." (BT 78/53) After all, I take it that Heidegger is not intending to make a vacuously true claim.
[2] In my notes from the Being and Time seminar (Fall '07): "Categorial" is a characteristic exemplified by Kantian and Aristotelian categories. It encompasses the fundamental categories of non-Dasein, including the being of equipment (ready-to-hand) and the being of the occurrent (present-at-hand). It is contrasted with the "Existential." "Existential" is the adjective form. The noun form is existentiale (pl. existentialia) and the contrast case is the category (pl. categories).
[3] I need to remain alert to points where there may be ambiguity, even if it may be painful and laborious to try and rectify. I'm a bit unclear as to what is being referred to by the expression "the being of Dasein." I'm also unclear about the relationship between the being of Dasein and the state of Dasein. Are these very precise notions. It would be wise to get clear on them. Recall that being is that in virtue of which a thing is what it is and is recognizable as the thing it is. It is our innate sensitivity to the different kinds of beings that entities possess that we are able to differentiate them and comport ourselves appropriately to them.
[4] Keep this in mind for the future.
[5] It is interesting that the synonymy of ability and possibility came to me so naturally. This is also a connection that Blattner draws and he interprets possibilities in terms of abilities. But I actually wonder whether that construal is correct. This is something to watch out for. I have left both in here for future reference.
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God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
Division 1. Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein
Chapter 2. Being-in-the-World in General as the Basic State of Dasein
Section 12. A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World, in terms of an Orientation towards Being-in as such
"In our preparatory discussions (section 9) we have brought out some characteristics of Being which will provide us with a steady light for our further investigation, but which will at the same time become structurally concrete as that investigation continues. Dasein is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being. In saying this, we are calling attention to the formal concept of existence. Dasein exists. Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. In each case Dasein exists in one or the other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated." (BT 78/52-53)
(1) Dasein comports itself understandingly towards its own being. It's being is an issue for it. It can bear a relationship to its own being that no other kind of entity has towards its own being. (2) Dasein exists. It does not just exist in the way that a table or a chair exists but in a manner that is distinctive of Dasein. (3) Mineness [Jemeinigkeit] belongs to any existent Dasein in such a way that it is possible for it to either own itself or not own itself. Own-li-ness [Eigentlichkeit] and un-own-li-ness [Uneigentlichkeit] are possibilities for Dasein because Dasein has mineness. [1]
Own-li-ness and un-own-li-ness are ways that Dasein's being takes on a definite character and they are both grounded on the state of being which we have called "Being-in-the-world". So if we are to understand being in general and the being of Dasein, then we should look at this particular state of being.
Being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon and must be taken as a whole, even though it has and we are able to look at its complex structure. To understand what is involved in being-in-the-world, it is not enough to understand what is meant by 'being,' 'in,' 'the,' and 'world,' and piece those pieces of information together. Consider, for example, if we understood by "in" the relationship that water has to a cup that contains it. If we were to try to understand human beings' way of existing in the world just in terms of this physical containment picture of "in," we would miss out on something important. So we must try to capture the whole concept and experience and reality that are denoted by "being-in-the-world," even as we examine its structure.
In looking at its structure, Heidegger emphasizes three items. First, he will look at the 'in-the-world'. This investigation will involved looking at the ontological structure of the 'world' and defining the idea of worldhood. Second, he will look at "that entity which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it is. ... By a phenomenological demonstration we shall determine who is in the mode of Dasein's average everydayness." (BT 79/53) Third, he will look at being-in [In-sein] as such, examining the constitution of "inhood" [Inheit] itself.
Each of these elements will be treated in the third, fourth, and fifth chapters of this division--respectively. Because they are interconnected--that is, because being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon--examining each in turn will necessarily involve pointing to aspects of the others. Heidegger writes, "Emphasis upon any one of these constitutive items signifies that the others are emphasized along with it; this means that in any such case the whole phenomenon gets seen. Of course Being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein which is necessary a priori, but it is far from sufficient for completely determining Dasein's Being." (BT 79/53) The language here is reminiscent of an attempt to define Dasein definitively. Heidegger acknowledges that Being-in-the-world is necessary a priori, but he denies that it is sufficient for defining Dasein definitively. What are the sufficient conditions? It may turn out that this is the wrong kind of question to ask, but having it in mind can help us to appreciate the distinctive approach that Heidegger takes to understanding the character of Dasein and the meaning of being.
Before turning to consider each of the three elements of being-in-the-world, Heidegger attempts to orient the discussion by looking a bit more closely at the third element--"being-in." Heidegger acknowledges that our first impulse, when trying to understand "being-in" is to resort to a spatial notion: "...we are inclinde to understand this Being-in as 'Being in something' ["Sein in..."]. This latter term designates the kind of Being which an entity has when it is 'in' another one, as the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is 'in' the cupboard." (BT 79/54) Heidegger says that every entity that is capable of bearing this relationship--either to another entity or to the 'world-space' has the same kind of being--"that of Being-present-at-hand--as Things occurring 'within' the world." (BT 79/54)
He goes on to say: "Being-present-at-hand 'in' something which is likewise present-at-hand, and Being-present-at-hand-along-with [Mitvorhandensein] in the sense of a definite location-relationship with something else which has the same kind of Being, are ontological characteristics which we call "categorial": they are of such a sort as to belong to entities whose kind of Being is not of the character of Dasein." (BT 79/54) [2]
Here is the contrast: "Being-in, on the other hand, is a state of Dasein's Being; it is an existentiale." (BT 79/54) Recall from Section 09 (Graduate [ ]) that existentialia (the plural form of existentiale) are those characteristics of Dasein defined in terms of Dasein's existentiality. 'Being-in,' as an existentiale cannot be grasped or understood if construed spatially or categorially. Heidegger traces the derivation of the word 'in' to words that refer to residing, dwelling, being accustomed to, being familiar with, and looking after. These series of derivations leads Heidegger to conclude: "an so 'ich bin' ['I am'] means in its turn "I reside" or "dwell alongside" the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. "Being" [Sein], as the infinitive of 'ich bin' (that is to say, when it is understood as an existentiale), signifies "to reside alongside...", "to be familiar with...". "Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state." (BT 80/54)
So 'being-in,' when used to describe Dasein does not describe Dasein's spatial relationship to the world or to any objects in the world. Rather, it connotes a relationship of familiarity, at-homeness, embeddedness, and involvement. "Being-in" is the formal existential expression for the being of Dasein. Dasein possesses "being-in" because it has being-in-the-world as its essential state. [3]
Heidegger goes on to discuss "being-alongside"--an existentiale founded upon being-in. Keep in mind, at this point, that being-in is also an existentiale and is a state of Dasein's being. So Dasein has being-in-the-world as its essential state. Being-in is the formal existential expression for the being of Dasein. And being-alongside is also an existentiale that is founded upon being-in. We shall discuss the character of being-alongside in a moment, but first Heidegger takes a moment to discuss his methodology.
"In these analyses the issue is one of seeing a primordial structure of Dasein's Being--a structure in accordance with whose phenomenal content the concepts of Being must be Articulated; because of this, and because this structure is in principle one which cannot be grasped by the traditional ontological categories, this 'Being-alongside' must be examined still more closely." (BT 81/54-55) Recall that the reason we are investigating the being of Dasein is so that we can get a clue to the meaning of being in itself. So we must be very careful that we approach the explication of the being of Dasein and its structure in an appropriate way. "We shall again choose the method of contrasting it with a relationship of Beinng which is essentially different ontologically--viz. categorial--but which we express by the same linguistic means." (BT 81/55) This is precisely why this investigation is so difficult. We can express both categorial and existential notions using the same words, like "in" and "alongside." Keeping clear the difference involves stating the obvious in many cases. This may seem tedious but it is necessary. Heidegger thinks that failure to be so meticulous has led metaphysics and ontology astray and has had the result that "we are even farther from possessing a stable coinge for the appropriate structural concepts." (BT 81/55)
Returning to the main topic: "As an existentiale, 'Being alongside' the world never means anything like the Being-present-at-hand-together of Things that occur. There is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world'." (BT 81/55) This may seem a radical statement since we very regularly and easily speak of people standing next to objects or inside of rooms. Heidegger recognizes this, of course, but goes on to say some even more startling things. After admitting that we regularly say things like, "The table stands "by" ['bei'] the door' or 'The chair "touches" ['beruhrt'] the wall'" he says, "Taken strictly, 'touching' is never what we are talking about in such cases, not because accurate reexamination will always eventually establish that there is a space between the chair and the wall, but because in principle the chair can never touch the wall, even if the space between them should be equal to zero." (BT 81/55) Heidegger insists that for one object to touch another the one must be the sort of thing 'for' which the other could and would be encounterable. Something that is present-at-hand can only be touched by something that has being-in as its own kind of being so that objects in the world can become accessible as being-present-at-hand. "When two entities are present-at-hand within the world, and furthermore are worldless in themselves, they can never 'touch' each other, nor can either of them 'be' 'alongside' the other." (BT 81-82/55) It should be fairly clear that Heidegger is treating expressions like "next to" and "touching" in ways other than they are normally used or understood. The idea seems to be that one object can only be related to another object if it is able to comport itself toward or encounter that object in some way. Does this mean that Heidegger denies that physical objects ever or under any description can bear the relationship of 'touching' to one another. I do not think this is necessarily the case, but he is trying to capture, with limited language, a certain relationship that human beings have to objects in virtue of their kind of being that is not open or available to just any object in the world.
Heidegger goes on to concede that there is a sense in which Dasein (which is not worldless) "can with some right and within certain limits be taken as merely present-at-hand. To do this, one must completely disregard or just not see the existential state of Being-in." (BT 82/56) Here Heidegger makes the, probably obvious, point that even though Dasein has a distinctive way of being that is not shared with entities in the world, it is possible to conceive of and think about the entity that is Dasein just in terms of the kind of being of presence-at-hand. But Heidegger throws in one further distinction that will take some work to understand.
"But the fact that 'Dasein' can be taken as something which is present-at-hand and just present-at-hand, is not to be confused with a certain way of 'presence-at-hand' which is Dasein's own. This latter kind of presence-at-hand becomes accessible not by disregarding Dasein's specific structures but only by understanding them in advance. Dasein understands its ownmost Being in the sense of a certain 'factual Being-present-at-hand'. And yet the 'factuality' of the fact [Tatsache] of one's own Dasein is at bottom quite different ontologically from the factual occurrence of some kind of mineral, for example. Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein's "facticity". (BT 82/55-56) Regarding facticity, it is also useful to look at H. 7 (Section 02) and H. 135 (Section 29). It will be necessary to distinguish the 'factual' from the 'factical' and the 'actual.' Note that there is a way of conceiving of Dasein as present-at-hand that does not involve stripping it of its essential being. Rather, there is a kind of presence-at-hand that arises from Dasein's structure and its facticity. Heidegger says that facticity is a definite way of being with a complicated structure that cannot be treated (or even grasped as a problem) until Dasein's basic existential states have been worked out. (The topic will be taken up again in chapter five of this section when the analysis of being-in is fully developed.) For now he leaves us with this idea: "The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world." (BT 82/56) It's not yet clear what is meant by 'destiny' but this may be the necessary clue for understanding fully why Heidegger denies that worldless objects can be related to one another. [4]
Heidegger reminds us, at this point, that characterizing being-in as an existentiale does not exclude a kind of spatiality to Dasein. But, he does insist that this spatiality or 'being-in-space' is possible only on the basis of being-in-the-world in general. So, he rejects the idea that the existential being-in is a property of the spiritual whereas the spatial being-in is a property of the corporeal. Such a view would involve treating both the spiritual and the corporeal as occurrent present-at-hand. "Not until we understand Being-in-the-world as an essential structure of Dasein can we have any insight into Dasein's existential spatiality. Such an insight will keep us from failing to see this structure or from previously cancelling it out--a procedure motivated not ontologically but rather 'metaphysically' by the naive supposition that man is in the first instance, a spiritual Thing which subsequently gets misplaced 'into' a space." (BT 83/56)
Here we get a hint at what Heidegger has in mind when speaking of Dasein's existential spatiality as being derivative of its being-in-the-world. He writes, "Dasein's facticity is such that is Beinng-in-the-world has always dispersed [zerstreut] itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making us of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining.... All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being--a kind of Being which we have yet to characterize in detail." (BT 83/56-57) All of these ways of being-in are derivative of or arise from Dasein's fundamental character of being-in-the-world. Heidegger also speaks of leaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, and taking a rest as deficient modes of concern, in which concern is just barely involved.
Now there are familiar colloquial uses of the word, 'concern,' but the expression will be used in this investigation as an ontological term for an existentiale (i.e. for a state of Dasein's being--remember that being-in and being-alongside are other examples of existentialia) and will designate the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world. The expression 'concern' has been chosen because of its close relationship to 'care'. In chapter six of this division, 'care' will be disclosed as an ontological structural concept. To be understood in its ontical sense (either positively or deficiently) is only possible for 'care' because Dasein, understood ontologically, is care. "Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world [Sein zur Welt] is essentially concern." (BT 84/57)
Heidegger emphasizes that being-in is not a mere property of Dasein. It is not the case that Dasein exists as some kind of entity that may or may not have the property of being-in or a relationship-of-being towards the 'world'. Rather, "Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is. This state of Being does not arise just because some other entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can 'meet up with' Dasein only in so far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a world." (BT 84/57)
Heidegger comments on the familiar way of speaking of 'man's having an environment' but points out that this says nothing ontologically as long as 'having' is left indefinite. The ability or possibility of 'having' is founded upon the existential state of being-in. [5] Because Dasein is essentially an entity with being-in, it is possible for it to discover and encounter entities environmentally. "To talk about 'having an environment' is ontically trivial, but ontologically it presents a problem. To solve it requires nothing else than defining the Being of Dasein, and doing so in a way that is ontologically adequate." (BT 84/58) The idea is that when speaking of human beings as entities, describing them as having an environment is obvious and trivial. But Heidegger is wondering what it is about human nature that makes it possible for human beings to have an environment. That is a much more puzzling question and requires the ontological analytic to resolve it. He again emphasizes that this state cannot be reduced to or construed merely in terms of a single discipline like biology. "For the environment is a structure which even biology as a positive science can never find and can never define, but must presuppose and constantly employ. Yet, even as an a priori condition for the objects which biology takes for its theme, this structure itself can be explained philosophically only if it has been conceived beforehand as a structure of Dasein." (BT 84/58)
Then he makes a highly interesting comment: "Only in terms of an orientation towards the ontological structure thus conceived can 'life' as a state of Being be defined a priori, and this must be done in a privative manner. Ontically as well as ontologically, the priority belongs to Being-in-the-world as concern." (BT 84-85/58) Macquarrie and Robinson include this footnote: "The point is that in order to understand life merely as such, we must make abstraction from the fuller life of Dasein. See H. 50 above." (BT 85, footnote 1) Following this reference takes us back to section 10, where Heidegger writes, "In the order which any possible comprehension and interpretation must follow, biology as a 'science of life' is founded upon the ontology of Dasein, even if not entirely. Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being; but essentially it is accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative Interpretation; it determines what must be the case if there can be anything like mere-aliveness [Nur-noch-leben]. Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein. In turn, Dasein is never to be defined ontologically by regarding it as life (in an ontologically indefinite manner) plus something else." (BT 75/50) Macquarrie and Robinson's interpretation is helpful and, I think, basically correct. Heidegger thinks that if one is to really understand human Life, one must not look to a purely biological definition and then attempt to supplement it in order to build up a concept of Life. Rather, the concept of life that we apply in biology and elsewhere is ultimately derived from the fullest concept of life available to us (and one that has been largely ignored, Heidegger thinks) and that is the life of Dasein. It is this understanding of Life that structures and informs our thinking about all the other forms of life in the world.
[Here I see a close connection to both points in Christian theology and platonism. Though, interestingly, Heidegger has objected to Christian dualism and Greek metaphysics. But Plato's conception of the forms as ideals from which are derived the various particulars and entities that we see and interact seems to have strong affinities with Heidegger's view of life and of these other aspects of Dasein's nature. Heidegger would probably object to what I am describing on the grounds that Dasein cannot access some "higher" notion of being than its own. His account treats the being of Dasein as that in terms of which Dasein approaches the world and as the point of reference from which it orients itself in thinking about being. Christian theology places that point of orientation in God and platonism in the forms. The question that I am interested in: Is it possible for us to recognize the priority of these other points of reference without making the mistake of thinking that we can exhaustively grasp them? As a Christian I'm committed to that idea, but I would like to be able to work it out. One main question that needs to be clarified is exactly what the relationship is between these derivative forms of being-in, of concern, of life, etc? Are these merely modes of discourse or is there something more substantial to them? Just how "substantial" are these ontical derivations?]
Now Heidegger acknowledges that his method of determining the nature of Dasein has, up to this point, consisted only in negative assertions. He says that this is not accidental but rather reveals what is peculiar to this phenomenon in an appropriate way. "When Being-in-the-world is exhibited phenomenologically, disguises and concealments are rejected because this phenomenon itself always gets 'seen' in a certain way in every Dasein. And it thus gets 'seen' because it makes up a basic state of Dasein, and in every case is already disclosed for Dasein's understanding of Being, and disclosed along with that Being itself." (BT 85/58) Unfortunately there has been a tendency to explain this state of being wrongly or to identify it with certain features of its derivative manifestations. However, Heidegger goes on to say, "On the other hand, this 'seeing in a certain way and yet for the most part wrongly explaining' is itself based upon nothing else than this very state of Dasein's Being, which is such that Dasein itself--and this means also its Being-in-the-world--gets its ontological understanding of itself in the first instance from those entities which it itself is not but which it encounters 'within' its world, and from the Being which they possess." (BT 85/58) This is an interesting claim and reflects an interesting idea on Heidegger's part. He takes it to be part of Dasein's character and reflective of that character that Dasein consistently misconstrues the character of its own being when trying to make that explicit. One goal of his analytic is to be able to explain why this is the case and why it is even necessary that the history of the study of being should have unfolded in this way.
[Interestingly, I am not so committed to the idea that Dasein has this tendency to misconstrue its own being as an almost essential characteristic. It is not necessarily natural to man that he should take as his point of reference for understanding himself the physical objects in the world. Rather, that is a result of man's fallenness. Ah, but he seems to have a more thorough explanation:]
The state of being-in-the-world is always familiar to Dasein. "Now if it is also to become known [erkannt], the knowing which such a task explicitly implies takes itself (as a knowing of the world [Welterkennen]) as the chief exemplification of the 'soul's' relationship to the world. Knowing the world (NOEIN)--or rather addressing oneself to the 'world' and discussing it (LOGOS)--thus functions as the primary mode of Being-in-the-world, even though Being-in-the-world does not as such get conceived." (BT 85/58-59) Because of this there is a tendency to mistake being-in-the-world as a relationship between one entity (the world) and another (the soul) and so "one tries to conceive the relationship between world and soul as grounded in these two entities themselves and in the meaning of their Being--namely, to conceive it as Being-present-at-hand." (BT 85-86/59) So even though one has a pre-phenomenological experience of and acquaintance with being-in-the-world, it remains invisible to attempts to interpret it. This misunderstanding and inappropriate interpretation has become the foundation for understanding problems both metaphysical and epistemological. "For what is more obvious than that a 'subject' is related to an 'Object' and vice versa? This 'subject-Object-relationship' must be presupposed. But while this presupposition is unimpeachable in its facticity, this makes it indeed a baleful one, if its ontological necessity and especially its ontological meaning are to be left in the dark." (BT 86/59)
Heidegger concludes this section by saying, "Thus the phenomenon of Being-in has for the most part been represented exclusively by a single exemplar--knowing the world. This has not only been the case in epistemology; for even practical behaviour has been understood as behaviour which is 'non-theoretical' and 'atheoretical'. Because knowing has been given this priority, our understanding of its own-most kind of Being gets led astray, and accordingly Being-in-the-world must be exhibited even more precisely with regard to knowing the world, and must itself be made visible as an existential 'modality' of Being-in." (BT 86/59)
[This last point has very direct application to things I've been thinking about. It may be developed more in Heidegger's own thinking about 'understanding'. The idea is that "knowing the world" is just one way of being-in and that if it is mistakenly taken as primary, then our understanding of all the other ways of being-in will be confused. This will be developed further in the next section.]
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FOOTNOTES:
[1] Watch out for this in the future. There is a question in the literature about what exactly is involved in authenticity or own-li-ness. Must Dasein exist in one or the other of these modes? Are they both modes of some more basic feature of Dasein? Regarding this quote, what does it mean to be 'modally undifferentiated'? "In each case Dasein exists as one or the other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated." (BT 78/53) After all, I take it that Heidegger is not intending to make a vacuously true claim.
[2] In my notes from the Being and Time seminar (Fall '07): "Categorial" is a characteristic exemplified by Kantian and Aristotelian categories. It encompasses the fundamental categories of non-Dasein, including the being of equipment (ready-to-hand) and the being of the occurrent (present-at-hand). It is contrasted with the "Existential." "Existential" is the adjective form. The noun form is existentiale (pl. existentialia) and the contrast case is the category (pl. categories).
[3] I need to remain alert to points where there may be ambiguity, even if it may be painful and laborious to try and rectify. I'm a bit unclear as to what is being referred to by the expression "the being of Dasein." I'm also unclear about the relationship between the being of Dasein and the state of Dasein. Are these very precise notions. It would be wise to get clear on them. Recall that being is that in virtue of which a thing is what it is and is recognizable as the thing it is. It is our innate sensitivity to the different kinds of beings that entities possess that we are able to differentiate them and comport ourselves appropriately to them.
[4] Keep this in mind for the future.
[5] It is interesting that the synonymy of ability and possibility came to me so naturally. This is also a connection that Blattner draws and he interprets possibilities in terms of abilities. But I actually wonder whether that construal is correct. This is something to watch out for. I have left both in here for future reference.
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God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
posted by Metaphysician_delta | 2:35 PM
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