Graduate 160: BT 27: Sec. 20
Part I, Division 1, Chapter 3. The Worldhood of the World
Subdivision B. A Contrast between our Analysis of Worldhood and Descartes' Interpretation of the World
Section 20. Foundations of the Ontological Definition of the 'World'
The idea that extension is the state-of-being that is constitutive of material entities is grounded on the more general concept of substantiality. "By substance we can undersand nothing else than an entity which is in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to be." (BT 125/92) Descartes understood that, in this sense, God is the only true substance. Every other entity is created by God. But this generates a problem: "The Being which belongs to one of these entities is 'infinitely' different from that which belongs to the other; yet we still consider creation and creator alike as entities. We are thus using "Being" in so wide a sense that its meaning embraces an 'infinite' difference." (BT 125/92) We still speak of two kinds of (created) substances: the thinking thing (res cogitans) and the extended thing (res extensa).
But how should we resolve this dilemma that's been raised--this possible source of confusion. "In the assertions 'God is' and 'the world is', we assert Being. This word 'is,' however, cannot be meant to apply to these entities in the same sense (SUNONUMOS, univoce), when between them there is an infinite difference of Being..." (BT 126/93) To ascribe 'being,' in the same sense, to God, physical substances, and mental substances, is to treat them all either as created or as uncreated. The Medievals took the meaning 'being' in each of these cases to operate 'by analogy'. This is an inadequate attempt at resolution, Heidegger thinks, but neither the Medievals nor Descartes attempt to dig any deeper into the matter. They do not develop a solid understanding of 'being' but rather treat its various significations as 'self-evident'.
Descartes actually goes so far as to suggest that substantiality (substance as such) is in and for itself inaccessible from the outset. Heidegger thinks that Kant takes this same basic view. Being is not something that is perceived or that affects us in such a way that we should be able to make an inquiry into its nature. Heidegger writes, "Because 'Being' is not in fact accessible as an entity, it is expressed thhrough attributes--definite characteristics of the entities under consideration, characteristics which themselves are. Being is not expressed through just any such characteristics, but rather through those satisfying in the purest manner that meaning of "Being" and "substantiality", which has still been tacitly presupposed." (BT 127/94) [1] Though we may try to grasp substance itself apart from either extension or thought, it is not actually possible to encounter such substances apart from their principle attributes.
"Thus the ontological grounds for defining the 'world' as res extensa have been made plain: they lie in the idea of substantiality, which not only remains unclarified in the meaning of its Being, but gets passed off as something incapable of clarification, and gets represented indirectly by way of whatever substantial property belongs most pre-eminently to the particular substance." (BT 127/94) Herein lies the reason for the double-signification of 'substantiality'. Sometimes 'substance' is taken to refer to something ontological and sometimes to something ontical, because, it is claimed, the ontological cannot be grasped except through the ontical. But Heidegger takes it that this construal refflects a failure to master the basic problem of Being. So he will set about tracking down the equivocation that is the source of the confusion and straightening it out.
--
FOOTNOTES:
[1] "Quin et facilius intelligimus substantiam extensam, vel substantiam cogitatem, quam substantiam solam, omisso eo quod cogitet vel sit extensa" (BT 127/94) "And in fact, more easily do we understand extended substance or thinking substance than substance alone, having laid aside that which would be thought or extended."
--
God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
Subdivision B. A Contrast between our Analysis of Worldhood and Descartes' Interpretation of the World
Section 20. Foundations of the Ontological Definition of the 'World'
The idea that extension is the state-of-being that is constitutive of material entities is grounded on the more general concept of substantiality. "By substance we can undersand nothing else than an entity which is in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to be." (BT 125/92) Descartes understood that, in this sense, God is the only true substance. Every other entity is created by God. But this generates a problem: "The Being which belongs to one of these entities is 'infinitely' different from that which belongs to the other; yet we still consider creation and creator alike as entities. We are thus using "Being" in so wide a sense that its meaning embraces an 'infinite' difference." (BT 125/92) We still speak of two kinds of (created) substances: the thinking thing (res cogitans) and the extended thing (res extensa).
But how should we resolve this dilemma that's been raised--this possible source of confusion. "In the assertions 'God is' and 'the world is', we assert Being. This word 'is,' however, cannot be meant to apply to these entities in the same sense (SUNONUMOS, univoce), when between them there is an infinite difference of Being..." (BT 126/93) To ascribe 'being,' in the same sense, to God, physical substances, and mental substances, is to treat them all either as created or as uncreated. The Medievals took the meaning 'being' in each of these cases to operate 'by analogy'. This is an inadequate attempt at resolution, Heidegger thinks, but neither the Medievals nor Descartes attempt to dig any deeper into the matter. They do not develop a solid understanding of 'being' but rather treat its various significations as 'self-evident'.
Descartes actually goes so far as to suggest that substantiality (substance as such) is in and for itself inaccessible from the outset. Heidegger thinks that Kant takes this same basic view. Being is not something that is perceived or that affects us in such a way that we should be able to make an inquiry into its nature. Heidegger writes, "Because 'Being' is not in fact accessible as an entity, it is expressed thhrough attributes--definite characteristics of the entities under consideration, characteristics which themselves are. Being is not expressed through just any such characteristics, but rather through those satisfying in the purest manner that meaning of "Being" and "substantiality", which has still been tacitly presupposed." (BT 127/94) [1] Though we may try to grasp substance itself apart from either extension or thought, it is not actually possible to encounter such substances apart from their principle attributes.
"Thus the ontological grounds for defining the 'world' as res extensa have been made plain: they lie in the idea of substantiality, which not only remains unclarified in the meaning of its Being, but gets passed off as something incapable of clarification, and gets represented indirectly by way of whatever substantial property belongs most pre-eminently to the particular substance." (BT 127/94) Herein lies the reason for the double-signification of 'substantiality'. Sometimes 'substance' is taken to refer to something ontological and sometimes to something ontical, because, it is claimed, the ontological cannot be grasped except through the ontical. But Heidegger takes it that this construal refflects a failure to master the basic problem of Being. So he will set about tracking down the equivocation that is the source of the confusion and straightening it out.
--
FOOTNOTES:
[1] "Quin et facilius intelligimus substantiam extensam, vel substantiam cogitatem, quam substantiam solam, omisso eo quod cogitet vel sit extensa" (BT 127/94) "And in fact, more easily do we understand extended substance or thinking substance than substance alone, having laid aside that which would be thought or extended."
--
God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
posted by Metaphysician_delta | 9:25 AM
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