Graduate 155: BT 22: Sec. 16
Part I, Division 1, Chapter 3. The Worldhood of the World
Subdivision A. Analysis of Environmentality and Worldhood in General
Section 16. How the Worldly Character of the Environment Announces itself in Entities Within-the-world
In this entry, Heidegger wants to look at Dasein's pre-philosophical, pre-phenomenological, pre-ontological understanding of the world. The world is not itself an entity within-the-world; and yet it is determinative for entities within the world. Only because there is a world can entities show themselves within the world as discovered and discoverable; but what is the character of that world, itself? Since Dasein is ontically constituted by being-in-the-world and has an understanding of the being of its self as an essential part of its being then Dasein must have an understanding of the world, even if that understanding is indefinite. This understanding is pre-ontological and can and does get along without explicit ontological insights. When we encounter entities within-the-world, the world shows itself for concernful being-in-the-world and this furnishes a pre-phenomenological glimpse of it. "Has Dasein itself, in the range of its concernful absoption in equipment ready-to-hand, a possibility of Being in which the worldhood of those entities within-the-world with which it is concerned is, in a certain way, lit up for it, along with those entities themselves?" (BT 102/73) In other words, is there a possible way of being for Dasein that will allow us to not only see the involved entities within-the-world but also the worldhood of those entities? [Keep in mind that our goal has been to understand worldhood as a constitutive component or structure of Dasein's being-in-the-world.] If we can find such a possibility of being for Dasein that can be exhibited within its concernful dealings, then we may be able to examine and interrogate that way of being for insight into worldhood itself.
Here I shall quote a long passage and then try to interpret it: "To the everydayness of Being-in-the-world there belong certain modes of concern. These permit the entities with which we concern ourselves to be encountered in such a way that the worldly character of what is within-the-world comes to the fore. When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are most closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not properly adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be damaged, or the material unsuitable. In each of these cases equipment is here, ready-to-hand. We discover its unusability, however, not by looking at it and establishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it. When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous. This conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-hand. But this implies that what cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as an equipmental Thing which looks so and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been present-at-hand too. Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself--that is to say, of the sort of thing we find when we put it back into repair. This presence-at-hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of all readiness-to-hand whatsoever; equipment which is present-at-hand in this way is still not just a Thing which occurs somewhere. The damage to the equipment is still not a mere alteration of a Thing--not a change of properties which just occurs in something present-at-hand." (BT 102-103/73)
So what's going on in this passage. Keep in mind that we are trying to confront worldhood itself and interrogate it and we need a way to access that. Now Heidegger says that there are different modes of concern that belong to the everydayness of being-in-the-world. These different modes allow us to encounter entities in such a way as to reveal their worldly character--which is what we want. He begins now with a particular case--when we encounter some piece of equipment in the mode of unusability. [I think that usability and unusability are supposed to be modes, though I could be mistaken. Also, I take it that he thinks that this particular mode is illuminating and not necessarily that every mode will disclose the worldly character of entities--at least not in the same way.] In such situations, the equipment is still ready-to-hand. The fact that it is not unusable does not mean that it is not ready-to-hand. Rather, usability and unusability are different modes of readiness-to-hand. This idea is further confirmed when we remember that we do not recognize an object as unusable just by looking at it but rather in contexts where we are involved and working with tools--where we are engaged and see with the sight of circumspection. When we encounter equipment as unusable, that equipment becomes conspicuous and is possessed of a certain un-readiness-to-hand. But, again, the equipment is not essentially encountered merely as present-at-hand in these cases. There is a way in which that equipment is encountered as purely present-at-hand, but the equipment immediately becomes ready-to-hand as soon as we approach as something to be repaired or dealt with in some concernful way. So even when we approach an unusable object as present-at-hand, that object is not devoid of readiness-to-hand. Such an object is not a merely occurring thing with shifting properties.
Heidegger continues by pointing out that in our concernful dealings, we not only encounter things that are ready-to-hand-and-unusable. We also find things which are missing--which are not 'to hand' at all. This is also a way of encountering something un-ready-to-hand. [1] Heidegger says that when we notice what is un-ready-to-hand, that object that is ready-to-hand enters the mode of obtrusiveness. It is interesting that Heidegger would describe something that is missing as 'obtrusive'. [See footnote 1, below] But he goes on to explain that the more desperately and urgently we need something that is missing or unavailable to us, the more obtrusive it becomes. [2] Again, we must keep in mind that the un-ready-to-hand and the ready-to-hand are not necessarily opposed. A piece of equipment can be encountered as un-ready-to-hand just because it already is and continues to be ready-to-hand. Also, obtrusiveness is a mode of readiness-to-hand. However, Heidegger does also say that an items obtrusiveness can become so great that it seems to lose its character of readiness-to-hand. So for instance, if I cannot find my car keys then I encounter them in the mode of obtrusiveness. And the more urgent my need to leave and the longer that I cannot find my keys, this not only affects my perception of my keys but also of my car. My car becomes manifest to me as a worthless hunk of metal as long as I am unable to find my keys; it is completely useless to me and just 'there' without the keys. "It reveals itself as something just present-at-hand and no more, which cannot be budged without the thing that is missing. The helpless way in which we stand before it is a deficient mode of concern, and as such it uncovers the Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more of something ready-to-hand." (BT 103/73) [3]
There is yet a third mode in which something may be encountered as un-ready-to-hand, even though it is not missing and not unusable. An object may be un-ready-to-hand because it 'stands in the way' of our concern. When we have some goal and something else is standing in the way--something for which we don't have time or that is otherwise a hindrance to our reaching our desired goal--that thing is un-ready-to-hand. "Anything which is un-ready-to-hand in this way is disturbing to us, and enables us to see the obstinacy of that with which we must concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else." (BT 103/74)
"The modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy all have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of presence-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand." (BT 104/74) But when encountered in this way, these objects are not encountered as just present-at-hand, but the presence-at-hand is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment. Even when our only relationship to a piece of equipment is a desire to be rid of it ("to shove out of the way"), the ready-to-hand still shows itself as ready-to-hand in its unswerving presence-at-hand.
"Now that we have suggested, however, that the ready-to-hand is thus encountered under modifications in which its presence-at-hand is revealed, how far does this clarify the phenomenon of the world?" (BT 104/74) Again, the whole point of this detour has been to try to grasp that thing. Our treatment up to this point has still been with those entities within-the-world. But Heidegger says that we are now in a position where we can bring worldhood into view. The idea is that conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy cause the ready-to-hand to lose its readiness-to-hand in a certain way. But the readiness-to-hand does not simply vanish or disappear, "but takes its farewell as it were, in the conspicuousness of the unusable." (BT 104/74) Readiness-to-hand, thus, still shows itself and this is where and also the way in which the worldly character of the ready-to-hand shows itself.
Here's how it works. "The structure of the Being of what is ready-to-hand as equipment is determined by references or assignments. In a peculiar and obvious manner, the 'Things' which are closest to us are 'in themselves' ["An-sich"]; and they are encountered as 'in themselves' in the concern which makes use of them without noticing them explicitly--the concern which can come up against something unusable. When equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive assignment of the "in-order-to" to a "towards-this" has been disturbed. The assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather 'there' when we concernfully submit ourselves to them [Sichstellen unter sie]. But when an assignment has been disturbed--when something is unusable for some purpose--then the assignment becomes explicit. Even now, of course, it has not become explicit as an ontological structure; but it has become explicit ontically for the circumspection which comes up against the damaging of the tool. When an assignment to some particular "towards-this" has been thus circumspectively aroused, we catch sight of the "towards-this" itself, and along with it everything connected with the work--the whole 'work-shop'--as that wherein concern always dwells. The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself." (BT 105/74-75)
In the next section, Heidegger will deal more directly with the character of references and signs, but for now it is enough to know they are what determine the structure of being of the ready-to-hand. These things, which are closest to us, are encountered 'in themselves' in the kind of concern for which they are usually invisible but sometimes appear as unusable. Concern is what allows equipment ready-to-hand to appear in any of its various modes. Unusability alerts one to a disturbance in the assignment of the "in-order-to" to the "towards-this". We do not perceive assignments directly but manifest our familiarity with them by our activities; and we become aware of those assignments when they are disturbed by encountering unusability. In such situations, the assignment becomes explicit ontically but not ontologically. We become manifestly aware of the "towards-this" that we had been aiming at. We become aware of the context and environment that we have been inhabiting all along. [4] In this way, the world announces itself.
Similarly, when something ready-to-hand is found missing, that causes a break in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. "Our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with, and what it was ready-to-hand for. The environment announces itself afresh." (BT 105/75) And this is what we've been looking for--for the environment to be lit up for our interrogation. The environment is, itself, ready-to-hand and constantly 'there' before we even consider or observe it. "It is itself inaccessible to circumspection, so far as circumspection is always directed towards entities; but in each case it has already been disclosed for circumspection." (BT 105/75) [Again, Heidegger is laying out the conditions for the possibility of encountering entities in the way we do. Circumspection does not perceive the environment, but without the environment, circumspection would perceive nothing at all.] Here follows an important vocabulary point: "'Disclose' and 'disclosedness' will be used as technical terms in the passages that follow, and shall signify 'to lay open' and 'the character of having been laid open.' Thus 'to disclose' never means anything like 'to obtain indirectly by inference'." (BT 105/75, boldface mine) [5]
Heidegger writes, "That the world does not 'consist' of the ready-to-hand shows itself in the fact (among others) that whenever the world is lit up in the modes of concern which we have been Interpreting, the ready-to-hand becomes deprived of its worldhood so that Being-just-present-at-hand comes to the fore." (BT 106/75) [6] If the world were constituted by the ready-to-hand, then when equipment is deprived of its readiness-to-hand, we would expect some kind of loss of world. But clearly the world is still there and is presupposed in our ability to encounter equipment either as fully ready-to-hand or as being-just-present-at-hand.
The remainder of this paragraph is a bit unclear to me so I shall copy it here: "If, in our everyday concern with the 'environment', it is to be possible for equipment ready-to-hand to be encountered in its 'Being-in-itself' [in seinem "An-sich-sein"], then those assignments and referential totalities in which our circumspection 'is absorbed' cannot become a theme for that circumspection any more than they can for grasping things 'thematically' but non-circumspectively. If it is to be possible for the ready-to-hand not to emerge from its inconspicuousness, the world must not announce itself. And it is in this that the Being-in-itself of entities which are ready-to-hand has its phenomenal structure constituted." (BT 106/75) [7]
Heidegger goes on to clarify what is meant by "being-in-itself." When entities in the world are not conspicuous, obtrusive, or obstinate--that is, when they have the character of "inconspicuousness", "unobtrusiveness", and "non-obstinacy", then they have the positive phenomenal character of the being of that which is proximally ready-to-hand. Clearly "in-conspicuousness" does not capture some negation or lack, given how we have characterized "conspicuousness" above. "With these negative prefixes we have in view the character of the ready-to-hand as "holding itself in"; this is what we have our eye upon in the "Being-in-itself" of something, though 'proximally' we ascribe it to the present-at-hand--to the present-at-hand as that which can be thematically ascertained." (BT 106/75) Here is another point at which we must be very careful with our vocabulary. When we commonly speak of what something is "in itself" we generally mean to refer to that thing as it is completely independently of any involvements or relationships to people. But when Heidegger speaks of an entity "in-itself" he means to refer to it just in the context of its involvements.
Heidegger says that if we orient ourselves primarily from the present-at-hand, then we cannot clarify ontologically the 'in-itself'. The point is that to really understand what some piece of equipment is "in-itself", we should not attempt to divorce it from its context of involvements and uses. "As the foregoing analysis has already made clear, only on the basis of the phenomenon of the world can the Being-in-itself of entities within-the-world be grasped ontologically.
With these distinctions in mind, we can now return to that paragraph that was so puzzling. The idea is this: if our goal is to understand equipment "in-itself"--if we hope to encounter it in this particular way--then we should remember that the assignments and referential totalities cannot (or should not) be treated as objects of scientific or theoretical scrutiny. If we take that approach, we will lose sight completely of the very thing that we are hoping to catch sight of. In order for the ready-to-hand to remain inconspicuous--that is, to remain thoroughly embedded in its context of involvements, the world must not announce itself. It is in this state of embeddedness that the essence (i.e. the being-in-itself, insofar as one may speak of essences) of the ready-to-hand has its phenomenal structure constituted.
Our goal is to be able to take a good look at the world--to have it disclosed. But the preceding has shown that the world is constantly disclosed (in one sense) whenever what is ready-to-hand within-the-world is accessed by circumspective concern. To come away from that is to lose sight of that world and catch sight of it again is to come back into that world.
"Being-in-the-world, according to our Interpretation hitherto, amounts to a non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment. Any concern is already as it is, because of some familiarity with the world." (BT 107/76) This familiarity also manifests itself in various modes and that will be treated in sections to come. But for now we want to continue on the line of inquiry that we have initiated: "Why can the worldly character of what is within-the-world be lit up? The presence-at-hand of entities is thrust to the fore by the possible breaks in that referential totality in which circumspection 'operates'; how are we to get a closer understanding of this totality?" Our goal is still to get a solid glimpse of worldhood. ("These questions are aimed at working out both the phenomenon and the problems of worldhood..." (BT 107/76)) We have made some progress toward that by seeing how worldhood can be disrupted through breaks in the referential totality that we encounter in circumspection. In order to understand these breaks more deeply, we now turn explicitly to what is involved in these structures of reference and signs.
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FOOTNOTES:
[1] This point will probably be addressed explicitly at some point, but it should be clear 'encountering' an object does not necessarily involve being brought into close spatio-temporal proximity to it. If I have a craving for a hamburger, I 'encounter' that object, even if I'm not able to actually meet that craving and get that hamburger. Even if the nearest available hamburger is 500 miles away, there is still an important way in which I 'encounter' and become involved with 'hamburger' by virtue of my craving and disposition. So the idea of 'encountering' something as missing is not contradictory. And Heidegger might actually wish to capitalize on this peculiar way that we have of speaking about 'finding' that I've 'lost' something.
[2] Heidegger writes, "...the more authentically it is encountered in its un-readiness-to-hand, all the more obtrusive [um so aufdringlicher] does that which is ready-to-hand become..." (BT 103/73)
[3] Again, we saw earlier in this section that an entity ready-to-hand may be encountered as present-at-hand.
[4] Something like this picture may be what's intended. When I'm working on a project, I am completely absorbed in that project. It may be, in extreme cases, that I lose the proverbial forest for the trees and become singularly focused on what I am doing. But when a piece of equipment breaks, suddenly I am forced to step back from what I am doing and take in a larger field. I may become suddenly aware of my environment in a way that I was not before. It may be that I also become aware of the workshop insofar as I start looking around for a way to repair my tool or replace my tool. It is not clear to me whether Heidegger has this particular idea in mind yet.
[5] "To say that something has been 'disclosed' or 'laid open' in Heidegger's sense, does not mean that one has any detailed awareness of the contents which are thus 'disclosed', but rather that they have been 'laid open' to us as implicit in what is given, so that they may be made explicit to our awareness by further analysis or discrimination of the given, rather than by any inference from it." (BT 105-106, footnote 1)
[6] This seems to be a line he hasn't used before--"the ready-to-hand becomes deprived of its worldhood"?
[7] Review Graduate 136 on what is involved in the idea of "announcing."
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God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
Subdivision A. Analysis of Environmentality and Worldhood in General
Section 16. How the Worldly Character of the Environment Announces itself in Entities Within-the-world
In this entry, Heidegger wants to look at Dasein's pre-philosophical, pre-phenomenological, pre-ontological understanding of the world. The world is not itself an entity within-the-world; and yet it is determinative for entities within the world. Only because there is a world can entities show themselves within the world as discovered and discoverable; but what is the character of that world, itself? Since Dasein is ontically constituted by being-in-the-world and has an understanding of the being of its self as an essential part of its being then Dasein must have an understanding of the world, even if that understanding is indefinite. This understanding is pre-ontological and can and does get along without explicit ontological insights. When we encounter entities within-the-world, the world shows itself for concernful being-in-the-world and this furnishes a pre-phenomenological glimpse of it. "Has Dasein itself, in the range of its concernful absoption in equipment ready-to-hand, a possibility of Being in which the worldhood of those entities within-the-world with which it is concerned is, in a certain way, lit up for it, along with those entities themselves?" (BT 102/73) In other words, is there a possible way of being for Dasein that will allow us to not only see the involved entities within-the-world but also the worldhood of those entities? [Keep in mind that our goal has been to understand worldhood as a constitutive component or structure of Dasein's being-in-the-world.] If we can find such a possibility of being for Dasein that can be exhibited within its concernful dealings, then we may be able to examine and interrogate that way of being for insight into worldhood itself.
Here I shall quote a long passage and then try to interpret it: "To the everydayness of Being-in-the-world there belong certain modes of concern. These permit the entities with which we concern ourselves to be encountered in such a way that the worldly character of what is within-the-world comes to the fore. When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are most closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not properly adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be damaged, or the material unsuitable. In each of these cases equipment is here, ready-to-hand. We discover its unusability, however, not by looking at it and establishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it. When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous. This conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-hand. But this implies that what cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as an equipmental Thing which looks so and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been present-at-hand too. Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself--that is to say, of the sort of thing we find when we put it back into repair. This presence-at-hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of all readiness-to-hand whatsoever; equipment which is present-at-hand in this way is still not just a Thing which occurs somewhere. The damage to the equipment is still not a mere alteration of a Thing--not a change of properties which just occurs in something present-at-hand." (BT 102-103/73)
So what's going on in this passage. Keep in mind that we are trying to confront worldhood itself and interrogate it and we need a way to access that. Now Heidegger says that there are different modes of concern that belong to the everydayness of being-in-the-world. These different modes allow us to encounter entities in such a way as to reveal their worldly character--which is what we want. He begins now with a particular case--when we encounter some piece of equipment in the mode of unusability. [I think that usability and unusability are supposed to be modes, though I could be mistaken. Also, I take it that he thinks that this particular mode is illuminating and not necessarily that every mode will disclose the worldly character of entities--at least not in the same way.] In such situations, the equipment is still ready-to-hand. The fact that it is not unusable does not mean that it is not ready-to-hand. Rather, usability and unusability are different modes of readiness-to-hand. This idea is further confirmed when we remember that we do not recognize an object as unusable just by looking at it but rather in contexts where we are involved and working with tools--where we are engaged and see with the sight of circumspection. When we encounter equipment as unusable, that equipment becomes conspicuous and is possessed of a certain un-readiness-to-hand. But, again, the equipment is not essentially encountered merely as present-at-hand in these cases. There is a way in which that equipment is encountered as purely present-at-hand, but the equipment immediately becomes ready-to-hand as soon as we approach as something to be repaired or dealt with in some concernful way. So even when we approach an unusable object as present-at-hand, that object is not devoid of readiness-to-hand. Such an object is not a merely occurring thing with shifting properties.
Heidegger continues by pointing out that in our concernful dealings, we not only encounter things that are ready-to-hand-and-unusable. We also find things which are missing--which are not 'to hand' at all. This is also a way of encountering something un-ready-to-hand. [1] Heidegger says that when we notice what is un-ready-to-hand, that object that is ready-to-hand enters the mode of obtrusiveness. It is interesting that Heidegger would describe something that is missing as 'obtrusive'. [See footnote 1, below] But he goes on to explain that the more desperately and urgently we need something that is missing or unavailable to us, the more obtrusive it becomes. [2] Again, we must keep in mind that the un-ready-to-hand and the ready-to-hand are not necessarily opposed. A piece of equipment can be encountered as un-ready-to-hand just because it already is and continues to be ready-to-hand. Also, obtrusiveness is a mode of readiness-to-hand. However, Heidegger does also say that an items obtrusiveness can become so great that it seems to lose its character of readiness-to-hand. So for instance, if I cannot find my car keys then I encounter them in the mode of obtrusiveness. And the more urgent my need to leave and the longer that I cannot find my keys, this not only affects my perception of my keys but also of my car. My car becomes manifest to me as a worthless hunk of metal as long as I am unable to find my keys; it is completely useless to me and just 'there' without the keys. "It reveals itself as something just present-at-hand and no more, which cannot be budged without the thing that is missing. The helpless way in which we stand before it is a deficient mode of concern, and as such it uncovers the Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more of something ready-to-hand." (BT 103/73) [3]
There is yet a third mode in which something may be encountered as un-ready-to-hand, even though it is not missing and not unusable. An object may be un-ready-to-hand because it 'stands in the way' of our concern. When we have some goal and something else is standing in the way--something for which we don't have time or that is otherwise a hindrance to our reaching our desired goal--that thing is un-ready-to-hand. "Anything which is un-ready-to-hand in this way is disturbing to us, and enables us to see the obstinacy of that with which we must concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else." (BT 103/74)
"The modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy all have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of presence-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand." (BT 104/74) But when encountered in this way, these objects are not encountered as just present-at-hand, but the presence-at-hand is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment. Even when our only relationship to a piece of equipment is a desire to be rid of it ("to shove out of the way"), the ready-to-hand still shows itself as ready-to-hand in its unswerving presence-at-hand.
"Now that we have suggested, however, that the ready-to-hand is thus encountered under modifications in which its presence-at-hand is revealed, how far does this clarify the phenomenon of the world?" (BT 104/74) Again, the whole point of this detour has been to try to grasp that thing. Our treatment up to this point has still been with those entities within-the-world. But Heidegger says that we are now in a position where we can bring worldhood into view. The idea is that conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy cause the ready-to-hand to lose its readiness-to-hand in a certain way. But the readiness-to-hand does not simply vanish or disappear, "but takes its farewell as it were, in the conspicuousness of the unusable." (BT 104/74) Readiness-to-hand, thus, still shows itself and this is where and also the way in which the worldly character of the ready-to-hand shows itself.
Here's how it works. "The structure of the Being of what is ready-to-hand as equipment is determined by references or assignments. In a peculiar and obvious manner, the 'Things' which are closest to us are 'in themselves' ["An-sich"]; and they are encountered as 'in themselves' in the concern which makes use of them without noticing them explicitly--the concern which can come up against something unusable. When equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive assignment of the "in-order-to" to a "towards-this" has been disturbed. The assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather 'there' when we concernfully submit ourselves to them [Sichstellen unter sie]. But when an assignment has been disturbed--when something is unusable for some purpose--then the assignment becomes explicit. Even now, of course, it has not become explicit as an ontological structure; but it has become explicit ontically for the circumspection which comes up against the damaging of the tool. When an assignment to some particular "towards-this" has been thus circumspectively aroused, we catch sight of the "towards-this" itself, and along with it everything connected with the work--the whole 'work-shop'--as that wherein concern always dwells. The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself." (BT 105/74-75)
In the next section, Heidegger will deal more directly with the character of references and signs, but for now it is enough to know they are what determine the structure of being of the ready-to-hand. These things, which are closest to us, are encountered 'in themselves' in the kind of concern for which they are usually invisible but sometimes appear as unusable. Concern is what allows equipment ready-to-hand to appear in any of its various modes. Unusability alerts one to a disturbance in the assignment of the "in-order-to" to the "towards-this". We do not perceive assignments directly but manifest our familiarity with them by our activities; and we become aware of those assignments when they are disturbed by encountering unusability. In such situations, the assignment becomes explicit ontically but not ontologically. We become manifestly aware of the "towards-this" that we had been aiming at. We become aware of the context and environment that we have been inhabiting all along. [4] In this way, the world announces itself.
Similarly, when something ready-to-hand is found missing, that causes a break in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. "Our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with, and what it was ready-to-hand for. The environment announces itself afresh." (BT 105/75) And this is what we've been looking for--for the environment to be lit up for our interrogation. The environment is, itself, ready-to-hand and constantly 'there' before we even consider or observe it. "It is itself inaccessible to circumspection, so far as circumspection is always directed towards entities; but in each case it has already been disclosed for circumspection." (BT 105/75) [Again, Heidegger is laying out the conditions for the possibility of encountering entities in the way we do. Circumspection does not perceive the environment, but without the environment, circumspection would perceive nothing at all.] Here follows an important vocabulary point: "'Disclose' and 'disclosedness' will be used as technical terms in the passages that follow, and shall signify 'to lay open' and 'the character of having been laid open.' Thus 'to disclose' never means anything like 'to obtain indirectly by inference'." (BT 105/75, boldface mine) [5]
Heidegger writes, "That the world does not 'consist' of the ready-to-hand shows itself in the fact (among others) that whenever the world is lit up in the modes of concern which we have been Interpreting, the ready-to-hand becomes deprived of its worldhood so that Being-just-present-at-hand comes to the fore." (BT 106/75) [6] If the world were constituted by the ready-to-hand, then when equipment is deprived of its readiness-to-hand, we would expect some kind of loss of world. But clearly the world is still there and is presupposed in our ability to encounter equipment either as fully ready-to-hand or as being-just-present-at-hand.
The remainder of this paragraph is a bit unclear to me so I shall copy it here: "If, in our everyday concern with the 'environment', it is to be possible for equipment ready-to-hand to be encountered in its 'Being-in-itself' [in seinem "An-sich-sein"], then those assignments and referential totalities in which our circumspection 'is absorbed' cannot become a theme for that circumspection any more than they can for grasping things 'thematically' but non-circumspectively. If it is to be possible for the ready-to-hand not to emerge from its inconspicuousness, the world must not announce itself. And it is in this that the Being-in-itself of entities which are ready-to-hand has its phenomenal structure constituted." (BT 106/75) [7]
Heidegger goes on to clarify what is meant by "being-in-itself." When entities in the world are not conspicuous, obtrusive, or obstinate--that is, when they have the character of "inconspicuousness", "unobtrusiveness", and "non-obstinacy", then they have the positive phenomenal character of the being of that which is proximally ready-to-hand. Clearly "in-conspicuousness" does not capture some negation or lack, given how we have characterized "conspicuousness" above. "With these negative prefixes we have in view the character of the ready-to-hand as "holding itself in"; this is what we have our eye upon in the "Being-in-itself" of something, though 'proximally' we ascribe it to the present-at-hand--to the present-at-hand as that which can be thematically ascertained." (BT 106/75) Here is another point at which we must be very careful with our vocabulary. When we commonly speak of what something is "in itself" we generally mean to refer to that thing as it is completely independently of any involvements or relationships to people. But when Heidegger speaks of an entity "in-itself" he means to refer to it just in the context of its involvements.
Heidegger says that if we orient ourselves primarily from the present-at-hand, then we cannot clarify ontologically the 'in-itself'. The point is that to really understand what some piece of equipment is "in-itself", we should not attempt to divorce it from its context of involvements and uses. "As the foregoing analysis has already made clear, only on the basis of the phenomenon of the world can the Being-in-itself of entities within-the-world be grasped ontologically.
With these distinctions in mind, we can now return to that paragraph that was so puzzling. The idea is this: if our goal is to understand equipment "in-itself"--if we hope to encounter it in this particular way--then we should remember that the assignments and referential totalities cannot (or should not) be treated as objects of scientific or theoretical scrutiny. If we take that approach, we will lose sight completely of the very thing that we are hoping to catch sight of. In order for the ready-to-hand to remain inconspicuous--that is, to remain thoroughly embedded in its context of involvements, the world must not announce itself. It is in this state of embeddedness that the essence (i.e. the being-in-itself, insofar as one may speak of essences) of the ready-to-hand has its phenomenal structure constituted.
Our goal is to be able to take a good look at the world--to have it disclosed. But the preceding has shown that the world is constantly disclosed (in one sense) whenever what is ready-to-hand within-the-world is accessed by circumspective concern. To come away from that is to lose sight of that world and catch sight of it again is to come back into that world.
"Being-in-the-world, according to our Interpretation hitherto, amounts to a non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment. Any concern is already as it is, because of some familiarity with the world." (BT 107/76) This familiarity also manifests itself in various modes and that will be treated in sections to come. But for now we want to continue on the line of inquiry that we have initiated: "Why can the worldly character of what is within-the-world be lit up? The presence-at-hand of entities is thrust to the fore by the possible breaks in that referential totality in which circumspection 'operates'; how are we to get a closer understanding of this totality?" Our goal is still to get a solid glimpse of worldhood. ("These questions are aimed at working out both the phenomenon and the problems of worldhood..." (BT 107/76)) We have made some progress toward that by seeing how worldhood can be disrupted through breaks in the referential totality that we encounter in circumspection. In order to understand these breaks more deeply, we now turn explicitly to what is involved in these structures of reference and signs.
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FOOTNOTES:
[1] This point will probably be addressed explicitly at some point, but it should be clear 'encountering' an object does not necessarily involve being brought into close spatio-temporal proximity to it. If I have a craving for a hamburger, I 'encounter' that object, even if I'm not able to actually meet that craving and get that hamburger. Even if the nearest available hamburger is 500 miles away, there is still an important way in which I 'encounter' and become involved with 'hamburger' by virtue of my craving and disposition. So the idea of 'encountering' something as missing is not contradictory. And Heidegger might actually wish to capitalize on this peculiar way that we have of speaking about 'finding' that I've 'lost' something.
[2] Heidegger writes, "...the more authentically it is encountered in its un-readiness-to-hand, all the more obtrusive [um so aufdringlicher] does that which is ready-to-hand become..." (BT 103/73)
[3] Again, we saw earlier in this section that an entity ready-to-hand may be encountered as present-at-hand.
[4] Something like this picture may be what's intended. When I'm working on a project, I am completely absorbed in that project. It may be, in extreme cases, that I lose the proverbial forest for the trees and become singularly focused on what I am doing. But when a piece of equipment breaks, suddenly I am forced to step back from what I am doing and take in a larger field. I may become suddenly aware of my environment in a way that I was not before. It may be that I also become aware of the workshop insofar as I start looking around for a way to repair my tool or replace my tool. It is not clear to me whether Heidegger has this particular idea in mind yet.
[5] "To say that something has been 'disclosed' or 'laid open' in Heidegger's sense, does not mean that one has any detailed awareness of the contents which are thus 'disclosed', but rather that they have been 'laid open' to us as implicit in what is given, so that they may be made explicit to our awareness by further analysis or discrimination of the given, rather than by any inference from it." (BT 105-106, footnote 1)
[6] This seems to be a line he hasn't used before--"the ready-to-hand becomes deprived of its worldhood"?
[7] Review Graduate 136 on what is involved in the idea of "announcing."
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God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
posted by Metaphysician_delta | 11:53 AM
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