Graduate 156: BT 23: Sec. 17
Part I, Division 1, Chapter 3. The Worldhood of the World
Subdivision A. Analysis of Environmentality and Worldhood in General
Section 17. Reference and Signs
In section 15, Heidegger said that to the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment. Equipment is essentially 'something-in-order-to...' and in the structure of the 'in-order-to' there lies an assignment or reference. In this section, we want to look directly at the phenomenon of reference or assignment that has become visible. Our goal is still to lay bare the world-phenomenon. There is a possibility that assignments and referential totalities will become constitutive for worldhood itself. "Hitherto we have seen the world lit up only in and for certain defininte ways in which we concern ourselves environmentally with the ready-to-hand, and indeed it has been lit up only with the readiness-to-hand of that concern. So the further we proceed in understanding the Being of entities within-the-world, the broader and firmer becomes the phenomenal basis on which the world-phenomenon may be laid bare." (BT 107/76-77) This, then, is the direction that we want to follow up on in this section.
We shall still take the being of the ready-to-hand as our point of departure, but our goal now is to grasp the phenomenon of reference or assignment itself more precisely. Heidegger writes, "We shall accordingly attempt an ontological analysis of a kind of equipment in which one may come across such 'references' in more senses than one. We come across 'equipment' in signs. The word "sign" designates many kinds of things: not only may it stand for different kinds of signs, but Being-a-sign-for can itself be formalized as a universal kind of relation, so that the sign-structure itself provides an ontological clue for 'characterizing' any entity whatsoever." (BT 107-108/77) Here are at least two ways of using the word 'sign.' 'Sign' may designate a class of things that may be further differentiated into groups of different kinds of signs. But 'sign' and 'being-a-sign-for' can also describe a feature of any entity whatsoever--a universal kind of relation. [1]
We will begin by considering the first usage of 'sign,' to refer to one type or category of equipment whose specific character as equipment consists in showing or indicating. Examples of these include "signposts, boundary-stones, the ball for the mariner's storm-warning, signals, banners, signs of mourning, and the like." (BT 108/77) Heidegger says that indicating can be defined as a 'kind' of referring and that referring, taken in a strictly formal way, is a relating. But he also says that relation is not a genus or category of things that may be subdivided into particular species or kinds of references. "A relation is something quite formal which may be read off directly by way of 'formalization' from any kind of context, whatever its subject-matter or way of Being." (BT 108/77) [2]
So here are three terms, the relations of which need to be understood: "indication," "reference," and "relation." Every 'indication' is a reference and every reference is a relation, but it is not the case that every relation is a reference or that every reference is an 'indication'. Heidegger writes: "The formally general character of relation is thus brought to light. If we are to investigate such phenomena as reference, signs, or even significations, nothing is to be gained by characterizing them as relations. Indeed we shall eventually have to show that 'relations' themselves, because of their formally general character, have their ontological source in a reference." (BT 108/78) So while there is a tendency to think of 'references' as one kind of 'relation,' Heidegger will try to show that the latter is actually ontologically grounded in the former.
At the moment, we want to understand the sign "as distinct from the phenomenon of reference". (BT 108/77) So we also want to treat it not as a relation but as an indication. But here we face a challenge insofar as there are so many different kinds of signs and so many different ways of indicating something. This great variety may be organized along formal lines by appeal to their relational character, but Heidegger is not satisfied with this approach. He writes, "[W]e find it especially tempting nowadays to take such a 'relation' as a clue for subjecting every entity to a kind of 'Interpretation' which always 'fits' because at bottom it says nothing, no more than the facile schema of content and form. (108/78)
--
So, to guide our investigation, Heidegger chooses one particular sign to consider: the adjustable arrow by which a motor car driver may indicate the direction the vehicle will take. This sign is an item of equipment which is ready-to-hand for the driver and for other people as well. "This sign is ready-to-hand within-the-world in the whole equipment-context of vehicles and traffic regulations. It is equipment for indicating, and as equipment, it is constituted by reference or assignment. It has the character of the "in-order-to", its own definite serviceability; it is for indicating. This indicating which the sign performs can be taken as a kind of 'referring'. But here we must notice that this 'referring' as indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign as equipment." (BT 109/78)
Two questions: In what way can the adjustable arrow's indicating be understood as a kind of 'referring'? What is the ontological structure of this particular kind of sign as equipment? According to Heidegger, 'referring' as indicating is grounded in the being-structure of equipment, in serviceability for something or some purpose. An entity (for instance, a hammer) may be serviceable without thereby being a sign, so serviceability is more basic to the ontological constitution of equipment. "Indicating, as a 'reference', is a way in which the "towards-which" of a serviceability becomes ontically concrete; it determines an item of equipment as for this "towards-which"." (BT 109/78) So indicating, as 'reference,' is one way in which a piece of equipment may manifest (make concrete) its "towards-which."
The idea seems to be this: the purpose of the adjustable arrow is to 'indicate' the direction in which the vehicle to turn. At this ontical level of discourse, the arrow does not 'refer' to anything; it does not, for instance, point to some particular thing. However, there is a sense in which the arrow, by performing its function of indicating, draws our attention to or refers to an equipment totality or equipment context. So here is an example of an 'indication' that is a 'reference,' even though the 'reference' is not an 'indication. But even this 'reference' to an equipment-context does not fully capture the ontological structure of that sign. Rather, it is the sign's serviceability that is fundamental. [3]
"What do we mean when we say that a sign "indicates"? We can answer this only by determining what kind of dealing is appropriate with equipment for indicating. And we must do this in such a way that the readiness-to-hand of that equipment can be genuinely grasped." (BT 110/79) If we are to understand what is involved in 'indicating,' we can do so by considering what follows from an indication. In the case of the arrow, to responses that are appropriate include, 'giving way' and 'standing still'. "Giving way, as taking a direction, belongs essentially to Dasein's Being-in-the-world." (BT 110/79) According to Heidegger, Dasein is always directed in some way, even at those moments when it is physically standing still. What is important for understanding the sign, then, is an understanding of the appropriate responses. The sign is not authentically grasped or encountered--it is not understood as the kind of thing that it is--if we just stare at it or if we think that it is pointing at something and look in that direction. [4] An arrow that points to something else addresses itself to "the circumspection of our concernful dealings... . The circumspective survey does not grasp the ready-to-hand; what it achieves is rather an orientation within our environment. [5] So there are a number of ways of encountering the arrow. One may even encounter it as a piece of equipment belonging to the car without understanding its function. Even in this way, we do not encounter it as a mere thing. "The experiencing of a Thing requires a definiteness of its own..., and must be contrasted with coming across a manifold of equipment, which may often be quite indefinite, even when one comes across it as especially close." (BT 110/79) But it is still the case that encountering or experiencing the arrow as a Thing does not allow us to encounter that piece of equipment authentically.
"Signs of the kind we have described let what is ready-to-hand be encountered; more precisely, they let some context of it become accessible in such a way that our concernful dealings take on an orientation and hold it secure. A sign is not a Thing which stands to another Thing in the relationship of indicating; it is rather an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself." (BT 110/79-80) You may have noticed a recurring theme at this point. The relationship of being-a-sign-for that exists between two objects is not something that obtains after-the-fact between two otherwise independent entities. Rather, it is something that occurs within an already-established context of discourse, interactions, and uses. When a driver sees the arrow on another car pointing to the left or sees a warning sign alerting him to the presence of road-work ahead, these other things are not encountered as independent, isolated, or discrete entities. Rather, they are something already understood. That is why the sign can perform its function: because it is already understood. The driver is ready for what comes ahead, or, if he is not, he encounters it as something that he should have been ready for. "Signs always indicate primarily 'wherein' one lives, where one's concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something." (BT 111/80)
Consider the example of a warning sign that alerts a driver to dangerous conditions ahead or, suppose, to the collapse of a bridge ahead. How does one establish a sign that will serve the function of communicating to drivers what is ahead? "This activity is performed in a circumspective fore-sight [Vorsicht] out of which it arises, and which requires that it be possible for one's particular environment to announce itself for circumspection at any time by means of something ready-to-hand, and that this possibility should itself be ready-to-hand." (BT 111/80) One must be able to set up a piece of equipment, ready-to-hand, that will allow the environment (including the collapsed bridge) to announce itself to the driver's circumspection. The difficulty comes in that what is most closely ready-to-hand within-the-world possesses the character of holding-itself-in, that is, of being largely invisible to us. [See H. 75-76] But a collapsed bridge is something unusual, a disruption. What is needed, then, is something that can serve the role of becoming conspicuous and so alerting the driver to the fact that something is out of place. [6]
Now one feature of warning signs to note is that they are not useful, not ready-to-hand, except in a very particular context. So when the manufacturer makes the warning sign, it is not immediately employed as the kind of thing it is until it is stationed on an appropriate road under appropriate conditions in a place where it is easily visible. But there are other signs that do immediately get established as ready-to-hand. This happens when one takes as a sign [Zum-Zeichen-nehmen]. In such a situation, what gets taken as a sign becomes accessible only through its readiness-to-hand. "If, for instance, thhe south wind 'is accepted' ["gilt"] by the farmer as a sign of rain, then this 'acceptance' ["Geltung"]--or the 'value' with which the entity is 'invested'--is not a sort of bonus over and above what is already present-at-hand in itself--viz, the flow of air in a definite geographical direction." (BT 111/80) The idea is that the south wind is not a thing in itself that becomes appropriated to the function of acting as a sign. "On the contrary, only by the circumspection with which one takes account of things in farming, is the south wind discovered in its Being." (BT 112/81) The south wind is encountered, as a sign, only within the context of the interests of farming.
Here, Heidegger addresses himself to a significant objection that may have been in your mind. "But, one will protest, that which gets taken as a sign must first have become accessible in itself and been apprehended before the sign gets established." (BT 112/81) But how would such entities be encountered in this before? As mere things? Or as equipment which has not been understood? This latter approach is to be preferred. "And here again, when the equipmental characters of the ready-to-hand are still circumspectively undiscovered, they are not to be Interpreted as bare Thinghood presented for an apprehension of what is just present-at-hand and no more." (BT 112/81) Heidegger says that a sign, in its conspicuousness and out-of-place-ness, does not merely 'document' the inconspicuousness constitutive for what is most closely ready-to-hand. Rather, the sign gets its conspicuousness from the inconspicuousness of the equipmental totality. Consider the case of a string tied around your finger, that is intended to remind you of something. Such a sign always points to something that is an object of one's concern and everyday circumspection. That larger context is presupposed and is what makes the string useful. But such a sign is very vague and can indicate many things and so is usually useful only for the person who ties and string, and even she may forget what the string was supposed to indicate or signify. However, "when the knot cannot be used as a sign, it does not lose its sign-character, but it acquires the disturbing obtrusiveness of something most closely ready-to-hand." (BT 110/81) What is important to see is that there is no point at which the sign or the thing signified are just entities in themselves, things present-at-hand, that acquire the status of sign and signified after the fact. Rather, what makes the sign a sign just is the fact that it is already embedded in a context of discourse and involvements.
Next Heidegger considers a particular case. He says that some may be tempted to try to see 'signs' in the fetishism and magic of primitive cultures, where inanimate objects are revered as being inhabited by or otherwise connecting one to spiritual beings and the spirit world. But interpreting these entities as signs will actually not enable us to grasp the kind of being-ready-to-hand that belongs to these objects. Rather, in primitive cultures, "the sign coincides with that which is indicated. Not only can the sign represent this in the sense of serving as a substitute for what it indicates, but it can do so in such a way that the sign itself always is what it indicates." (BT 113/82) Heidegger thinks that in primitive cultures the distinction between sign and signified has not yet been reached. However, he goes on to say, "But if an understanding of Being is constitutive for primitive Dasein and for the primitive world in general, then it is all the more urgent to work out the 'formal' idea of worldhood--or at least the idea of a phenomenon modifiable in such a way that all ontological assertions to the effect that in a given phenomenal context something not yet such-and-such or no longer such-and-such, may acquire a positive phenomenal meaning in terms of what it is not." (BT 113/82) [7]
The preceding points to a threefold relation between sign and reference. "1. Indicating, as a way whereby the "towards-which" of a serviceability can become concrete, is founded upon the equipment-structure as such, upon the "in-order-to" (assignment). 2. The indicating which the sign does is an equipmental character of something ready-to-hand, and as such it belongs to a totality of equipment, to a context of assignments or references. 3. The sign is not only ready-to-hand with other equipment, but in its readiness-to-hand the environment becomes in each case explicitly accessible for circumspection. A sign is something ontically ready-to-hand which functions both as this definite equipment and as something indicative of [was... anzeigt] the ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential totalities, and of worldhood." (BT 113-114/82) So, 1. When a sign indicates, it makes concrete a serviceability and a "towards-which". 2. The sign is, itself, a piece of equipment and belongs to a totality of equipment and a context of assignments and references. Within such a totality, all the items of equipment bear a relationship of reference to the "towards-which" or the "in-order-to". 3. The readiness-to-hand of a sign is such as to draw our attention, in circumspection, to the readiness-to-hand of the environment generally. A sign is a piece of equipment within a totality and context, at the ontical level; at the ontological level, it points to (indicates, refers to) the structure of readiness-to-hand of the referential totality and of worldhood.
Reference, then, is ontological more fundamental. Reference is not something that a sign does or one function that a sign performs. Rather, reference is that by which readiness-to-hand itself is constituted. A piece of equipment is ready-to-hand because it bears a relationship (of reference) to an end (a "towards-which" or "in-order-to"). We turn to the next section, then, with this question: "In what sense, then, is reference 'presupposed' ontologically in the ready-to-hand, and to what extent is it, as such an ontological foundation, at the same time constitutive for worldhood in general?" (BT 114/83)
--
FOOTNOTES:
[1] I shall attempt to make clear how both these uses of 'sign' are important.
[2] As I read through this entry again, I am reminded that purely 'formal' relations have a different character than those that are connected to a particular way of being. Such relations are not as useful for understanding the being of entities. Keep this in mind.
[3] "On the other hand," Heidegger writes, "the kind of reference we get in 'serviceability-for', is an ontologico-categorial attribute of equipment as equipment. That the "towards-which" of serviceability should acquire its concreteness in indicating, is an accident of its equipment constitution as such." (BT 109/78) When I wrote this entry, I wasn't sure what to make of this apparently contrary line. I will not take it up here but will simply refer the reader to the next entry where Heidegger's treatment of these references is dealt with in a way that I think is helpful and illuminating.
[4] "The sign is not authentically 'grasped'... ...the sign is not authentically encountered." (BT 110/79) I may wish to refer to this passage later as an instance of the use of 'authentically'.
[5] Recall Heidegger's treatment of what 'circumspection' involves. "Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to'. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves in circumspection." (BT 98/69)
[6] Recall discussion of 'conspicuousness' from Section 16.
[7] Just a point regarding the use of 'formal': So Heidegger does seem to be trying to work out a formal, abstract concept--one that is manifested constantly in our immediate world of involvements, but one that is also flexible enough that it is constantly being manifested in all worlds of contexts.
--
God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
Subdivision A. Analysis of Environmentality and Worldhood in General
Section 17. Reference and Signs
In section 15, Heidegger said that to the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment. Equipment is essentially 'something-in-order-to...' and in the structure of the 'in-order-to' there lies an assignment or reference. In this section, we want to look directly at the phenomenon of reference or assignment that has become visible. Our goal is still to lay bare the world-phenomenon. There is a possibility that assignments and referential totalities will become constitutive for worldhood itself. "Hitherto we have seen the world lit up only in and for certain defininte ways in which we concern ourselves environmentally with the ready-to-hand, and indeed it has been lit up only with the readiness-to-hand of that concern. So the further we proceed in understanding the Being of entities within-the-world, the broader and firmer becomes the phenomenal basis on which the world-phenomenon may be laid bare." (BT 107/76-77) This, then, is the direction that we want to follow up on in this section.
We shall still take the being of the ready-to-hand as our point of departure, but our goal now is to grasp the phenomenon of reference or assignment itself more precisely. Heidegger writes, "We shall accordingly attempt an ontological analysis of a kind of equipment in which one may come across such 'references' in more senses than one. We come across 'equipment' in signs. The word "sign" designates many kinds of things: not only may it stand for different kinds of signs, but Being-a-sign-for can itself be formalized as a universal kind of relation, so that the sign-structure itself provides an ontological clue for 'characterizing' any entity whatsoever." (BT 107-108/77) Here are at least two ways of using the word 'sign.' 'Sign' may designate a class of things that may be further differentiated into groups of different kinds of signs. But 'sign' and 'being-a-sign-for' can also describe a feature of any entity whatsoever--a universal kind of relation. [1]
We will begin by considering the first usage of 'sign,' to refer to one type or category of equipment whose specific character as equipment consists in showing or indicating. Examples of these include "signposts, boundary-stones, the ball for the mariner's storm-warning, signals, banners, signs of mourning, and the like." (BT 108/77) Heidegger says that indicating can be defined as a 'kind' of referring and that referring, taken in a strictly formal way, is a relating. But he also says that relation is not a genus or category of things that may be subdivided into particular species or kinds of references. "A relation is something quite formal which may be read off directly by way of 'formalization' from any kind of context, whatever its subject-matter or way of Being." (BT 108/77) [2]
So here are three terms, the relations of which need to be understood: "indication," "reference," and "relation." Every 'indication' is a reference and every reference is a relation, but it is not the case that every relation is a reference or that every reference is an 'indication'. Heidegger writes: "The formally general character of relation is thus brought to light. If we are to investigate such phenomena as reference, signs, or even significations, nothing is to be gained by characterizing them as relations. Indeed we shall eventually have to show that 'relations' themselves, because of their formally general character, have their ontological source in a reference." (BT 108/78) So while there is a tendency to think of 'references' as one kind of 'relation,' Heidegger will try to show that the latter is actually ontologically grounded in the former.
At the moment, we want to understand the sign "as distinct from the phenomenon of reference". (BT 108/77) So we also want to treat it not as a relation but as an indication. But here we face a challenge insofar as there are so many different kinds of signs and so many different ways of indicating something. This great variety may be organized along formal lines by appeal to their relational character, but Heidegger is not satisfied with this approach. He writes, "[W]e find it especially tempting nowadays to take such a 'relation' as a clue for subjecting every entity to a kind of 'Interpretation' which always 'fits' because at bottom it says nothing, no more than the facile schema of content and form. (108/78)
--
So, to guide our investigation, Heidegger chooses one particular sign to consider: the adjustable arrow by which a motor car driver may indicate the direction the vehicle will take. This sign is an item of equipment which is ready-to-hand for the driver and for other people as well. "This sign is ready-to-hand within-the-world in the whole equipment-context of vehicles and traffic regulations. It is equipment for indicating, and as equipment, it is constituted by reference or assignment. It has the character of the "in-order-to", its own definite serviceability; it is for indicating. This indicating which the sign performs can be taken as a kind of 'referring'. But here we must notice that this 'referring' as indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign as equipment." (BT 109/78)
Two questions: In what way can the adjustable arrow's indicating be understood as a kind of 'referring'? What is the ontological structure of this particular kind of sign as equipment? According to Heidegger, 'referring' as indicating is grounded in the being-structure of equipment, in serviceability for something or some purpose. An entity (for instance, a hammer) may be serviceable without thereby being a sign, so serviceability is more basic to the ontological constitution of equipment. "Indicating, as a 'reference', is a way in which the "towards-which" of a serviceability becomes ontically concrete; it determines an item of equipment as for this "towards-which"." (BT 109/78) So indicating, as 'reference,' is one way in which a piece of equipment may manifest (make concrete) its "towards-which."
The idea seems to be this: the purpose of the adjustable arrow is to 'indicate' the direction in which the vehicle to turn. At this ontical level of discourse, the arrow does not 'refer' to anything; it does not, for instance, point to some particular thing. However, there is a sense in which the arrow, by performing its function of indicating, draws our attention to or refers to an equipment totality or equipment context. So here is an example of an 'indication' that is a 'reference,' even though the 'reference' is not an 'indication. But even this 'reference' to an equipment-context does not fully capture the ontological structure of that sign. Rather, it is the sign's serviceability that is fundamental. [3]
"What do we mean when we say that a sign "indicates"? We can answer this only by determining what kind of dealing is appropriate with equipment for indicating. And we must do this in such a way that the readiness-to-hand of that equipment can be genuinely grasped." (BT 110/79) If we are to understand what is involved in 'indicating,' we can do so by considering what follows from an indication. In the case of the arrow, to responses that are appropriate include, 'giving way' and 'standing still'. "Giving way, as taking a direction, belongs essentially to Dasein's Being-in-the-world." (BT 110/79) According to Heidegger, Dasein is always directed in some way, even at those moments when it is physically standing still. What is important for understanding the sign, then, is an understanding of the appropriate responses. The sign is not authentically grasped or encountered--it is not understood as the kind of thing that it is--if we just stare at it or if we think that it is pointing at something and look in that direction. [4] An arrow that points to something else addresses itself to "the circumspection of our concernful dealings... . The circumspective survey does not grasp the ready-to-hand; what it achieves is rather an orientation within our environment. [5] So there are a number of ways of encountering the arrow. One may even encounter it as a piece of equipment belonging to the car without understanding its function. Even in this way, we do not encounter it as a mere thing. "The experiencing of a Thing requires a definiteness of its own..., and must be contrasted with coming across a manifold of equipment, which may often be quite indefinite, even when one comes across it as especially close." (BT 110/79) But it is still the case that encountering or experiencing the arrow as a Thing does not allow us to encounter that piece of equipment authentically.
"Signs of the kind we have described let what is ready-to-hand be encountered; more precisely, they let some context of it become accessible in such a way that our concernful dealings take on an orientation and hold it secure. A sign is not a Thing which stands to another Thing in the relationship of indicating; it is rather an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself." (BT 110/79-80) You may have noticed a recurring theme at this point. The relationship of being-a-sign-for that exists between two objects is not something that obtains after-the-fact between two otherwise independent entities. Rather, it is something that occurs within an already-established context of discourse, interactions, and uses. When a driver sees the arrow on another car pointing to the left or sees a warning sign alerting him to the presence of road-work ahead, these other things are not encountered as independent, isolated, or discrete entities. Rather, they are something already understood. That is why the sign can perform its function: because it is already understood. The driver is ready for what comes ahead, or, if he is not, he encounters it as something that he should have been ready for. "Signs always indicate primarily 'wherein' one lives, where one's concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something." (BT 111/80)
Consider the example of a warning sign that alerts a driver to dangerous conditions ahead or, suppose, to the collapse of a bridge ahead. How does one establish a sign that will serve the function of communicating to drivers what is ahead? "This activity is performed in a circumspective fore-sight [Vorsicht] out of which it arises, and which requires that it be possible for one's particular environment to announce itself for circumspection at any time by means of something ready-to-hand, and that this possibility should itself be ready-to-hand." (BT 111/80) One must be able to set up a piece of equipment, ready-to-hand, that will allow the environment (including the collapsed bridge) to announce itself to the driver's circumspection. The difficulty comes in that what is most closely ready-to-hand within-the-world possesses the character of holding-itself-in, that is, of being largely invisible to us. [See H. 75-76] But a collapsed bridge is something unusual, a disruption. What is needed, then, is something that can serve the role of becoming conspicuous and so alerting the driver to the fact that something is out of place. [6]
Now one feature of warning signs to note is that they are not useful, not ready-to-hand, except in a very particular context. So when the manufacturer makes the warning sign, it is not immediately employed as the kind of thing it is until it is stationed on an appropriate road under appropriate conditions in a place where it is easily visible. But there are other signs that do immediately get established as ready-to-hand. This happens when one takes as a sign [Zum-Zeichen-nehmen]. In such a situation, what gets taken as a sign becomes accessible only through its readiness-to-hand. "If, for instance, thhe south wind 'is accepted' ["gilt"] by the farmer as a sign of rain, then this 'acceptance' ["Geltung"]--or the 'value' with which the entity is 'invested'--is not a sort of bonus over and above what is already present-at-hand in itself--viz, the flow of air in a definite geographical direction." (BT 111/80) The idea is that the south wind is not a thing in itself that becomes appropriated to the function of acting as a sign. "On the contrary, only by the circumspection with which one takes account of things in farming, is the south wind discovered in its Being." (BT 112/81) The south wind is encountered, as a sign, only within the context of the interests of farming.
Here, Heidegger addresses himself to a significant objection that may have been in your mind. "But, one will protest, that which gets taken as a sign must first have become accessible in itself and been apprehended before the sign gets established." (BT 112/81) But how would such entities be encountered in this before? As mere things? Or as equipment which has not been understood? This latter approach is to be preferred. "And here again, when the equipmental characters of the ready-to-hand are still circumspectively undiscovered, they are not to be Interpreted as bare Thinghood presented for an apprehension of what is just present-at-hand and no more." (BT 112/81) Heidegger says that a sign, in its conspicuousness and out-of-place-ness, does not merely 'document' the inconspicuousness constitutive for what is most closely ready-to-hand. Rather, the sign gets its conspicuousness from the inconspicuousness of the equipmental totality. Consider the case of a string tied around your finger, that is intended to remind you of something. Such a sign always points to something that is an object of one's concern and everyday circumspection. That larger context is presupposed and is what makes the string useful. But such a sign is very vague and can indicate many things and so is usually useful only for the person who ties and string, and even she may forget what the string was supposed to indicate or signify. However, "when the knot cannot be used as a sign, it does not lose its sign-character, but it acquires the disturbing obtrusiveness of something most closely ready-to-hand." (BT 110/81) What is important to see is that there is no point at which the sign or the thing signified are just entities in themselves, things present-at-hand, that acquire the status of sign and signified after the fact. Rather, what makes the sign a sign just is the fact that it is already embedded in a context of discourse and involvements.
Next Heidegger considers a particular case. He says that some may be tempted to try to see 'signs' in the fetishism and magic of primitive cultures, where inanimate objects are revered as being inhabited by or otherwise connecting one to spiritual beings and the spirit world. But interpreting these entities as signs will actually not enable us to grasp the kind of being-ready-to-hand that belongs to these objects. Rather, in primitive cultures, "the sign coincides with that which is indicated. Not only can the sign represent this in the sense of serving as a substitute for what it indicates, but it can do so in such a way that the sign itself always is what it indicates." (BT 113/82) Heidegger thinks that in primitive cultures the distinction between sign and signified has not yet been reached. However, he goes on to say, "But if an understanding of Being is constitutive for primitive Dasein and for the primitive world in general, then it is all the more urgent to work out the 'formal' idea of worldhood--or at least the idea of a phenomenon modifiable in such a way that all ontological assertions to the effect that in a given phenomenal context something not yet such-and-such or no longer such-and-such, may acquire a positive phenomenal meaning in terms of what it is not." (BT 113/82) [7]
The preceding points to a threefold relation between sign and reference. "1. Indicating, as a way whereby the "towards-which" of a serviceability can become concrete, is founded upon the equipment-structure as such, upon the "in-order-to" (assignment). 2. The indicating which the sign does is an equipmental character of something ready-to-hand, and as such it belongs to a totality of equipment, to a context of assignments or references. 3. The sign is not only ready-to-hand with other equipment, but in its readiness-to-hand the environment becomes in each case explicitly accessible for circumspection. A sign is something ontically ready-to-hand which functions both as this definite equipment and as something indicative of [was... anzeigt] the ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential totalities, and of worldhood." (BT 113-114/82) So, 1. When a sign indicates, it makes concrete a serviceability and a "towards-which". 2. The sign is, itself, a piece of equipment and belongs to a totality of equipment and a context of assignments and references. Within such a totality, all the items of equipment bear a relationship of reference to the "towards-which" or the "in-order-to". 3. The readiness-to-hand of a sign is such as to draw our attention, in circumspection, to the readiness-to-hand of the environment generally. A sign is a piece of equipment within a totality and context, at the ontical level; at the ontological level, it points to (indicates, refers to) the structure of readiness-to-hand of the referential totality and of worldhood.
Reference, then, is ontological more fundamental. Reference is not something that a sign does or one function that a sign performs. Rather, reference is that by which readiness-to-hand itself is constituted. A piece of equipment is ready-to-hand because it bears a relationship (of reference) to an end (a "towards-which" or "in-order-to"). We turn to the next section, then, with this question: "In what sense, then, is reference 'presupposed' ontologically in the ready-to-hand, and to what extent is it, as such an ontological foundation, at the same time constitutive for worldhood in general?" (BT 114/83)
--
FOOTNOTES:
[1] I shall attempt to make clear how both these uses of 'sign' are important.
[2] As I read through this entry again, I am reminded that purely 'formal' relations have a different character than those that are connected to a particular way of being. Such relations are not as useful for understanding the being of entities. Keep this in mind.
[3] "On the other hand," Heidegger writes, "the kind of reference we get in 'serviceability-for', is an ontologico-categorial attribute of equipment as equipment. That the "towards-which" of serviceability should acquire its concreteness in indicating, is an accident of its equipment constitution as such." (BT 109/78) When I wrote this entry, I wasn't sure what to make of this apparently contrary line. I will not take it up here but will simply refer the reader to the next entry where Heidegger's treatment of these references is dealt with in a way that I think is helpful and illuminating.
[4] "The sign is not authentically 'grasped'... ...the sign is not authentically encountered." (BT 110/79) I may wish to refer to this passage later as an instance of the use of 'authentically'.
[5] Recall Heidegger's treatment of what 'circumspection' involves. "Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to'. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves in circumspection." (BT 98/69)
[6] Recall discussion of 'conspicuousness' from Section 16.
[7] Just a point regarding the use of 'formal': So Heidegger does seem to be trying to work out a formal, abstract concept--one that is manifested constantly in our immediate world of involvements, but one that is also flexible enough that it is constantly being manifested in all worlds of contexts.
--
God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.
posted by Metaphysician_delta | 4:07 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home