Graduate 155: BT 22: Sec. 16

Part I, Division 1, Chapter 3. The Worldhood of the World
Subdivision A. Analysis of Environmentality and Worldhood in General
Section 16. How the Worldly Character of the Environment Announces itself in Entities Within-the-world

In this entry, Heidegger wants to look at Dasein's pre-philosophical, pre-phenomenological, pre-ontological understanding of the world. The world is not itself an entity within-the-world; and yet it is determinative for entities within the world. Only because there is a world can entities show themselves within the world as discovered and discoverable; but what is the character of that world, itself? Since Dasein is ontically constituted by being-in-the-world and has an understanding of the being of its self as an essential part of its being then Dasein must have an understanding of the world, even if that understanding is indefinite. This understanding is pre-ontological and can and does get along without explicit ontological insights. When we encounter entities within-the-world, the world shows itself for concernful being-in-the-world and this furnishes a pre-phenomenological glimpse of it. "Has Dasein itself, in the range of its concernful absoption in equipment ready-to-hand, a possibility of Being in which the worldhood of those entities within-the-world with which it is concerned is, in a certain way, lit up for it, along with those entities themselves?" (BT 102/73) In other words, is there a possible way of being for Dasein that will allow us to not only see the involved entities within-the-world but also the worldhood of those entities? [Keep in mind that our goal has been to understand worldhood as a constitutive component or structure of Dasein's being-in-the-world.] If we can find such a possibility of being for Dasein that can be exhibited within its concernful dealings, then we may be able to examine and interrogate that way of being for insight into worldhood itself.

Here I shall quote a long passage and then try to interpret it: "To the everydayness of Being-in-the-world there belong certain modes of concern. These permit the entities with which we concern ourselves to be encountered in such a way that the worldly character of what is within-the-world comes to the fore. When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are most closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not properly adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be damaged, or the material unsuitable. In each of these cases equipment is here, ready-to-hand. We discover its unusability, however, not by looking at it and establishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it. When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous. This conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-hand. But this implies that what cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as an equipmental Thing which looks so and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been present-at-hand too. Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself--that is to say, of the sort of thing we find when we put it back into repair. This presence-at-hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of all readiness-to-hand whatsoever; equipment which is present-at-hand in this way is still not just a Thing which occurs somewhere. The damage to the equipment is still not a mere alteration of a Thing--not a change of properties which just occurs in something present-at-hand." (BT 102-103/73)

So what's going on in this passage. Keep in mind that we are trying to confront worldhood itself and interrogate it and we need a way to access that. Now Heidegger says that there are different modes of concern that belong to the everydayness of being-in-the-world. These different modes allow us to encounter entities in such a way as to reveal their worldly character--which is what we want. He begins now with a particular case--when we encounter some piece of equipment in the mode of unusability. [I think that usability and unusability are supposed to be modes, though I could be mistaken. Also, I take it that he thinks that this particular mode is illuminating and not necessarily that every mode will disclose the worldly character of entities--at least not in the same way.] In such situations, the equipment is still ready-to-hand. The fact that it is not unusable does not mean that it is not ready-to-hand. Rather, usability and unusability are different modes of readiness-to-hand. This idea is further confirmed when we remember that we do not recognize an object as unusable just by looking at it but rather in contexts where we are involved and working with tools--where we are engaged and see with the sight of circumspection. When we encounter equipment as unusable, that equipment becomes conspicuous and is possessed of a certain un-readiness-to-hand. But, again, the equipment is not essentially encountered merely as present-at-hand in these cases. There is a way in which that equipment is encountered as purely present-at-hand, but the equipment immediately becomes ready-to-hand as soon as we approach as something to be repaired or dealt with in some concernful way. So even when we approach an unusable object as present-at-hand, that object is not devoid of readiness-to-hand. Such an object is not a merely occurring thing with shifting properties.

Heidegger continues by pointing out that in our concernful dealings, we not only encounter things that are ready-to-hand-and-unusable. We also find things which are missing--which are not 'to hand' at all. This is also a way of encountering something un-ready-to-hand. [1] Heidegger says that when we notice what is un-ready-to-hand, that object that is ready-to-hand enters the mode of obtrusiveness. It is interesting that Heidegger would describe something that is missing as 'obtrusive'. [See footnote 1, below] But he goes on to explain that the more desperately and urgently we need something that is missing or unavailable to us, the more obtrusive it becomes. [2] Again, we must keep in mind that the un-ready-to-hand and the ready-to-hand are not necessarily opposed. A piece of equipment can be encountered as un-ready-to-hand just because it already is and continues to be ready-to-hand. Also, obtrusiveness is a mode of readiness-to-hand. However, Heidegger does also say that an items obtrusiveness can become so great that it seems to lose its character of readiness-to-hand. So for instance, if I cannot find my car keys then I encounter them in the mode of obtrusiveness. And the more urgent my need to leave and the longer that I cannot find my keys, this not only affects my perception of my keys but also of my car. My car becomes manifest to me as a worthless hunk of metal as long as I am unable to find my keys; it is completely useless to me and just 'there' without the keys. "It reveals itself as something just present-at-hand and no more, which cannot be budged without the thing that is missing. The helpless way in which we stand before it is a deficient mode of concern, and as such it uncovers the Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more of something ready-to-hand." (BT 103/73) [3]

There is yet a third mode in which something may be encountered as un-ready-to-hand, even though it is not missing and not unusable. An object may be un-ready-to-hand because it 'stands in the way' of our concern. When we have some goal and something else is standing in the way--something for which we don't have time or that is otherwise a hindrance to our reaching our desired goal--that thing is un-ready-to-hand. "Anything which is un-ready-to-hand in this way is disturbing to us, and enables us to see the obstinacy of that with which we must concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else." (BT 103/74)

"The modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy all have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of presence-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand." (BT 104/74) But when encountered in this way, these objects are not encountered as just present-at-hand, but the presence-at-hand is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment. Even when our only relationship to a piece of equipment is a desire to be rid of it ("to shove out of the way"), the ready-to-hand still shows itself as ready-to-hand in its unswerving presence-at-hand.

"Now that we have suggested, however, that the ready-to-hand is thus encountered under modifications in which its presence-at-hand is revealed, how far does this clarify the phenomenon of the world?" (BT 104/74) Again, the whole point of this detour has been to try to grasp that thing. Our treatment up to this point has still been with those entities within-the-world. But Heidegger says that we are now in a position where we can bring worldhood into view. The idea is that conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy cause the ready-to-hand to lose its readiness-to-hand in a certain way. But the readiness-to-hand does not simply vanish or disappear, "but takes its farewell as it were, in the conspicuousness of the unusable." (BT 104/74) Readiness-to-hand, thus, still shows itself and this is where and also the way in which the worldly character of the ready-to-hand shows itself.

Here's how it works. "The structure of the Being of what is ready-to-hand as equipment is determined by references or assignments. In a peculiar and obvious manner, the 'Things' which are closest to us are 'in themselves' ["An-sich"]; and they are encountered as 'in themselves' in the concern which makes use of them without noticing them explicitly--the concern which can come up against something unusable. When equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive assignment of the "in-order-to" to a "towards-this" has been disturbed. The assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather 'there' when we concernfully submit ourselves to them [Sichstellen unter sie]. But when an assignment has been disturbed--when something is unusable for some purpose--then the assignment becomes explicit. Even now, of course, it has not become explicit as an ontological structure; but it has become explicit ontically for the circumspection which comes up against the damaging of the tool. When an assignment to some particular "towards-this" has been thus circumspectively aroused, we catch sight of the "towards-this" itself, and along with it everything connected with the work--the whole 'work-shop'--as that wherein concern always dwells. The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself." (BT 105/74-75)

In the next section, Heidegger will deal more directly with the character of references and signs, but for now it is enough to know they are what determine the structure of being of the ready-to-hand. These things, which are closest to us, are encountered 'in themselves' in the kind of concern for which they are usually invisible but sometimes appear as unusable. Concern is what allows equipment ready-to-hand to appear in any of its various modes. Unusability alerts one to a disturbance in the assignment of the "in-order-to" to the "towards-this". We do not perceive assignments directly but manifest our familiarity with them by our activities; and we become aware of those assignments when they are disturbed by encountering unusability. In such situations, the assignment becomes explicit ontically but not ontologically. We become manifestly aware of the "towards-this" that we had been aiming at. We become aware of the context and environment that we have been inhabiting all along. [4] In this way, the world announces itself.

Similarly, when something ready-to-hand is found missing, that causes a break in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. "Our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with, and what it was ready-to-hand for. The environment announces itself afresh." (BT 105/75) And this is what we've been looking for--for the environment to be lit up for our interrogation. The environment is, itself, ready-to-hand and constantly 'there' before we even consider or observe it. "It is itself inaccessible to circumspection, so far as circumspection is always directed towards entities; but in each case it has already been disclosed for circumspection." (BT 105/75) [Again, Heidegger is laying out the conditions for the possibility of encountering entities in the way we do. Circumspection does not perceive the environment, but without the environment, circumspection would perceive nothing at all.] Here follows an important vocabulary point: "'Disclose' and 'disclosedness' will be used as technical terms in the passages that follow, and shall signify 'to lay open' and 'the character of having been laid open.' Thus 'to disclose' never means anything like 'to obtain indirectly by inference'." (BT 105/75, boldface mine) [5]

Heidegger writes, "That the world does not 'consist' of the ready-to-hand shows itself in the fact (among others) that whenever the world is lit up in the modes of concern which we have been Interpreting, the ready-to-hand becomes deprived of its worldhood so that Being-just-present-at-hand comes to the fore." (BT 106/75) [6] If the world were constituted by the ready-to-hand, then when equipment is deprived of its readiness-to-hand, we would expect some kind of loss of world. But clearly the world is still there and is presupposed in our ability to encounter equipment either as fully ready-to-hand or as being-just-present-at-hand.

The remainder of this paragraph is a bit unclear to me so I shall copy it here: "If, in our everyday concern with the 'environment', it is to be possible for equipment ready-to-hand to be encountered in its 'Being-in-itself' [in seinem "An-sich-sein"], then those assignments and referential totalities in which our circumspection 'is absorbed' cannot become a theme for that circumspection any more than they can for grasping things 'thematically' but non-circumspectively. If it is to be possible for the ready-to-hand not to emerge from its inconspicuousness, the world must not announce itself. And it is in this that the Being-in-itself of entities which are ready-to-hand has its phenomenal structure constituted." (BT 106/75) [7]

Heidegger goes on to clarify what is meant by "being-in-itself." When entities in the world are not conspicuous, obtrusive, or obstinate--that is, when they have the character of "inconspicuousness", "unobtrusiveness", and "non-obstinacy", then they have the positive phenomenal character of the being of that which is proximally ready-to-hand. Clearly "in-conspicuousness" does not capture some negation or lack, given how we have characterized "conspicuousness" above. "With these negative prefixes we have in view the character of the ready-to-hand as "holding itself in"; this is what we have our eye upon in the "Being-in-itself" of something, though 'proximally' we ascribe it to the present-at-hand--to the present-at-hand as that which can be thematically ascertained." (BT 106/75) Here is another point at which we must be very careful with our vocabulary. When we commonly speak of what something is "in itself" we generally mean to refer to that thing as it is completely independently of any involvements or relationships to people. But when Heidegger speaks of an entity "in-itself" he means to refer to it just in the context of its involvements.

Heidegger says that if we orient ourselves primarily from the present-at-hand, then we cannot clarify ontologically the 'in-itself'. The point is that to really understand what some piece of equipment is "in-itself", we should not attempt to divorce it from its context of involvements and uses. "As the foregoing analysis has already made clear, only on the basis of the phenomenon of the world can the Being-in-itself of entities within-the-world be grasped ontologically.

With these distinctions in mind, we can now return to that paragraph that was so puzzling. The idea is this: if our goal is to understand equipment "in-itself"--if we hope to encounter it in this particular way--then we should remember that the assignments and referential totalities cannot (or should not) be treated as objects of scientific or theoretical scrutiny. If we take that approach, we will lose sight completely of the very thing that we are hoping to catch sight of. In order for the ready-to-hand to remain inconspicuous--that is, to remain thoroughly embedded in its context of involvements, the world must not announce itself. It is in this state of embeddedness that the essence (i.e. the being-in-itself, insofar as one may speak of essences) of the ready-to-hand has its phenomenal structure constituted.

Our goal is to be able to take a good look at the world--to have it disclosed. But the preceding has shown that the world is constantly disclosed (in one sense) whenever what is ready-to-hand within-the-world is accessed by circumspective concern. To come away from that is to lose sight of that world and catch sight of it again is to come back into that world.

"Being-in-the-world, according to our Interpretation hitherto, amounts to a non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment. Any concern is already as it is, because of some familiarity with the world." (BT 107/76) This familiarity also manifests itself in various modes and that will be treated in sections to come. But for now we want to continue on the line of inquiry that we have initiated: "Why can the worldly character of what is within-the-world be lit up? The presence-at-hand of entities is thrust to the fore by the possible breaks in that referential totality in which circumspection 'operates'; how are we to get a closer understanding of this totality?" Our goal is still to get a solid glimpse of worldhood. ("These questions are aimed at working out both the phenomenon and the problems of worldhood..." (BT 107/76)) We have made some progress toward that by seeing how worldhood can be disrupted through breaks in the referential totality that we encounter in circumspection. In order to understand these breaks more deeply, we now turn explicitly to what is involved in these structures of reference and signs.

--

FOOTNOTES:

[1] This point will probably be addressed explicitly at some point, but it should be clear 'encountering' an object does not necessarily involve being brought into close spatio-temporal proximity to it. If I have a craving for a hamburger, I 'encounter' that object, even if I'm not able to actually meet that craving and get that hamburger. Even if the nearest available hamburger is 500 miles away, there is still an important way in which I 'encounter' and become involved with 'hamburger' by virtue of my craving and disposition. So the idea of 'encountering' something as missing is not contradictory. And Heidegger might actually wish to capitalize on this peculiar way that we have of speaking about 'finding' that I've 'lost' something.

[2] Heidegger writes, "...the more authentically it is encountered in its un-readiness-to-hand, all the more obtrusive [um so aufdringlicher] does that which is ready-to-hand become..." (BT 103/73)

[3] Again, we saw earlier in this section that an entity ready-to-hand may be encountered as present-at-hand.

[4] Something like this picture may be what's intended. When I'm working on a project, I am completely absorbed in that project. It may be, in extreme cases, that I lose the proverbial forest for the trees and become singularly focused on what I am doing. But when a piece of equipment breaks, suddenly I am forced to step back from what I am doing and take in a larger field. I may become suddenly aware of my environment in a way that I was not before. It may be that I also become aware of the workshop insofar as I start looking around for a way to repair my tool or replace my tool. It is not clear to me whether Heidegger has this particular idea in mind yet.

[5] "To say that something has been 'disclosed' or 'laid open' in Heidegger's sense, does not mean that one has any detailed awareness of the contents which are thus 'disclosed', but rather that they have been 'laid open' to us as implicit in what is given, so that they may be made explicit to our awareness by further analysis or discrimination of the given, rather than by any inference from it." (BT 105-106, footnote 1)

[6] This seems to be a line he hasn't used before--"the ready-to-hand becomes deprived of its worldhood"?

[7] Review Graduate 136 on what is involved in the idea of "announcing."

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.

Graduate 154: BT 21: Sec. 15

Part I, Division 1, Chapter 3. The Worldhood of the World
Subdivision A. Analysis of Environmentality and Worldhood in General
Section 15. The Being of the Entities Encountered in the Environment

Our interpretation of the being of Dasein (which we are conducting with the hope of ultimately coming to some insight about the character of being in general) begins by looking at being-in-the-world, one of the ways in which Dasein's being is expressed. Being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomena but also possesses a complex structure. We are looking at the first aspect of that structure, worldhood, and disclosing that by looking at the still-more-particular case of Dasein's environment. This analysis of Dasein's environment involves not only looking at Dasein but also at the being of the entities that it encounters proximally and in a concernful way. Heidegger said, toward the end of the last section, 'We shall seek the worldhood of the environment (environmentality) by going through an ontological Interpretation of those entities within-the-environment which we encounter as closest to us." (BT 94/66) Now in this section, we turn to do just that.

"The Being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be exhibited phenomenologically if we take as our clue our everyday Being-in-the-world, which we also call our "dealings" in the world and with entities within-the-world." (BT 95/66) [1] Such "dealings" or "going-arounds" do not have the character of bare perceptual cognition (the basic 'awareness' of things in the world) but rather the character of concern which leads to manipulation and use. [2] Our investigation, here, begins by considering the being of those entities that we encounter in this way. But before moving into that, Heidegger stops to make a comment about methodology.

"In the disclosure and explication of Being, entities are in every case our preliminary and our accompanying theme [das Vor-und Mitthematische]; but our real theme is Being." (BT 95/67) Our goal, in focusing on the entities that are encountered proximally and concernfully in Dasein's environment, is not to grasp those entities as such or to understand the world by understanding those entities. Rather, our goal is to use those entities in order to look towards being. "This phenomenological interpretation is accordingly not a way of knowing those characteristics of entities which themselves are [seiender Beschaffenheiten des Seienden]; it is rather a determination of the structure of the Being which entities possess." (BT 95-96/67) Since it is being that is being disclosed, it yields a greater understanding of the being which belongs to Dasein and which 'comes alive' in its dealing with those entities. Now this is not a stance toward entities that we need to try and put ourselves into. Rather, it is the way in which everyday Dasein always is: "when I open the door, for instance, I use the latch." (BT 96/67) Often, when we try to analyze such familiar actions, what we end up doing is leaving the stance of the familiar and actually obscuring what is most familiar about the door and the latch that allows us to interact with it so effortlessly. "The achieving of phenomenological access to the entities which we encounter, consists rather in thrusting aside our interpretative tendencies, which keep thrusting themselves upon us and running along with us, and which conceal not only the phenomenon of such 'concern', but even more those entities themselves as encountered of their own accord in our concern with them." (BT 96/67) [3]

These tendencies toward interpretation that actually hinder our investigation can be seen more clearly when we try to figure out which entities we should take as our object of study. One proposal would be to say that we are trying to study "things." But there's a problem with that answer. It actually presupposes the ontological character of those entities. When we approach an entity merely as a "thing" we approach it with certain eyes and with a view to examining it under certain aspects. "When analysis starts with such entities and goes on to inquire about Being, what it meets is Thinghood and Reality. Ontological explication discovers, as it proceeds, such characteristics of Being as substantiality, materierality, extendedness, side-by-side-ness, and so forth. But even pre-ontologically, in such Being as this, the entities which we encounter in concern are proximally hidden." (BT 96/68) In other words, if we try to understand what it is in virtue of which we are able to interact with objects concernfully by investigating objects just in terms of their basic thinghood, we will never be able to reach our goal. Even if we have the idea that the most familiar way in which we encounter objects is as things, such an approach sets the ontological investigation on the wrong track. Moreover, it will not do to characterize the objects of our investigation as things 'invested with value'. This just introduces more features and characteristics that are left obscure. In addition, we have already indicated that the being of entities that are encountered concernfully is not additive. [4]

Heidegger takes a different route, drawing upon the Greek word for 'things': PRAGMATA--"that is to say, that which one has to do with in one's concernful dealings (PRAXIS)." (BT 96-97/68) Interestingly, Heidegger says that the Greeks did not grasp the 'pragmatic' character of this notion of 'things' but thought of PRAGMATA as 'mere things'. He says, "We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern "equipment". In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement. The kind of Being which equipment possesses must be exhibited. The clue for doing this lies in our first defining what makes an item of equipment--namely, its equipmentality." (BT 97/68)

Heidegger continues with an interesting line: "Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to...' ["etwas um-zu..."]. A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to', such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability." (BT 97/68) What does Heidegger mean when he says, "Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment." Does he actually mean to deny that we can ever meaningfully speak of a hammer or an allen wrench? No, that is not what he is saying. In order to grasp what he's getting at, you have to take seriously the quotation marks around 'is'. There 'is' no such thing as an equipment. Now when Heidegger encloses 'is' in quotation marks or when he speaks of something 'existing,' he does not have in mind 'mere existence.' (We've discussed this in previous entries.) So he is not denying that tools or equipment exist within the space-time continuum as individual and discrete objects. Rather, what he is denying is that any individual thing can be a piece of equipment just in virtue of the properties it possesses in itself. Something is a piece of equipment in virtue of its relationship to other entities and to certain goals ("in-order-to"). What makes a hammer a tool? Is it the fact that it has a certain shape or weight or material composition. Those factors may be part of it, but what is more essential to a particular thing being a hammer is, for instance, the existence of nails. If nails did not exist then hammers would not be hammers because what makes something a hammer is its relationship to nails and to the craft of carpentry.

One important point for Heidegger is that the "totality of equipment" is prior to the particular items that exist within it. He writes, "In the 'in-order-to' as a structure there lies an assignment or reference of something to something." (BT 97/68) What is involved in the idea of an assignment will be treated more in section 17. For now, Heidegger gestures at the idea in this way: "Equipment--in accordance with its equipmentality--always is in terms of [aus] its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These 'Things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room." (BT 97-98/68) When we see a pen as a pen, we always see it in terms of its relationship to other things, like papers, and notebooks. We don't encounter it primarily as an object possessing a certain set of dimensions and weight and physical properties. Nor do we perceive it as occupying a space three feet off the ground, two feet from the right hand wall, and seven feet from the far wall; we just perceive it as being on the desk. "Out of this the 'arrangement' emerges, and it is in this that any 'individual' item of equipment shows itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered." (BT 98/68-69) Without the arrangement, the pen would not emerge as a pen. The totality of equipment is already in the background. The context is there that allows me to see objects for what they are.

"Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure (hammering with a hammer, for example); but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using." (BT 98/69) [5] In the course of actual involvement and the pursuit of the "in-order-to," which Heidegger describes as constitutive for the equipment being employed, one approaches a hammer less and less as a 'thing' and, to a greater extent, just makes use of it. In the course of that use, we encounter it as it is--as equipment. "The hammering itself uncovers the specific 'manipulability' ["Handlichkeit"] of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses--in which it manifests itself in its own right--we call "readiness-to-hand" [Zuhandenheit]. Only because equipment has this 'Being-in-itself' and does not merely occur, is it manipulable in the broadest sense and at our disposal." (BT 98/69) So "readiness-to-hand" is the kind of being that belongs to equipment, and it is that being in virtue of which such an object is manipulable. No amount of just looking at a thing or of approaching it 'theoretically' will reveal that it is equipment or manipulable or is ready-to-hand. That is not to say that our use of it is blind; rather there is a kind of sight that guides our manipulation and gives the object its thingly character. "Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to'. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves in circumspection." (BT 98/69) In other words, the sight that our dealings with equipment have, that is subordinated and sensitive to the 'in-order-to,' is called circumspection.

Heidegger turns to consider the conventional distinction between the theoretical and the practical (commonly, the 'atheoretical'). He emphasizes that when we are involved in using some piece of equipment (practical), we are not sightless. For both theoretical and practical endeavors are kinds of concern. Both are a kind of concern and both have a kind of sight. Heidegger says that theoretical behaviour involves just looking--and so does not involve circumspection, in the technical sense of that word. But even though it does not involve circumspection, it still has a method.

Heidegger says that the ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all. More interestingly, "The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw [zuruckzuziehen] in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically." (BT 99/69) [6] The idea, here, is that when we are most involved in using tools is when we are least aware of the tools themselves and most focused on the work that is being done. In these cases, even the work--that which is to be produced--is ready-to-hand. "The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered." (BT 99/70) See above for what Heidegger says about the 'totality of equipment'. Heidegger expands on this point: "The work to be produced, as the "towards-which" of such things as the hammer, the plane, and the needle, likewise has the kind of Being that belongs to equipment." (BT 99/70) That being is readiness-to-hand. These items, be they shoes or clocks, have a usability that is essential to them. "[I]n this usability it lets us encounter already the "towards-which" for which it is usable. A work that someone has ordered [das bestellte Werk] is only by reason of its use and the assignment-context of entities which is discovered in using it." (BT 99/70) The idea seems to be that we are generally folded into these layers and layers of involvements and purposes. A cobbler uses a hammer to make a shoe but the shoe also has an already-established purpose and is attached to a context and totality of equipment in its own right.

These layers of use run in both directions. The cobbler uses the hammer to produce the shoe that will serve some further purpose. The shoe is usable for something. But the production of the shoe also involves certain uses. Not only of the hammer itself but of the elements that went into making the hammer and the other tools that the cobbler uses. This can be especially clearly seen when we consider the raw materials that compose our tools. "So in the environment certain entities become accessible which are always ready-to-hand, but which, in themselves, do not need to be produced. Hammer, tongs, and needle, refer in themselves to steel, iron, metal, mineral, wood, in that they consist of these. In equipment that is used, 'Nature' is discovered along with it by that use--the 'Nature' we find in natural products." (BT 100/70) [7] Heidegger refers to these raw materials at always ready-to-hand but not needing to be produced. He says that it is in this context of concerns and aims that nature is first encountered. Recall that we looked at nature in previous entries and Heidegger dismissed it as an unacceptable starting point for understanding the being of those entities closest to Dasein. But he has not forgotten nature and believes that it comes to be understood first in relation to Dasein's interests.

When we encounter nature in this way, Heidegger says, we do not encounter it as present-at-hand. Rather the forest is encountered as a source of timber or the mountain is encountered as a quarry of rock. Even when it comes to seeing nature as something beautiful and to be appreciated, Heidegger says, the kind of being that makes that possible is readiness-to-hand. If we disregard the being of nature as ready-to-hand, "the Nature which 'stirs and strives', which assails us and enthralls us as landscape, remains hidden. The botanist's plants are not the flowers of the hedgerow; the 'source' which the geographer establishes for a river is not the 'springhead of the dale'." (BT 100/70) [8]

Heidegger continues: "The work produced refers not only to the "towards-which" of its usability and the "whereof" of which it consists: under simple craft conditions it also has an assignment to the person who is to use it or wear it." (BT 100/70) He is continuing to highlight all of the circumstances and conditions that make possible the production of work. Where work is concerned or some "towards-which," we do not only find ourselves brought into contact with the ready-to-hand but also with entities having Dasein's kind of being--"entities for which, in their concern, the product becomes ready-to-hand; and together with these we encounter the world in which wearers and users live, which is at the same time ours." (BT 100/71) At it's widest scope, it seems, this world that is encountered is the public world or environing nature. "Any work with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand not only in the domestic world of the workshop but also in the public world. Along with the public world, the environing Nature [die Umweltnatur] is discovered and is accessible to everyone. In roads, streets, bridges, buildings, our concern discovers Nature as having some definite direction." (BT 100/71) The idea is that we demonstrate our familiarity with nature and with the course of nature in the ways that we construct buildings, etc. in response to nature. When we use a clock which is clearly ready-to-hand, the environing nature (e.g. the sun's position) is ready-to-hand along with it. "Our concernful absorption in whatever work-world lies closest to us, has a function of discovering; and it is essential to this function that, depending upon the way in which we are absorbed, those entities within-the-world which are brought along [beigebrachte] in the work and with it (that is to say, in the assignments or references which are constitutive for it) remain discoverable in varying degrees of explicitness and with a varying circumspective penetration." (BT 101/71)

As he begins to wrap up this section, Heidegger reminds us that readiness-to-hand is not a mere 'aspect' of entities that are, in the first place, present-at-hand. If that were the case then we would need to encounter entities first as purely present-at-hand and then come to grasp the 'world' and the meaningfulness of its contents. "But this already runs counter to the ontological meaning of cognition, which we have exhibited as a founded mode of Being-in-the-world. To lay bare what is just present-at-hand and no more, cognition must first penetrate beyond what is ready-to-hand in our concern." (BT 101/71) We must be wary of making this mistake.

Here is an interesting remark: "Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially. Yet only by reason of something present-at-hand, 'is there' anything ready-to-hand. Does it follow, however, granting this thesis for the nonce, that readiness-to-hand is ontologically founded upon presence-at-hand?" (BT 101/72) This is an extremely interesting question that Heidegger does not address right here. Instead, he follows it up with another equally difficult question. [9]

We have already said that in our investigation of entities within-the-world, we are presupposing the world. We have also indicated that the 'world' is more than the sum of all the entities that make it up, so that we cannot grasp the 'world' by just adding up what we know about its parts. This raises the question, "But even if, as our ontological Interpretation proceeds further, readiness-to-hand should prove itself to be the kind of Being characteristic of those entities which are proximally discovered within-the-world, and even if its primordiality as compared with pure presence-at-hand can be demonstrated, have all these explications been of the slightest help towards understanding the phenomenon of the world ontologically? ... If, then, we start with the Being of these entities, is there any avenue that will lead us to exhibiting the phenomenon of the world?" (BT 101-102/72)

We shall try to make some headway toward answering both these questions in the next section.

--

FOOTNOTES:

[1] "Dealings" ('Umgang') literally means 'going around' or 'going about,' somewhat as when speaking of 'going about his business.' 'Intercourse' and 'trafficking' are other possible translations.

[2] "The kind of dealing which is closest to us is as we have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind of 'knowledge'." (BT 95/67, italics mine) I don't recall off-hand whether this claim about knowledge is made earlier in Being and Time. At any rate, it is a claim worth noting. Now J.P. Moreland, I believe, has suggested that knowledge-how depends upon knowledge-that, and Heidegger seems to be saying the opposite. Are these claims really opposed or is Heidegger getting at something strictly other than knowledge-how.

[3] In the paragraph that I have been discussing, there have been a couple references to "producing." I didn't focus on this idea much until I saw that it was recurring. I'm not sure what it's import is but figured I should document these couple of quotations. "In the domain of the present analysis, the entities we shall take as our preliminary theme are those which show themselves in our concern with the environment. Such entities are not thereby objects for knowing the 'world' theoretically; they are simply what gets used, what gets produced, and so forth." (BT 95/67) "Those entities which serve phenomenologically as our preliminary theme--in this case, those which are used or which are to be found in the course of production--become accessible when we put ourselves into the position of concerning ourselves with them in some such way." (BT 96/67)

[4] I'm pretty sure that we've already said this. At least I'm pretty sure that the basic idea has been put forward before in these entries.

[5] "Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure". This raises a question as to whether there are objective constraints on what can count as a tool and what makes a particular tool what it is. This line suggests that there is a measure of suitability to a hammer that is distinct from human evaluation.

[6] Note again, the use of 'authentically'.

[7] We just hit page 100 in the Macquarrie and Robinson edition of Being and Time. We're one-fifth of the way through. Only 388 pages to go.

[8] I am beginning to wonder about the distinction between the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand and the distinction between the theoretical and the concernful approach to entities in the world. The way Heidegger speaks in this passage suggests that science involves encountering entities in a way opposed to the kind of involvement characteristic of the ready-to-hand. But does that mean that there is no involvement involved at all? Clearly not, for elsewhere he speaks of such mere looking as a deficient (but not a negative) mode of involvement (I think). So is it really the case that considering the perspective of the scientist must hide our actual involvement with things since, in fact, it is a way of being involved? It seems to me that Heidegger's account should lead to the conclusion that though this scientistic approach has led people astray in the past, it need not. So his approach is not necessarily superior, but it has definite advantages given the course of history up to this point. Think about this.

[9] Because of Heidegger's style of writing, it is not clear to me whether he is stating a sincere question or presenting what he takes to be a misconceived question. Given all that he has said about the priority of the ready-to-hand, it seems odd that he would concede that there is some priority to the present-at-hand, and he only seems to want to concede this point for the nonce. We shall see where he goes with this.

--

God is in this place,
And that reality, seen and understood by the grace of God in Christ Jesus through the work of the Holy Spirit, makes all the difference in the world.